596 N.Y.S.2d 797 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1993
—Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Beatrice Shainswit, J.), entered on or about August 4, 1992, which denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 or, in the alternative, join the corporation as an additional defendant and granted plaintiffs cross-motion for priority of discovery, is unanimously modified on the law to the extent of dismissing the third, fifth, sixth, seventh and ninth causes of action and directing that the corporation be added as a defendant and otherwise affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
According to the complaint, defendant has increased his salary and paid for phantom expenses without plaintiff’s approval and has engaged in a series of fraudulent acts in violation of his fiduciary obligations. Plaintiff claims that he diverted millions of dollars to himself, utilized company funds to pay personal expenses, wasted corporate assets, mismanaged the business and that he did all this while spending hardly any time on the job. In the nine causes of action, plaintiff seeks, respectively, damages for defendant’s purported contravention of the 1970 agreement; specific enforcement of this agreement; damages for fraud; removal of defendant from his position as president due to the breach of his fiduciary duties; a direction that he return his ill-gotten gains and enjoining him from drawing any salary, declaring any bonus or paying any corporate expenses without plaintiff’s
Although the Supreme Court correctly rejected defendant’s attempt to have the complaint dismissed in its entirety, some of the causes of action are not adequately pleaded or are duplicative of other claims. In that regard, the third cause of action for fraud is defective since it asserts neither misrepresentation nor reliance, both of which are essential elements of a claim for fraud (Orbit Holding Corp. v Anthony Hotel Corp., 121 AD2d 311). The fifth cause of action that defendant be directed to disgorge all moneys unlawfully removed from the corporation in violation of the 1970 agreement is effectively indistinguishable from the first cause of action for breach of that agreement and should, therefore, be dismissed. Similarly, the sixth cause of action for injunctive relief merely restates the injunctive relief already requested in the second cause of action. The seventh cause of action seeking punitive damages should also be dismissed since not only is that claim therefor insufficiently pleaded but "punitive damages may not be sought as a separate cause of action” (Weir Metro Ambu-Serv. v Turner, 57 NY2d 911, 912). Finally, the ninth cause of action requesting the appointment of a receiver is deficient in that the requirements for such an appointment as specified in Business Corporation Law § 1202 are not alleged. Plaintiff is not seeking dissolution of the corporation, and there is no contention that the corporation has no officer within this State who is qualified to administer the company’s assets. In view of the fact that a corporation is ordinarily an indispensable party in a derivative suit (Carruthers v Waite Min. Co., 306 NY 136) and plaintiff offers no reasons against adhering to the general rule, Consolidated Electric should be joined as a defendant.