JUDGE CRENSHAW
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action on the promissory note of the defendant, payable to one Payne or bearer.
On the trill the testimony of Payne was admitted to impeach the consideration of the note^ and this is the matter now .ssigned as error.
This is animportant question as to a rule of evidence. The Englishdecisions made on it at different times, conflict with eaci other, and the decisions in our sister States do not agree The old doctrine seems to have been, that one who hac put his name to an instrument of writing, or who had riven currency to a negotiable instrument, was under aiy circumstances, incompetent to impeach its *200validity, though it was said he might be competent to piovt the instrument paid or discharged, or to prove facts oc curring after he had transferred the paper. This is yet the rule adhered to in some of the States, though confined to negotiable -instruments. But the general rule now adopted in England, and by some respectable American adjudications is, that a party to a bill or note is competent to prove it void, unless he be directly interested in the event of the action, or unless the verdict would be evidence for or against him. The reason of the rule results from the consideration, that if the testimony7 of one so circumstanced were to prevail, he would stand in no ■bet'er situation than if a contrary verdict were given. In this case it was remotely to Payne’s interest to support the action, for if the plaintiff failed in this action, he would be entitled to his remedy against Pitts, his endorser, and Pitts against Pavne, who had transferred the note to him without endorsement. Payne then, in giving testimony wuich went to defeat the action, was testifying against his own interest, and clearly a competent witness for the defendant. We give no opinion as to Payne’s right to ob-je t to giving evidence, nor as to the right of the plaintiff to ‘iruroduce him as a witness.
The Chief Justice and Judge Gayle concurred.
By JUDGE WHITE.
Tue opinion just given is in conformity with the more-rec.-s¡1 decisions of the English Courts; but their former decisions, aid those of New-York, New-Hampshire, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, are to the contrary. Connecticut is the only State in the Union, w’iose Courts have adopted the modern English doctrine o.i this point. As the authorities thus conflict, I feel at lberty to regard the probable effect of the principle on society. To permit a man who has transferred a negotiable paper, to give testimony by which its validity in the haids of an en-dorsee, or subsequent holder, is to be destroyid, must evidently encourage combinations to commit fraids, and tend to destroy confidence in notes and bills, whici is essential to commercial operations. The very circurrstance of its being necessary to introduce the evidence cf the payee, to impeach the validity of the note, presupposes (in most cases) that the original transaction has b.-ei kept secret from all but him and the maker. To a mm capable of *201entering into such fraudulent combinations, his responsibility to those to whom he may transfer the note, seems too remote and contingent to outweigh the immediate temptation by which he may.be seduced. True it is, that one giving evidence under such suspicious circumstances, would not readily be credited by an honest jury; but to shew that necessarily he will not be believed, proves that there is no utility in his testifying. And though witnesses thus situated, might sometimes give evidence essential to the correct administration of justice, and be believed, it seems to me that this would occur in a proportion of such cases, by far too small, to justify the establishment of a rule of evidence so dangerous to society-as this. I cannot concur in the opinion of the majority of the Court. The view which I have taken is supported by authority.
Judge Safeold having sealed the bill of exceptjpns in the Court below, gave no opinion here.
Judgement affirmed.