14 S.D. 52 | S.D. | 1900
From the year 1880 to the 1st of January, 1885, Charles E. McKinney, the defendant, was a partner in the firm of McKinney & Scougal, engaged in the business of banking in the cities of Sioux Falls and Yankton. At the last mentioned date the partnership was dissolved, and the business was continued in Yankton by Scougal, one of the said partners, at the same place, using the same kind of bank checks, bills, drafts, certificates of deposit, and letter heads, excepting the ommission of the name of C. E. McKinney on one corner of the letter heads, and retaining the same sign on the bank and building that the firm of McKinney & Scougal had used.
The motion for a direction of a verdict was made upon the following grounds, among others : That the plaintiff has failed to show that she was a customer of the bank, or had had business transactions
The case as we view it presents two questions: (1) Was the action barred by the statute of limitations? (2) Did the plaintiff have such dealings with the partnership during its existence as to entitle her to personal notice of its dissolution, and in the absence of such notice enable her to maintain this action? The first question is substantially disposed of by the decision in Cornwall v. McKinney, 12 S. D. 118, 80 N. W. 171. In that case this court held in effect, that an action upon a cerifícate of deposit issued by a bank in the usual form cannot be maintained until payment of the same has been demanded, adopting the view of Mr. Daniel in his work on Negotiable Instruments. Upon the subject of the statute of limitations Mr. Daniel says: “The better opinion seems to us to be that the statute of limitations only begins to run when there is an actual demand of payment in due form, and that such demand must precede a suit.” Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1707a. There is a conflict in the authorities, but the rule as stated by Mr. Daniel is fully sustained by the courts of New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Maryland (Munger v. Bank, 85 N. Y. 587; Howell v. Adams, 68 N. Y. 314; McGough v. Jamison, 107 Pa. St. 336; Bellows Falls Bank v. Rutland Co. Bank, 40 Vt. 377; Institution v. Weedon, 18 Md. 320), and is, in our opinion, the better rule. In Howell v. Adams, supra, the court of appeals of
The second question involved'in this case is one of more difficulty. Upon this subject our code provides as follows: “The liability of a general partner for the acts of his copartners continues, even after a dissolution of the partnership, in favor of persons who have had dealings with, and given credit to, the partnership, during its existence, until they have had personal notice of the dissolution; and in favor of other persons, until such dissolution has been advertised in a newspaper published in every county where the partnership, at the time of its dissolution, had a place of business; to the extent, in either case, to which such persons part with value, in good faith, and in the belief that such partner is still a member of the firm.” Section 4059, Comp. Laws. The first question arising under this section is, what construction is to be placed upon the clause, “in favor of
It is contended on the part of the respondent that to entitle the appellant to recover she must have been in the habit of dealing with the firm. It is true this language is used in Story or. Partnership (§ 161), and by Mr. Justice Brewer in delivering the opinion of the supreme court of Kansas in Merritt v. Williams, 17 Kan. 287; but it will be noted that this is not the language of our statute, and we cannot so construe it as to embrace such language without interpolating into the statute other words, which in this case we are not authorized to do. We are inclined to say, in the language of the court in. Clapp v. Rogers, supra, that this case does not afford a very striking exemplification of the rule, for the dealing was so limited in amount that there is no great reason to believe that' the plaintiff would have taken the trouble to ascertain' who the partners were. We cannot, however, say positively that she did not. It would be dangerous for this court to attempt to graft upon this section exceptions or limitations that have not been provided by the legislature. These views lead to the conclusion that the learned circuit court erred in directing a verdict, and the judgment of that court is reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial. .