Toca v. StateToca v. State
Rоbert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard M. Fishkin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.
ORDER ON MOTION TO ACCOMMODATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
Jesse Toca, a pro se litigant who has filed numerous proceedings in this court, persists in refusing to sign his filings. On March 7, 2002, we directed Mr. Toca to sign his filings and warned that unsigned documents filed after that date would be stricken. In response, Mr. Toca has filed a motion in which he asserts that we must forgo thе signature requirement as an accommodation of his religious beliefs. He is mistaken.1
BACKGROUND
Mr. Toca alleges that his religious beliefs prohibit his taking any sort of oath.2
We asked the State to respond to Mr. Toca‘s motion and, in particular, to address the question whether Florida‘s Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 (RFRA),
DISCUSSION
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.060 sets forth the requirements for the signing of pleаdings and other filings. Subsection (c) describes the signature requirements for filings of attorneys. Subsection (d), entitled “Party Not Represented by Attorney to Sign,” requires that “[a] party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign any pleading or other paper and state the party‘s address and telephone number, including area code.” Subsection (e) describes the forms of signatures deemed acсeptable for purposes of the rule. It provides:
(1) The signatures required on pleadings and papers by subdivisions (c) and (d) of this rule may be:
(A) original signatures;
(B) original signatures that have been reproduced by electronic means, such as on electronically transmitted documents or photocopied documents; or
(C) any other signature format authorized by general law, so long as the clerk where the proceeding is pending has the capability of receiving and has obtained approval from the Supreme Court of Florida to accept pleadings and papers with that signature format.
Mr. Toca has not signed his filings in any manner that complies with this rule.4
Whether the certification contemplated in the attorney‘s signature requirement qualifies as an oath may be debatable. See Metcalf v. Langston, 296 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (observing that an attorney‘s signature on a pleading is a certification that there are good grounds to support it, but does not attest to its truthfulness). If that is so, there can be no question that the bare signature required of an unrepresented person is not an oath. Rather, the purpose of this requirement is simply, but importantly, one of authentication. See Schaefer v. Riegelman, 250 Wis. 2d 494, 639 N.W.2d 715 (2002); Coker v. Weatheread, 852 S.W. 2d 764 (Tex. App. 1993). Requiring signatures reduces the possibility that a court will act in reliance on allegations, representations, arguments, stipulаtions, or admissions of a party who has not actually made them. See, e.g., J.L.S. v. R.J.L., 708 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (reversing order transferring venue based on alleged unsigned stipulation that was disavowed by appellant).
The fact that Mr. Toca‘s signature would not constitute an oath does not resolve the issue before us, however. To the contrary, this fact might be wholly irrelevant, depending on which body of law we apply. This would be the cаse under a purely constitutional analysis.
Both the Federal and the Florida Constitutions guarantee an individual‘s right to freely exercise his religion.5 When considering assertions that these provisions exempt a person from regulatory mandates when compliance would contravene his religious beliefs, courts avoid questioning the rationality of those beliefs. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990), the Court observed that “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds” (quoting Hernandez v. Comm‘r, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 104 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1989)).
Therefore, although we have pointed out that Mr. Toca‘s signature would not constitute an oath in a secular sense, we do not presume to question whether his interpretation of the religious proscription is valid or rational. Further, although Mr. Toca has not yet proved that he sincerely abides by a religious proscription against taking oaths and that this prohibition includes the signing of documents filed in this court, we will assume the truth of these allegations for purposes of analyzing Mr. Toca‘s constitutional assertions.
Nevertheless, the Federal Constitution does not require us to excuse Mr. Toca from the signаture rule. In Smith, 494 U.S. 872, the United States Supreme Court held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes conduct that his religion prescribes, or vice versa. The Smith Court rejected a claim by Native Americans that the Free Exercise Clause permitted them tо ingest peyote for religious purposes notwithstanding the Oregon controlled substances law. In a majority opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.
Applying Smith, we can easily see that rule 2.060(d) is a neutral, generally applicable regulation that only incidentally burdens Mr. Toca‘s exercise of religion. Therefore, the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution does not exempt Mr. Toca from the signature requirement contained in rule 2.060(d).
We have found no authority holding that Florida‘s Free Exercise Clause requires a different analysis or result. For the most part, the courts have treated the protection afforded under the state constitutional provision as coequal to the federal one, and have measured government regulations against it accordingly.6 See, e.g., Yasir v. Singletary, 766 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). See also Commentary to Art. I, § 3, 1968 Revision of the Florida Constitution (observing that Florida‘s Free Exercise Clause parallels the First Amendment and that cases under the First Amendment are “of great value in evaluating the status of religious freedoms“). In some instances, Florida courts have applied a compelling interest test in cases involving an “overlap” of the right to free exercise and a fundamental right, such as the Florida constitutional right of privacy. See In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1993). The matter before us involves no such overlap. Accordingly, we apply Smith and conclude that requiring Mr. Toca to comply with rule 2.060(d) does not violate his rights under article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution.
In addition to his constitutional argument, Mr. Toca relies on the so-called Religious
In response to Flores, the Florida Legislature passed Florida‘s own Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998, modeled after its federal predecessor. The avowed purpose of the legislation is to require application of the compelling interest test in free exercise cases notwithstanding its rejection by the United States Supreme Court in Smith.
Section 761.03 of the Act provides:
761.03. Free exercise of religion protected
(1) The governmеnt shall not substantially burden a person‘s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that government may substantially burden a person‘s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person:
(a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(2) A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief.
The statute defines government as “any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official or other person acting under color of law of the state, a county, special district, municipality, or any other subdivision of the state.”
Determining whether a person‘s act or refusal to act is substantially motivated by a religious belief and whether his exercise of religion is substаntially burdened by a government regulation would require determinations of fact—hence, the State‘s assertion that Mr. Toca is not burdened at all because he is not, in truth, motivated by religious belief. Were we to decide this matter under the RFRA, we likely would appoint a commissioner to take evidence and determine these essential facts, as to which Mr. Toca would bear the burden of proof. See Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1997) (interpreting federal RFRA). If these facts were found in Mr. Toca‘s favor, our inquiry would turn to whether the government has a compelling interest in imposing the signature requirement on him and whether doing so is
As can be seen, by imposing the compelling interest test, the RFRA may well restrict the government‘s ability to burden an individual‘s religious freedom to a narrower range of circumstances than is permitted under the constitutional analysis in Smith.8 This difference has no bearing here, though, because the RFRA cannot control when the regulation under consideration is a rule of practiсe or procedure in the courts. The Florida Constitution grants to the Florida Supreme Court exclusive power to prescribe such rules. Art. V, § 2, Fla. Const. Under the separation of powers doctrine, codified in our constitution at article II, section 3, the legislature may not exercise that power.
The RFRA does not violate these constitutional principles by devising any particular rulе of practice or procedure. By its terms, however, it proscribes any government regulation that substantially burdens a person‘s exercise of religion unless the government demonstrates that applying the regulation to the person serves a compelling government interest by the least restrictive means. If this legislation were to be applied to rules of practice and procedure in the courts, it would, in effect, append a statutory proviso onto each such rule. The Florida Constitution does not permit this. Therefore, we reject Mr. Toca‘s assertion that the RFRA entitles him to file documents in this court without signing them as required by rule 2.060(d).
Mr. Toca‘s citation to articles 14 and 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) likewise is unavailing. The ICCPR was opened fоr ratification by resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in 1966. Having obtained a sufficient number of ratifications, it went into force as planned in 1976. The United States Senate ratified the ICCPR in 1992, with a number of reservations, understandings, and declarations. Of course, a properly ratified treaty is binding on the states. U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
Article 14 of the ICCPR provides that “[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts аnd tribunals” and then sets forth a number of due process protections applicable to criminal prosecutions. Obviously, it does not assist Mr. Toca‘s attempt to secure an individual exemption from a court rule of general applicability.
Article 18 states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in сommunity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
1976 U.N.T.S. No. 14668, vol. 999, p. 171.
There is scant case law nationally, and none we could find in Florida, interpreting this provision. Probably, this is due in large part to the fact that when ratifying the ICCPR, the Senate declared that “the provisions of Articles 1 through 26 of the Covenant are not self-executing.” 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-84 (1992). The Senate stated that the declaration was meant to “clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. Courts.” S. Exec. Rep., No. 102-23, at 15 (1992). Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has observed that a treaty must be self-executing in order for an individual citizen to have standing to protest a violation of the treaty. United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985); United States. v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1979). For this reason, it is doubtful that Mr. Toca has standing to complain that requiring him to sign his filings would violate the ICCPR.
In any event, prior to the ICCPR‘s ratification by the United States, at least one court interpreted article 18 as furnishing no greater rights or protections than those provided in the First Amendment. Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983). Therefore, even if Mr. Toca had standing to enforce the ICCPR, his assertions under article 18 would fare no better than his constitutional claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons described, we deny Mr. Toca‘s motion to accommodate religious beliefs, and we reaffirm our order of March 7, 2002.
ALTENBERND and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.