Certiorari to review an order of the industrial commission denying the demand of the alien property custodian for the payment and delivery to him of the accrued and unaccrued compensation benefits awarded to a nonresident alien widow, which order of denial further directed the employer to resume payment of such compensation benefits to the widow.
On October 11, 1938, Nick Evanoff was killed in the course of his employment. His sole surviving dependent was his wife, Katerina Nicolova Evanova Todeva, who was then, and ever since has been, an alien residing in Bulgaria. On September 22, 1939, the industrial commission awarded the widow compensation at the rate of $13.29 per week commencing October 11,1938, and to continue thereafter — • subject to the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act — during her dependency, but not to exceed the sum of $7,500. The controversy over whether the alien property custodian or the widow is entitled to the death compensation benefits arises out of the application of a war measure known as the Trading with the Enemy
*425
Act.
2
The act creates powerful, swift, and summary procedures for the seizure and sequestration of property rights and interests owned or controlled by enemy countries and their nationals. See, Stoehr v. Wallace,
“(c) any * * * property or interest within the United States of any nature whatsoever owned or controlled by, payable or deliverable to, held on behalf of or on account of, or owing to, or which *426 is evidence of ownership or control by, a designated enemy country or national thereof: * *
In express recognition of the President’s freezing of the property rights and interest of enemy countries and their nationals and upon petition of the employer, the industrial commission by order dated October 1, 1941, authorized the employer to suspend, further payments of compensation to Mrs. Todeva until peace had been declared in Europe or until further order of the commission. In its order of suspension, after referring specifically to Executive Order No. 8389, the commission, apparently as a further basis for its action, said that there appeared to be no practical or lawful method available whereby payments to Mrs. Todeva could be made with reasonable certainty that they would reach her and not be appropriated by German authorities, and that it was for the best interests of both parties (Mrs. Todeva and the employer) that such payments be suspended until peace had been restored. At the time of the order of suspension, Mrs. Todeva had received under the compensation award weekly payments from October 11, 1938, until July 1, 1940, in an aggregate total of $1,193.90, which, assuming that the widow continued to live and did not remarry, left an unpaid balance of $6,306.10 due her under the award.
A treaty of peace with Bulgaria did not become effective until September 15, 1947 (61 Stat. Part 2, p. 1915). On February 26, 1946, the alien property custodian, 4 having determined that Mrs. Todeva was a national of Bulgaria, issued Vesting Order No. 5974, whereby he vested in himself “All right, title, interest, and claim of any Tcmd or character whatsoever” in and to Mrs. Todeva’s compensation award. Shortly thereafter, the custodian made demand upon the employer for the payment and delivery to him of all the property described in the vesting order. This was followed by the *427 custodian’s application to the commission for an order directing the employer to pay to him all accumulated compensation payments then owing under the award to Mrs. Todeva, as well as all future payments as they should accrue.
Upon review of the industrial commission’s order denying the custodian’s application, which order directed the resumption of payment of compensation benefits to Mrs. Todeva, we have the following issues:
(1) Subject to the statutory limitations as to total amount, does a widow who is the sole surviving dependent of her husband, who was accidentally killed while covered by the Minnesota workmen’s compensation act, immediately upon her husband’s death acquire a fixed statutory right to the payment of compensation benefits which continues unimpaired as long as she survives and does not remarry?
(2) Is the widow’s right to compensation benefits upon the death of her husband, the employe, a property right, and, if so, does it extend to installments which have not accrued or become payable under the industrial commission’s award?
(8) Did the widow’s rights to compensation benefits under the award vest in and come under the control of the alien property custodian?
It is admitted that Mrs. Todeva is a nonresident alien who still survives and who has not remarried.
A widow of an employe who dies as the result of a compensable accident, pursuant to M. S. A. 176.12, acquires at the time of her husband’s death a fixed statutory right to weekly compensation benefits in an aggregate total of not to exceed $7,500 (changed to $10,000 by L. 1949, c. 540, § 4), and this fixed statutory right continues unimpaired as long as she survives and does not remarry. Warner v. Zaiser,
“The right of dependents to compensation benefits for the death of the workman is a distinct and independent statutory right which arises at the time of the workman’s death. Lewis v. Connolly Contracting Co.196 Minn. 108 ,264 N. W. 581 . Until then, there is not a matured right of action but rather an inchoate right, contingent in nature and entirely dependent upon the employe’s' death.”
In determining the nature and scope of the right of a disabled workman, or of his dependents if he dies from a compensable injury, it is well to bear in mind that compensation acts are
sui
generis,
5
and the rights and liabilities created thereunder are to be given full force and effect according to their own unique status, although they may not fit into the timeworn grooves of other areas of the law. In a certain limited sense, the rights and liabilities arise out of contract, on the theory that the statute becomes a part of the contract of employment (see, Warner v. Zaiser,
Without question, Executive Order No. 9095,
supra,,
which authorized the custodian to vest in himself any property right or interest of an enemy national, and Vesting Order No. 5974, issued pursuant thereto, were both broad and inclusive enough to cover Mrs. Todeva’s entire property right in the award, both as to accrued and as to future installments of compensation. At the time the President’s freezing order was issued (Executive Order No. 8389,
supra),
and likewise when it was amended on March 4, 1941, to apply specifically to Bulgaria and its nationals (Executive Order No. 8701,
supra),
Mrs. Todeva’s property right in the award existed in its full maturity. The freezing order was designed to preserve the
status quo,
and from the moment of its issuance it prevented any change in the status of Mrs. Todeva’s property rights. It was further designed to require that all transactions involving the property of an enemy national be thenceforth carried out under regulations of the federal government. By its inclusive scope, it covered compensation awards. See, Clark v. Propper (2 Cir.) 169 F. (2d) 324, affirmed,
The moment the vesting takes place, the custodian steps into the shoes of the alien beneficiary of the compensation award and thereby acquires the exclusive possession of all rights of the
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original owner without impairment or change, and the rights so acquired by the custodian are not limited to the duration of the war and are not terminated by any subsequent declaration of peace. See, Matter of Bendit,
Should the custodian’s demand for interest be allowed on accrued compensation installments? The President’s freezing order prevented the employer from making any further compensation payments. The order of the industrial commission, which followed, simply suspended the making of further payments and made no provision for the accumulation of benefit installments as they should come due. The employer was powerless to pay and was wholly without any legal obligation to make any disbursement under the award while the freezing order was in effect, and this situation continued until the custodian issued a vesting order. In Bourdeaux v. Gilbert Motor Co.
“The true ground upon which to put the allowance of interest is the fault of the party who is to pay the debt. If he has made default of payment, then, ex aequo et bono, he should reimburse the creditor for keeping him out of the use of his money. He should render an equivalent for the use of what is not his own. If there be a specified time for payment, and a failure to then pay, or a demand of payment of a liquidated claim, and default, then the debt should, as a matter of law, bear interest from the time of such failure. This is the current of authority, and it is supported by both right and reason.”
As already noted, until the vesting order was issued, there was no one to whom the employer could make payment, and there was no failure to pay. The moment, however, the vesting order was issued, all accrued installments became due and payable to the custodian to the same extent as they would have been payable to the original owner of the compensation award, namely, Mrs. Todeva, if the freezing order had then been cancelled. From the moment the principal of the accrued installments became due and payable, the obligation to pay interest commenced, in that interest goes with the principal as the fruit with the tree. Bourdeaux v. Gilbert Motor Co. supra. Although no interest was payable on the accrued compensation installments while the President’s freezing order prevented the employer from making any disbursement under the award, once the custodian was vested with the right to receive the compensation installments which had accrued, he became entitled not only to the accrued principal, but also to receive interest thenceforth upon any accrued amount which was thereafter withheld, and no action of the industrial commission, by continuation of its order of suspension or otherwise, could deprive him of such principal or interest.
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Pursuant to the vesting of the compensation award in the custodian, any allowance for attorney’s fees for services rendered in bebalf of the enemy national who was tbe original owner must be asserted under tbe Trading with tbe Enemy Act. See, In re Estate of Eckes,
Tbe order of tbe industrial commission is reversed with directions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed.
Notes
40 Stat. 411, 50 USCA Appendix, §§ 1 to 31. The Trading with the Enemy Act, whether taken as originally enacted (October 6, 1917) or as since amended (March 28, 1918, November 4, 1918, July 11, 1919, June 5, 1920), is strictly a war measure and finds its sanction in the federal constitutional provision, Art. I, § 8, cl. 11, empowering congress “To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.”
As amended, Executive Order No. 9193, dated July 6, 1942, 7 F. R. 5205; Executive Order No. 9567, dated June 8, 1945, 10 F. R. 6917 (50 USCA Appendix, § 6 note).
His powers and duties have since been taken over by the attorney general of the United States by Executive Order No. 9788, dated October 15, 1946 (11 F. R. 11981, 50 USCA Appendix, § 6 note), but for convenience the term “custodian” will be used herein as referring to the alien property custodian or to his successor, the attorney general.
See, Olson v. Trinity Lodge,
See, Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Acc. Comm.
See, Matter of Bendit,
See, Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A. G.,