delivered the opinion op the court.
It is well settled that suits for rescission or for specific performance of agreements respecting land are transitory, and not local. Kendrick v. Wheatley, 3 Dana, 34 (1835); Bullitt y. E. K. Land Co., 18 Ky. Law Rep. 230 [36 S. W. 16]. But this rule is not applicable to suits against non-residents. In such cases the courts where the land is situated have jurisdiction to rescind the contract for fraud or other reason, or enforce its specific execution. This is a rule of necessity. Dicken v. King, 3 J. J. Marsh. 592 (1830); Berryman v. Mullins, 8 B. Mon. 152; Newm. Pl. & Prac. 38. The purpose of the present action is to rescind a contract involving a swap of lands; those of appellee being in Kentucky, and those of appellants being in Florida. The chancellor decreed a rescission. We have seen that the Kentucky court where the appellee’s land was situated had jurisdiction, and, the remaining questions — the existence of fraud, want of title, and misrepresentation of material facts inducing the trade — being questions of fact, we do not feel inclined to disturb the chancellor’s finding; and especially so as it appears that the appellant Todd has not performed a material part of the contract, by paying off a mortgage on the Kentucky land, for the payment of which appellee was personally bound. Judgment affirmed.