696 A.2d 1063 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1995
The plaintiffs claim that on or about June 6, 1988, and for some time prior thereto, Todd M., the minor plaintiff, was a student at an elementary school in a town in Connecticut. During the 1987-88 school year, while being transported to and from school on a school bus, the minor plaintiff was allegedly subjected to repeated physical and sexual abuse by other students being similarly transported, whereby he was forced, through the threat and use of physical violence, to engage in sexually self-abusive conduct. This alleged conduct caused him to suffer the severe personal and emotional injuries set forth in the plaintiffs' complaint. *528
The several defendants in this action were responsible for providing, selecting or conducting all or part of the transportation of Todd M. and the other students to and from the elementary school. The named defendant, Richard L., as the director of transportation for the town's board of education, was responsible for securing and supervising the transportation of children to and from the town's public schools. The defendant, Jody O., was an employee of the town's board of education, and was acting within the scope of his duties for the town's board of education as the driver of the bus which transported the minor plaintiff to and from school.
The plaintiffs brought this claim by an amended complaint, dated November 7, 1994, in which it is alleged that the defendants were negligent in the provision, selection and conduct of Todd's transportation. The complaint further alleges that as a result of this negligence, Todd M. was subjected to abuse and to injuries suffered as a result thereof. On March 28, 1995, the defendants filed an "Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint" in which they asserted several special defenses. These defenses are the subject of this motion to strike.
The first special defense asserts that the plaintiffs' claim is barred by the limitations period provided in General Statutes §
A special defense is a pleading used by a defendant who seeks the admission of evidence that is not inconsistent with the claim by the plaintiff but nevertheless tends to show that the plaintiff has no cause of action. Practice Book § 164; Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint, or any one or more *531
counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Practice Book § 152(1). "In deciding upon a motion to strike . . . a trial court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and cannot be aided by the assumption of any facts not therein alleged." Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby,
In the first and second special defenses, the defendants invoke §§
Section
The plain language of this section provides that this period of limitations applies to all claims for personal injuries to a minor caused by sexual assault or sexual exploitation. The statute provides that, regardless of the general limitations period for torts, such as those relied upon by the defendants, no action seeking redress *532 for injuries suffered as a result of misconduct of a sexual nature may be brought later than seventeen years from the date of majority. This action, brought on behalf of this minor plaintiff, seeks redress for personal injuries caused by a sexual assault. Under this statute, as long as this action was brought within seventeen years from the date that the minor plaintiff attains the age of majority, it is timely.
The defendants argue that §
A review of the legislative history of §
The portion of the victims' rights bill that was later codified as §
A review of the record of debate on this bill demonstrates that it was intended to provide minor victims of sexual abuse with an opportunity to exercise their rights against the offender once they had attained the age of majority and could exercise control over their lives. See generally 29 H.R. Proc. Pt. 12, 1986 Sess., pp. 4387-97. *533
The legislature revisited the issue in 1991 when the period of limitations was extended from seven years from the date of the alleged abuse to seventeen years from the age of majority. Public Acts 1991, No. 91-240. At that time, the Joint Standing Committee on the Judiciary heard extensive testimony from professionals and victims about the frequency of repressed memories of abuse and the need to "redress a fundamental inequity and hardship that is worked upon adult victims of childhood incest abuse when traditional rules of actual accrual are applied to the civil claims." Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 4, 1991 Sess., p. 1141, remarks of Gail Burns Smith of the Connecticut Sexual Assault Crises Services Association; 34 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 1991 Sess., pp. 4704-4707, remarks of Representative Sally M. Bolster. In describing the amended legislation, Tulisano, its chief author, once again noted that "Connecticut was among the first states to recognize that minor victims of sexual assault often do not have the independence and the opportunity to bring civil actions against the perpetrators of crimes against them . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Id., 4705. Tulisano elaborated that in these cases the only way it was thought the legislature might be able to help a victim become whole was to be able to bring a civil cause of action against the perpetrator. Id., 4706-4707.
The defendants further argue that of all of the states having extended statutes of limitations for civil actions for sexual abuse, only one, Minnesota, specifically provides for an action against a person who negligently permitted sexual abuse to occur. Minn. Stat. §
This issue has been considered in a thoughtful and well reasoned opinion of United States District Court Judge Alan Nevas in Almonte v. New York MedicalCollege,
The facts of Almonte involve an individual who, while a psychiatric postgraduate student at the defendant, New York Medical College, sexually assaulted and threatened a ten year old boy. Almonte v. New YorkMedical College, supra,
The Connecticut state courts have infrequently addressed this issue. On several occasions the issue was raised by a motion to strike or as a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute.7 On both of these occasions, *536
the trial courts did not reach the precise issue presented by the first and second special defenses in the present case. One published Superior Court case, however, has dealt with the issue raised by the defendant in the present case and has ruled that §
The plaintiffs in See and Rosado brought personal injury claims against the perpetrators of the sexual assaults and against the Bridgeport Diocesan Corporation. The Diocesan Corporation moved for summary judgment on the ground that the claims against it were barred by §
The facts of the present case are analogous to bothAlmonte and the Bridgeport Diocesan cases. The facts include actions by individuals over which the defendants have supervision and control. These individuals allegedly perpetrated abuse of a sexual nature against a minor which, in the exercise of reasonable and proper care, the nonperpetrator defendants, it is maintained, could and should have prevented. The courts in those cases determined that the applicable statute of limitations was provided by §
Accordingly, the motion to strike the first and second special defenses is granted.
The defendant's third special defense alleges that the "[l]iability of the defendants is barred by General Statutes §
The motion to strike the defendants' third special defense, therefore, is granted as §
The defendants fourth special defense raises the issue of governmental immunity. A lawsuit against a town is not a suit against a sovereign. Unlike the state, towns do not benefit from sovereign immunity and may sue or be sued in any action. Murphy v. Ives,
Additionally, governmental immunity may be abrogated by statute. Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, supra,
The fifth special defense raises the issue of sovereign immunity. A few specific facts are necessary for a resolution of this issue. The minor plaintiff, Todd M., during the 1987-88 school year, was a special education student in the town's school district. He was transported to school in accordance with the individualized education program developed for him as mandated by statute. See generally General Statutes §
In developing and maintaining a special education program, a board of education acts under state mandate *539
and, thus, acts as an agent of the state. See Cheshirev. McKenney,
The transportation of Todd M. to the elementary school involved duties and activities for which the board was responsible as an agent of the state. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, it is maintained, should apply in this instance.
This question was addressed by the court in Crandallv. Groton Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 102935 (November 26, 1993,
The cases cited by the plaintiffs in opposition to this principle, are inapposite. In Belanger v. Glastonbury,
Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 90380529 (April 22, 1991,
Since the provision of special education services, which specifically include transportation as a part of an individualized education plan, is carried out by a board of education pursuant to a specific educational mandate of the state, the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies and bars the plaintiffs' claims of negligence in the present case. The plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' fifth special defense is denied.
The defendants' sixth special defense raises the issue of laches in the following manner: "Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of laches." The Connecticut courts have held that a special defense of laches must be stricken if it fails to plead facts sufficient to support the legal conclusion that the claim is barred by laches.Shawmut, N.A. v. Concord Steel Corp. of Connecticut,
Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. 67176 (June 2, 1993); Hydro-Kem Services v. UnitedIlluminating Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV910324789S (October 30, 1992); D'Addario v. Bergman, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV900266582S (January 17, 1992). In Shawmut, the court, J. Walsh, J., struck the defendant's special defense of laches for failure to plead sufficient facts to show that the defendant was indeed prejudiced by the plaintiff's delay in bringing the action. Id. Similarly, inKydro-Kem Services, the court, Celotto, J., granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's special defense when it held that the laches defense contained *542
no more than conclusions and was demurrable. Id., citing Warner v. Liimatainen,
The defendants' sixth special defense merely states that the "[p]laintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of laches." As such, this defense fails to allege any facts to support the contention that the plaintiff's delay is prejudicial to the defendants.
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the equitable defense of laches is barred in an action at law. A. Sangivanni Sons v. F.M. Floryan Co.,
The defendants' seventh special defense states that "[a]ny alleged injuries sustained by plaintiffs were the result of the intentional, intervening tortious conduct of the other students on [the] bus . . . which conduct was a superseding cause of plaintiffs' injuries."
Section 315 of the second Restatement of Torts provides that there is generally no duty to control the conduct of a third person to prevent harm to others unless there is a special relationship giving the injured party a right to such protection. 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 315 (1965). The types of relationships that impose a duty because of the relation of the actor to a third person include parents, employers, and landowners. Id., § 316-319. The types of relationships that *543
impose a duty based on the relation of the actor to the victim include that of innkeeper, common carrier, police and the like. Id., § 314. Where one of these special relationships exists, there is a duty to so control the intentional conduct of third persons. Kargul v. SandpiperDunes Limited Partnership, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 505600, (January 28, 1991,
In the present case, there are elements of both types of "special relationship." Here, the defendants had a duty imposed by law to protect the minor plaintiff from harm and to prevent the intentional harm to the school children in their care. Members and employees of boards of education stand as surrogate parents to their pupils. See