Annie Maye Williams Tolbert and Henry TOLBERT, PlaintiffsAppellees,
v.
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., DefendantsAppellants.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
*739 Samuel Harold Craven, Alexandria, for Annie Maye Williams Tolbert, et al.
James A. Bolen, Jr., Alexandria, for Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., et аl.
Before THIBODEAUX, COOKS and WOODARD, JJ.
THIBODEAUX, Judge.
The defendants, Michael Foreman; his employer, Replacement Parts, Inc., d/b/a Rapides Auto Supply; and, their liability insurer, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, appeal a judgment which granted a partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, Rosa Holmes and Annie Maye Tolbert, on the issue of liability arising from an automobile accident. The defendants claim the trial court erred in finding no issue of material fact concerning the negligence of Mr. Foreman. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
I.
ISSUE
We shall consider whether the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to the liability of the defendants.
II.
FACTS
The facts in this case are undisputed. Michael Foreman was an employee of Replacement Parts, Inc., d/b/a Rapides Auto Supply, which is insured by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. Mr. Foreman's job duty was to make deliveries to the surrоunding stores, garages, and gas stations.
On June 24,1996, Mr. Foreman was returning to Alexandria after making his Colfax deliveries. He was traveling south on Highway 71. It had been raining approximately one hour prior to Mr. Foreman's departure from Colfax. Mr. Foreman was traveling at a speed of approximately 55 m.p.h., but he slowed his speed to about 52 m.p.h. when the rain began to interfere with his vision.
Mr. Foreman's van collided with a car driven by Rosа Holmes in which Annie Maye Tolbert was a passenger. Mr. Foreman's vehicle spun out of control crossing over the center line resulting in a head on collision with Ms. Holmes and Ms. Tolbert in their lane of traffic. Mr. Forеman was given a traffic citation for failure to maintain control of his vehicle to which he pled guilty.
*740 III.
LAW & DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, under the same criteria which govern the district court's consideration of the appropriatenеss of summary judgment. Potter v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. of Scotlandville, et al.,
Liability of Michael Foreman
At the time of thе accident, it is undisputed that: (1) it was raining; (2) Mr. Foreman was traveling at or just under the 55 m.p.h. speed limit; (3) Mr. Foreman lost control of his van; and (4) Mr. Foreman collided with the plaintiffs in their lane of traffic. The primary contention оf the defendants is that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs because the accident could have been caused by some factor other than negligence on the part of Mr. Foreman.
It is well established in Louisiana that when a collision occurs between two vehicles, one of which is in the wrong lane of travel, there is a presumption that the driver in the wrong lane was negligent, and that the burden is on him to show that the collision was not caused by his negligence (citations omitted). Welch v. State, Dep't of Transp. and Dev.,
"A duty is imposed on the driver of a motor vehicle by La.R.S. 32:64(A) not to drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and potential hazards then existing, having due regard for, among other things, the surface of the roadway." Mansour v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
It is claimed that Mr. Foreman drove his van at a safe speed and distance. We disagree. Driving at almost the maximum sрeed limit in a rain storm with greatly decreased visibility is neither reasonable nor responsible. But, even if the court were to agree that Mr. Foreman acted responsibly, "to excuse himself from responsibility for this fаult defendant must show something more than that he acted responsibly. He must show that the damages resulted from some external circumstance sufficient to discharge him from responsibility for his fault." Seals v. Morris,
The defendants forcefully argue that Mr. Foreman hydroplaned and the accident was unavoidable or inevitable. As a general rule, the doctrine of "unavoidable or inevitable accident" relieves a person of liаbility. Nalle v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., *741
As a corollary of the rule for determining legal responsibility for negligence, if a motorist or other traveler had exercised ordinаry care as required by the common law (or the highest degree of care as may be required), and has nevertheless been the occasion of inflicting injury on another, the accident is said to inevitablе, for which no liability attaches. Unavoidable accident is not an affirmative defense but merely negatives negligence.
* * * * * *
The mere fact that as to a motorist a collision might have been inevitable or unavoidable at the time of its occurrence will not entitle that motorist to the protection of the doctrine of unavoidable accident if the situation thus brought about was the result of the motorist's own nеgligence.
Id. at 857, quoting 2 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice § 101.13, 3rd ed. (1979).
King v. King,
Extremely adverse driving conditions call for unusual caution on the part of motorists. King,
Mr. Fоreman pled guilty to failure to maintain control of his vehicle. Even though his guilty plea is not conclusive evidence of fault, guilty pleas "have been admitted into evidence as an admission against interest rеlevant to show fault." Shepard,
The court rejects this reasoning. Mr. Foreman's learning disabilities does not prevent him from understanding matters such as a traffic citation. His learning disabilities showed that he had difficulty with his reading, not his comprehension. Even so, Mr. Foreman should have understood that he was obligated to maintain control of his vehicle at all times. Because Mr. Foreman did not have the benefit of counsel when he pled guilty to the traffic citation does not mean he did not understand what he was doing. Mr. Foreman even stated that he did not consider the citation "a big deal." Not considering the consеquences of his actions on future litigation does not render Mr. Foreman incapable of understanding what his actions were at the time.
A motorist has a duty to maintain control of his vehicle, even in rainy weather. Shepard,
Mr. Foreman argues that there is an issue of material fact as to what caused the van to spin out of control. The sole purpose for the motion for summary judgment is to determine in advance of trial *742 whether a genuine issue of material fact exists between litigants. Genusa v. B & B Steel Metal & Roofing,
The trial court was correct when it concluded that the origin of the accident could only have been due to the negligence of Mr. Foreman. His actions were far from responsible or reasonable under the circumstances. Mr. Foreman only alleged that he could have hydroplaned through no fault of his own. While it may be true he did hydroplane, the catalyst of his hydroplaning was not just the inclement weather, but the excessive speed at which he was traveling. The assertion of an alternative cause of the accident is not sufficient absent supportive proof which would overshadow Mr. Foreman's actions. Thus, a disputed fact is not material when, considered along with all other undisputed facts in the case, its resolution cannot have any impact on a litigant's success or if the outcome of litigation is precisely the same. Washington v. State, Dep't of Transp. and Dev.,
Therefore, the trial court was сorrect in concluding that the sole cause of the accident was due to Mr. Foreman's negligence. We find that the trial court was correct in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, due to Mr. Foreman's failure to bear his burden of producing evidence that there was an issue of material fact concerning liability.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiffs, with all costs assessed against the defendants.
AFFIRMED.