Case Information
*1 Before BOWMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and STROM, District Judge.
___________
BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
*2 After receiving an arbitrator's decision against the company, Titan Wheel Corp.
of Iowa sued in the District Court [2] to vacate the arbitrator's award. Titan argued that the award should be vacated because it was rendered seven months after it was due under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in force between Titan and Local 2048. The District Court granted summary judgment to Local 2048, and Titan appeals.
I.
Titan terminated Alvaro Perales's employment in March 1997. Perales grieved his termination, and eventually his union, Local 2048, entered into binding arbitration with Titan pursuant to the CBA. The arbitration hearing took place before a single arbitrator on February 13, 1998. The parties filed their briefs with the arbitrator on April 1, 1998, officially closing the arbitration proceedings.
The parties had not received a decision from the arbitrator by August 1998, and they jointly sent a letter to the arbitrator on August 7 inquiring about the status of the proceeding. [3] The arbitrator did not respond. On December 23, 1998, the arbitrator *3 issued his decision, which awarded Perales retroactive reinstatement with full backpay and benefits.
II.
On appeal, a district court's order confirming an arbitration award is subject to
de novo review on questions of law and review of findings of fact for clear error. First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
Titan argues that we should set aside the arbitrator's decision because it was
rendered well after the time limit specified in the CBA and therefore failed to draw its
essence from the CBA. Section 5:16 of the CBA provides that the arbitrator's decision
"must be in writing within thirty (30) calendar days after the closing of proceedings."
To comply with this provision, the award should have been rendered by May 1, 1998.
Instead, it was issued in December 1998, approximately seven months late. The CBA
does not contain any provision specifying what effect, if any, a late award has.
[4]
*4
Titan argues that the thirty-day time limit in the CBA is mandatory and
jurisdictional; thus, the award cannot draw its essence from the CBA because it was
void ab initio. Unless the parties explicitly agree otherwise, questions of procedure
such as this one are submitted to the arbitrator along with the merits of the dispute. See
McKesson Corp. v. Local 150 IBT,
Titan and Local 2048 as an objection by Titan. Nowhere in the letter is the thirty-day
*5
arbitrator in this case reasonably could have interpreted the CBA to permit him to issue
his award after the expiration of the thirty-day limit found in section 5:16. See Midwest
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Allied Sales Drivers, Local 792,
Titan argues that even though it failed to make a timely objection to the lateness of the award, we should decline to enforce the award because of the harm Titan will suffer. Titan is obligated to pay a greater sum of backpay and benefits to Perales because of the award's untimeliness. Titan argues that because it must pay more, it has necessarily been harmed. The harm Titan complains of is not, in this instance, the kind of legally cognizable harm that would cause us to excuse its failure to make a timely objection to the lateness of the arbitrator's award. Titan could have objected to the lateness of the arbitrator's decision before that decision was rendered. The company's failure to object until after the arbitrator had issued his decision renders the company limit mentioned, nor does either party affirmatively assert its right to a timely award. See supra n.3. The District Court did not clearly err by finding that the only plausible reading of the letter is that the parties were inquiring as to the status of the decision. The letter does not express an objection to the award's lateness, nor does it act, as Local 2048 contends, as a waiver of the time-limit provision in the CBA. Our resolution of this issue also conforms to the approach we have taken in
similar labor disputes regarding procedural irregularities and objections made to them
after the issuance of an arbitrator's decision. See, e.g., Minot Builders Supply Ass'n v.
Teamsters Local 123,
ill-positioned to now complain about the resulting monetary increase in the arbitrator's award.
The order of the District Court granting summary judgment to Local 2048 is affirmed.
A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Notes
[1] The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
[2] The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
[3] The entire body of the letter stated the following: In reviewing our files, we noted that we have not heard from you regarding the above-captioned grievance. As this is a joint inquiry, we would appreciate hearing from you regarding the status of this matter. Thank you. Letter from Douglas G. Olson and Thomas D. Stockton to William O. Eisler, Arbitrator (Aug. 7, 1998). A representative of Titan and of Local 2048 signed the letter.
[4] Citing cases from the Sixth, Fourth, Seventh, and Second Circuits, Titan asserts
that the circuit courts are split as to the effect of a late award when the CBA is silent
on that particular issue. We disagree. In Detroit Coil Co. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge # 82,