Titford v. KnottTitford v. Knott
delivered the opinion of the court. The question, in this case, is as to the competency of the proof of the hand-writing оf the defendant; and we are of opinion it was admissible. It is usual for witnesses to prove hand-writing, from previous knowledge of the hand, derived from having seen the person write, or from authentic papers, received in the course of business.(
To repel this proof, the defendant produced two witnesses, who severally swore, that they were acquainted with his hand-writing, and that the note in question was not signed with his hand. The defendants, also, produced several notes, admittеd to be his, for the jury to judge, by comparison, and they were delivered to the judge, by consent. This consent takes away all objection tо the admissibility of the notes, and we, therefore, decline giving any opinion, as to the legality of such testimony, without consent.
The рlaintiff then proved the endorsement to the note by a confidential clerk, who testified, that the plaintiff and endorser (who rеsided in London) had long beea correspondents, and that their letters came into his hands; and although he had never seen the endorser write, he believed the endorsement to be his hand, from/the knowledge he had acquired from the correspondеnce.
This proof was undoubtedly admissible and competent; (Buller’s N. P. 236;) and there is no sufficient cause shown for disturbing the verdict.
Rule refused.(
Notes
(a) The State v. Allen, 1 Hawks’ R. 6. Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. R. 55, 59, 60. Carey v. Pitt, Peake’s add. Cas. 130. Russell v. Coffin, 8 Pick R. 143. Hammond’s case, 2 Greenl. R. 33. Radford’s adm’r. v. Peggy,
“ Hand-writing is well proved by a witness who has received letters from the party, in answer to letters written to him by the witness, though the witness has never done аnything in consequence of the receipt of such letters. Doe v. Wallinger, cor. Holroyd, 3. Dorchester Spring Assizes, 1819, 2 Stark. Ev. 273, n. (h.) 6th Amer. ed. If letters are sеnt directed to a person on particular business, and an answer is received in due course, a fair inference arises that the answer was sent by the person in whose hand-writing it purports to be. Per Lord Kenyon in Carey v. Pitt, Peake’s add. Cas. 130. The like general doсtrine prevails where’the witness, though he has seen no written correspondence of the party, is able to testify from other authentic papers, received or examined by him in the course of business; per Kent, J. in Titford v. Knott,
(b) “ Mr. Starkie, sрeaking as to the rule excluding mere comparison of hands, says, that perhaps after all, the most satisfactory reason for it is, that if such comparison were allowed, it would open the door to the admission of a great deal of cоllateral evidence, which might go to a very inconvenient length. For, in every case, it would be necessary to go into distinct evidence, to prove each specimen produced to be genuine ; and even in support of a particulаr specimen, (if the present rule were to be broken through,) evidence of comparison would be receivable in order to establish the specimen, and so the evidence might branch out to an indefinite extent. 2 Stark. Ev. 375, 6th Am. ed.
“ By comparison, is now meant, an actual comparison of two writings with each other, in order to ascertain whether both were written by the same рerson ; though formerly, even comparing the standard formed in the witness’ mind with the writing in dispute, was called evidence by comparisоn : and hence, was deemed inadmissible, at least in criminal eases. 2 Stark. Ev. 373, 374, 6th Am. ed.
“ The English courts have consistently followed the rule, еxcluding evidence founded upon a mere comparison of hands by witnesses. See an elaborate note, exhibiting most of the earlier English cases, 4 Esp. Rep. 273, a, Day’s ed. A witness cannot have two writings placed in his hands, and then be asked, whether, in his belief, bоth were not written by the same person. Clermont v. Tullidge, 4 Carr. & Payne, 1. See also Mutchinson v. Allcock, 1 Dowl. & Ryl. 165 ; Greaves v. Hunter, 2 Carr. & Payne, 477. On information for a riot, a letter from the prosecutor was offered by the defendant, and admitted to be genuine. Thеn a lost letter was proposed to be proved by a witness, who never saw the prosecutor write, but would swear it was in the same hand with the letter produced ; this was rejected because he had never seen the party write. The King v. Sir T. Culpepper, Skin. 673.” Cowen & Hill’s Notes to 1 Phil. Ev. 1326.
“ The doctrine excluding comparison of hands by witnesses, was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Strother v. Lucas, 7 Peters’ R. 763. ‘ It is a general rule,’ said Thomрson, C. J., delivering the opinion in that case, ‘ that evidence by comparison of hands is not admissible, where the witness has had no previous knowledge of the hand-writing, but is called upon to testify merely from a comparison of hands.’ Id. 767.” The same doctrine has bеen recognized in New York, Jackson ex dem. Van Duzen v. Van Duzen, 5 Johns. R. 155. See Jackson ex dem. Woodruff v. Cody, 9 Cowen, 140 ; Haskins v. Stuyvesant, Auth. N. P. 97 ; Jackson v. Phillips, 9 Cowen, 94; Wilson v. Kirkland,
(c) See Peake’s Law of Ev. 2d ed. 103, 107.