133 A.D. 529 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1909
Lead Opinion
This action was brought to obtain an injunction restraining the .defendant the New York Juvenile Asylum from using a sewer through the plaintiffs’ property and from maintaining any connection with it for any sewer belonging to or used by said defendant, and from discharging into it any sewerage from the property owned and occupied by said defendant. The complaint alleges that one James Jennings McComb "during his life was the owner of certain property at Dobbs Ferry in the. State of New York; that McComb died on "the 31st of March, 1901, leaving' a last will and testament by which he gave and devised such real property to the plaintiffs as trustees; that McComb constructed a private road through his property, known, as Walgrove avenue, and under said road constructed a private sewer for the purpose of. draining his property and for the use of residences erected thereon ; that in September, 1901, the plaintiffs, as executors and trustees of McComb, conveyed a portion of the property owned by McComb during his life to the defendant Ida E. Brown, she being entitled to use this private Toad
The defendant in answer to this complaint alleges that prior to the death of McComb the Chauncey Realty Company, was the owner of a large tract of land situated to the south of the McComb tract; that McComb was a stockholder in the said company and that the company undertook to lay out the projierty with streets and avenues, contemplating the construction of houses and a club house thereon; that prior to the 1st of December, 1899, McComb had constructed under "Walgrove avenue through his premises a sewer, and that between the 1st day of December, 1899, and the 1st day of March, 1900, McComb agreed with the Chauncey Realty Company that if the company would settle and discharge certain alleged claims of one Wood or his estate against Erhardt and others interested in the Chauncey property he would grant to said company an easement in perpetuity to use Walgrove avenue as described in the complaint herein as a right of way and to connect with and use the sewer mains thereunder, and would extend said Walgrove avenue to connect with the roads to be built by the company upon its premises ; that the Chauncey Realty Company settled the claims of Wood, and thereafter, in reliance upon this agreement of McComb, the Chauncey Realty Company used said Walgrove avenue as a right of way and connected with and used said sewer mains under said Walgrove avenue, and that or its successors in title are still connected with and still using said sewer mains for the purpose of draining said property then owned by the said company; that said Chauncey Company and this defendant have performed all the conditions,. covenants and agreements of this agreement between
Upon the trial at Special Term the court found : “ That, between the first day of December, 1899, and February 20th, 1900, said James- Jennings McComb agreed with said Chauricey Eealty Company that if said company would settle and discharge certain claims of the estate • of John P. Wood, the brother-in-law of said James. Jennings McComb, against Joel B. Erliard.t and others interested in the Chauncey property,, which- were then in. suit, by delivering to Mary Esther McComb, the. wife of James- Jennings McComb,'and sister of said Wood,” certain satisfaction pieces of mortgages,- and deliver a note of the Chauncey Company for $2,000- to said .'administratrix of Wood, “ he,/the said James Jennings McComb,. would grant and convey to the Chauncey Eealty Company for the benefit of .its said lands an easement in. perpetuity to use Walgrove avenue and the sewer mains thereunder, and also to extend said mains, from the terminals- thereof, and to extend Walgrove avenue in a.southerly direction through his property into the lands- of the Chauncey Eealty Company, and to use said sewer and roadway extensions, and would also grant and. convey to the Chauncey Eealty Company a right of way over his property known as the Alpine Drive Turn.” It was . further found that the Chauncey Company subsequently delivered the satisfaction pieces, to..the administratrix of Wood, and also-a note of-the- Chauncey Company for $2,000, and received from the said McComb a deed of the easement known as the Alpine Drive Turn.
I think the finding that McComb made any such agreement as is
A Hr. Fish, who was present at one of these interviews between Lamb and HcComb, testified as to the conversation in’ relation io the proposed development of the Chauncey Company’s scheme, and the great advantage that that would be to HcComb’s property was insisted upon. Fish says that what HcCo.mb. said was that if Lamb could adjust these other matters in relation to the Wood claim he’ would grant this concession, the details to be subject to the approval of Hr.. Kidney. But all that was said was based upon the fact-that aiding the’ development of the Chauncey Company’s property would be a benefit to HcComb’s property, .and there was nothing .granted or agreed, to be granted except aright or privilege’to aid in this proposed development of the company’s property. I think the fair, inference from ,all the conversations was that what was granted was conditioned upon the carrying out of this development, and the right that was agreed to was to enable the Chauncey Company to carry it out. But, as before stated, it was clearly contemplated that whatever rights were to be given were to be settled by the interchange of written instruments, and when this settlement came to be carried out there-was such an exchange of written instruments.
Hr. HcClelland, who was employed by HcComb to .act as his attorney i<n relation to the final settlement in relation to the Wood matter with the Chauncey Company, testified that an action had been commenced against the Chauncey Company by Wood’s administratrix to recover upon what was considered to be the amount .due the Wood estate from the Chauncey Company; that after these discussions between Lamb, Fish and HcComb, under that retainer and as representing HcComb, he called upon’Hr! V,eddév, the president of the' Chauncey Realty Company, and had two or more interviews with him; that propositions and counter-propositions were .made, and ' u-litimately .a settlement effected ■ by ■ which the claim of the Wood estate against the Chauncey Company was .settled, and what the Chauncey Company,had demanded from HcComb .was obtained .as the consideration for that settlement. HcClelland testified that after .several interviews with Yedder he came to an understanding
Mr. Kidney, who was McComb’s representative, testified that up to the twentieth of June McComb refused to give his consent to the construction of this .sewer; that the construction of the sewer was not mentioned at any time when he was present when the Wood settlement was talked of; that the granting of an easement for the sewer had no relation to that settlement; that the connection with a sewer was talked of from time, to time,"Lamb insisting that it would benefit McComb’s property, and that the proposed improvements of the Chauncey Company in building a club house and residences would be an advantage to McComb; that he, Lamb, wished to make the sewer connection to connect with the house sewerage of the houses that the Chauncey Company expected to build ; that this was the only thing that was ever talked of in relation to this sewer connection; that there was never any agreement that there should be any sewerage connection or sewer agreement except to be used for the house sewerage" on the houses when erected by the Chauncey Company, and that continued-down as late as June, 1900.
Thus, from the whole testimony, I think it is entirely clear that the settlement of the Wood claim was entirely independent of this sewerage connection ; that this .claim was finally settled as the result of the negotiations between McClelland and Vedder, the president of the Chauncey Realty Company ; that while there had
The title to the property acquired by the defendant the New York Juvenile Asylum was acquired by the asylum by deed from the referee, dated October 7, 1901, upon the foreclosure of the mortgage against the Chauncey Realty Company. It is not claimed that' McComb was a party to that action or that in that action there was any claim to this easement. Whatever right the Chauncey Company obtained was a mere verbal understanding made after the giving of the mortgage, and was in form a personal right given to the Chauncey Company, and not as appurtenant to the property the Chauncey. Company owned. By section 1632 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is provided that a conveyance upon a sale'made pursuant to a final judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage upon real property vests in the purchaser the same estate only that would have vested in the mortgagee if the equity
The cases where verbal -contracts for easements have been enforced have .generally been based upon the principle of • an estoppel, where the verbal agreement- was conclusively proved, and where, one party having acted on it with, the knowledge, of the-other party to it,, the principle of estoppel justified a court of equity in enforcing it. Thus it was said by Judge Earl in Miller v. Ball (64 N. Y. 291) that “ the principle, upon which courts of equity liold that part performance, is sufficient, is, that a party who- has'per- ’ rnitted another to. perform acts on the- faith of an agreement shall not he allowed tó' insist that the agreement is invalid because it was-not in writing.”' And :as- was said by Judge Andrews' in Newman v. Nellis (97 N. Y. 285): ' “ But we know of no rule of law which prevents a party from performing' a promise which could not be legally enforced,, or which will permit a party, morally but not legally bound to do a certain act or thing, upon the act or thing' being done,, to recall it to the' prejudice of the promisee on the plea that the promise^ while still executory, could not by reason of some-technical rule of law have been enforced by action.” But- at the time this mortgage was granted no easement of any kind had been acquired by the Chauneey Company over, the property of McComb.. Assuming that while the mortgage was on the property and before it was foreclosed, McOomb had verbally granted a permission tocen nect a sewer on his property so as to drain the houses which the Chauneey Company -intended to build upon the property, no such houses were ever built, but by a foreclosure of the mortgage, the defendant the juvenile asylum had acquired the right of the mortgagor at the time the mortgage was executed. Certainly there could be acquired' under the judgment in this foreclosure - suit no right granted by McComb subsequent to the execution of the mort
My conclusion, therefore, is that a finding that a general easement of a right of sewerage was granted is without evidence to support it, and that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellants to abide the event.
Laughlin and Scott, JJ., concurred ; McLaughlin and Houghton, JJ., dissented.
Sic.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
The referee found as a fact that MeComb, who owned a large tract of land adjoining land owned by the Chauncey Realty Company, agreed if that company would settle and discharge certain claims of the estate - of Wood, his brother-in-law, against Joel B.; Erhardt and others interested in the realty company’s property, which were in-suit, by satisfying two mortgages for something over $1,000, and in addition give' á note of the realty company for $2,000 to Mary Esther MeComb, as administratrix, that then “ he, the said James Jennings MeComb, would grant and convey to the Chauncey Realty Company for the benefit of its said lands, an easement in perpetuity to use Walgrove Avenue and the sewer mains thereunder, and also to extend said mains from the terminals thereof, and to extend • Walgrove Avenue in a southerly direction through his property into the lands of the Chauncey Realty Company and to use said sewer and roadway extensions, and would also grant and' convey. to the Chauncey Realty Company a right of way over ..his property, known as the Alpine Drive Turn. But it - was provided by the said MeComb that said easement of sewage was to be limited to interior and not to include the roof drainage of . buildings or surface' drainage, and that said Walgrove Avenue extensions and the sewer thereunder were to be subject as to location ■ to the approval of William C. Kidney, the agent, of said MeComb, and the sewer extension was to be built with Y’s every 50 feet to furnish drainage facilities for the MeComb property through which . it passed.”
The prevailing opinion proceeds lipón the theory that this finding ' is without evidence to support it, and for that reason there should be a new trial. I am unable to concur in this view. . I think that the finding is not only sustained by the evidence,, but that a finding to the contrary would be against evidence. The fact that the realty company did settle the claims of the Wood estate against Erhardt and others, and satisfied the mortgages and gave the note is not disputed, and it could not well be in view of the receipt given on the 20th of February, 1900, by the administratrix of that estate, and which was witnessed by MeComb himself. Mor is the fact disputed that the realty company did' exténd Walgrove avenue across McComb’s property at an expense to it of $1,655,-and laid there
When the whole subject is considered, it is perfectly obvious that the realty company was negotiating not for a mere personal license, but for something which shbuld be permanent —something which should be appurtenant to and run with the property which was to be developed. It wanted a way onto its land and a right to sewer therefrom. It is improbable that the company would expend large
We have, therefore, not only the testimony.of the witness, Lamb, that McComb agreed to give a. perpetual easement of sewerage and roadway, and the testimony of the witness, Kidney, that he heard the matter discussed between them, but we have also the written statement of McComb himself that he had given such easements and the written report of the president of the realty company to its stockholders to the same effect, to which he did. not in any way ■object.
There is other evidence in the record tending' to- show that what he agreed to give was not a mere license, but an easement. Enough lias been referred to, however, to1 indicate that the finding to which reference is made in the first part of the prevailing opinion, instead ■of being without evidence to support it,, is abundantly sustained by the evidence. We start, therefore, with the proposition, that McComb didi agree to give such easement, and the question is, is it of such a kind or character as a court of equity will enforce? In answer to the question it is suggested that since no deed had been given when the asylum purchased the property the agreement, was a mere chose in action and did not pass- under the foreclosure sale. But it is to be observed that when the property was sold tire sewer and roadway had been completed. So far as the realty company was concerned the contract had been performed. It had built the road and sewer across the McComb lands precisely as it agreed to do. .All that remained was to connect whatever buildings might be erected upon its property with the sewer which extended some twenty feet onto its land'. This was the condition when the asylum took title. Thé conveyance by the referee of the’ land covered by the mortgage carried with it as an appurtenance to the thing conveyed, McComb’s agreement to give an easement of sewerage and roadway. It was the visible means of access to and from the property. It was the only system of sewerage connected with it.
The .case in some respects is much like Newman v. Nellis (97
The principle announced in that case, it seems to me, should be applied to this. For a valuable consideration McComb had agreed to grant the easements in question and in pursuance of the agreement the realty company paid the consideration, entered upon his land, and at a large expense constructed the sewer and roadway as the parties had agreed. -The contract having been performed by the realty company it thereby acquired- a right or easement which a court of equity ought to enforce or protect, and this easement or right, whichever it may be called, passed to the asylum. (Dempsey v. Kipp, 61 N. Y. 462; Rindge v. Baker., 57 id. 209.) As was said in the case last cited': “ As a court of equity will take a parol contract for the sale of lands out of the statute of frauds, when it is partly performed, it will, on the same principle, treat an executed parol contract for an easement as equivalent to a grant under seal, where the parties cannot be restored to their original position.”
It would be most unjust and inequitable, as the case now stands, to deprive the asylum of the right to use the sewer and roadway. It has spent between $800,000 and $900,000 upon its property and unless it can use the sewer as it now exists it will cost in the neighborhood of $100,000 more to provide sewer facilities. It nowhere appears that the use of the sewer will injure, the plaintiffs or be prejudicial to their rights, but unless the asylum can do so it must necessarily result, to its great damage. Under such circumstances a court of equity ought to enforce the agreement which McComb made. (Rindge v. Baker, supra; Miller v. Ball, 64 N. Y. 286; Newman v. Nellis, supra; Hay v. Knauth, 169 N. Y. 298.)
I think the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Hottghtojst, J., concurred.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellants to abide event.
See 3 Waskb. Real Prop. (3d ed.) 379.— [Rep.