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Tippins Bank & Trust Co. v. Southern General Insurance
464 S.E.2d 381
Ga.
1995
Check Treatment

*1 Roy Browning, Tanksley Casurella, Barnes, E. Alston & Barnes, Bird, & Conley Ingram, Graves, III, Daniel F. Judson Ben Johnson G. Gregory, Powell, Rothman, Arnall, Robert L. Kent, & A. Golden Murphy, Rawls, Anderson, & Walker Goldstein, James C. Frazer & Bush, Jr., Reichert, H. amici curiae. Walter et al. S94G1341. TIPPINS BANK & TRUST COMPANY GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY. SOUTHERN 381) Justice. Hines, Appeals granted de- to consider its We certiorari to the Court of Tippins Bank in Southern Ins. Co. v. &c. cision Gen. determined The Court of required longer under OCGA 33-24-46 insurer that an lapse notify stan- insured lienholder of the residential or a premi- pay failure to fire because of the named insured’s dard legislative in- based assessment of ums. The determination was tent. on an construing glean in is to the intent The cardinal rule a statute 601) Mulkey, legislature. 201, 202 State v. (1984); (1980). Christy, Bd. Trustees v. history telling. legislature legislation of the passed provided: act, an which any policy of in

No which interests by pay- protected loss in the lienholders named may insurer so clause cancelled or nonrenewed able be destroy protection for the said as to afforded possessed by unless notice of such interests the lienholders copy to the or or thereof sent cancellation lienholders nonrenewal provided [Ga. Code] sections manner for 56-2430 and 56-2430.1. p. as OCGA 33-24-47.

Ga. L. This was later 878. codified January amended, to add the The Code was effective pro- predecessor § 56-2430.3, which Ga. Code cancellation insured vided that the insurer send to the policies. L. Ga. or nonrenewal of certain standard fire (b) (3) p. as “failure Code defined “nonrenewal” 56-2430.3 by expressly 2018. Subsection an insurer to renew.” Id. at refusal premium: nonpayment nonrenewal for statute addressed notice is be unless written Nonrenewal shall not effective provided respect nonpayment premium . . . to the pay expiring policy for the or the failure of the insured to renewal, required by either of days such effective shall not than ten case date be less after the date of notice.

Id. at 2018-2019.

Chapter 24 of in 1984. significant Title 33 underwent amendment containing provision notice to the lienholders repealed entirety adopted. in its and a new 33-24-46 was OCGA (b) (1) solely 33-24-46 then defined “nonrenewal” as “a refusal renew,” an insurer ... to and omitted from the definition a “failure” (d) to provided: renew. Subsection “No insurer shall refuse to a renew applies to which this Code section a written unless notice person nonrenewal is mailed or delivered to named insured.” Appeals correctly The repeal Court concluded 33-24-47, OCGA coupled changes with the OCGA 33-24-46 evinced the legislative required intent that an insurer now be (d) pursuant only when the re- reason, is, fuses, for whatever That in- to renew cluding provision, longer its notice included the situation in which nonpayment premium by was not renewed because of insured. legislative requirement intent narrow of the

statute is confirmed addition the statute effective 1995. The amendment added to the definition of or “nonrenewal” (b) (1): “nonrenewed” contained in Failure pay required of an insured to of the insured for renewal after the insurer has manifested a will- ingness by delivering policy, renew a renewal renewal cer- tificate, or other evidence renewal to the named insured or representative his or her has or offered to issue a renewal certificate, policy, or other evidence of or has renewal mani- fested by any such intention other means shall not be con- strued to be nonrenewal.

(Emphasis supplied.) “In construing subsequent statutes acts of the legislature may subject Wingfield on the same be considered.” v. Ku tres, 474) (1911). Indeed, SE the courts not only guided by to be Assembly’s expression the General last on a sub ject, Comm., the latest declaration controls. v. Public Svc. Alford (b) (418 (1992); Bd. Trustees Christy, supra Balkcom, at 555 See Gunn v. also 500) (1972). case, insurer did not of this

Accordingly, the circumstances required under 33-24-46. duty to send notice have reconsideration, rejected On the Court motion whether the insurer statutory provision governing assertion pay the insured fails give notice to a lienholder when must pol- policy lapses at the end policy premium and the rather than OCGA icy period is OCGA 33-24-44 not expiration lapse does con- properly It did so. “[T]he Goodley v. Fund American Fireman’s stitute a cancellation.” Life King See also Co., Ins. (11th 1982). This F2d Cir. com- v. Guardian Life statutory required limit notice to ports apparent scheme to the insurer’s coverage is ended because of those instances own failure unwillingness or refusal to renew rather then insured’s to act. concur, Hunstein, Judgment except All the Justices affirmed.

Carley, JJ., Thompson, who dissent. Justice, dissenting. Carley, (Insured) purchased Dees a standard Tommy J. (In- Company

fire Southern General Insurance from *3 surer). the contents policy The covered Insured’s residence and & Trust one-year Tippins and Bank Com- period thereof for a listed (Lienholder) 1991, payee. May In Insurer mailed a re- pany as a loss him Insured, informing policy expire newal to that 18, premium paid before that on June 1991 unless the renewal was Thereafter, the re- date. sent to the lienholder. No such was and, 5,1991, Insured’s residence paid newal was not payment destroyed by When a and its contents were fire. claim denied, against suit policy under Lienholder filed Insured and summary in favor of In- granted judgment Insurer. The trial court Lienholder, Appeals Southern sured and but the Court of reversed. (444 Co., &c. SE2d Tippins App. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Bank 213 Ga. 176 331) (1994). holding of granted We certiorari in order to review the that Appeals majority of this Court affirms hold- Court of Ap- ing. my opinion, court the Court the trial was correct and peals I dissent. Accordingly, respectfully erred. must policy differs from the “non-

The “cancellation” of an insurance Co., Ins. Goodley thereof. v. Fireman’s Fund American renewal” Life 7) (1985); v. Southland App. 173 Ga. 277 SE2d Robertson Life Co., (3) Ins. Ga. 808 SE2d OCGA App. policies in general. 33-24-44 OCGA deals the “cancellation” § and the specifically the “cancellation” 33-24-46 addresses both policies, while OCGA property “nonrenewal” certain “nonrenewal” of specifically addresses “cancellation” and policies. requirement automobile a There can be no “cancellation” as previous policy subject which has been “nonrenewal.” supra; provides Goodley, supra. Robertson, at issue here property contemplated OCGA 33-24-46. Accord- ingly, whether, resolution the first issue for under 33-24- coverage a June there was “nonrenewal” Insured’s so that expired as of (d) provides, part, “[n]o in-

OCGA 33-24-46 in relevant policy . surer nonrenewal is mailed or delivered in The error that and the refuse to . . shall renew unless a written notice

person to the named insured.” perceive holdings I in the of both Court of given majority language relates to construction language, that, I would hold under this it upon incumbent and an insurer effectuate nonrenewal give requisite re- insurer’s failure to notice of nonrenewal sults the automatic renewal See Bank Toccoa v. Cotton thereof. (2) (439 60) (1993) App. States Mut. Ins. and Ga. 426) (1988) App. Mims, Mut. Co. v. (e) (construing language the identical of OCGA 33-24-45 (1)). Unigard Compare Fox, Mut. Ins. Co. v. (decided (1977) 33-24-46)). enactment OCGA language If this mandates automatic renewal of automobile insur- give ance for failure of OCGA notice of nonrenewal under (e) (1), language then the identical of OCGA 33- (d) property 24-46 mandates an automatic renewal insurance under that same Statutes not to circumstance. are be construed a vac- part, they uum, relation to other statutes which and all relating subject statutes to the same matter are to be construed to- gether, possible. Express and harmonized wherever East West Col- 599) undisputed lins, It is provide any Insurer did not notice of its refusal to renew Insured’s contrary, affirmatively gave To the Insurer notice of its intent policy. Accordingly, applies here, renew if automatically Insured’s was renewed as the result of Insurer’s failure notice of nonrenewal. regard pro- insurance, With to automobile the automatic renewal *4 (e) apply § vision of OCGA 33-24-45 does in not certain enumerated including instances, the case wherein the insurer its has “manifested (f) willingness § Thus, to renew” the if giving insurance, case involved automobile the insurer’s of notice policy finding preclude of its intent renew the of automatic give renewal based on the failure of the insurer to notice of nonre- Progressive Brown, newal. v. Ins. Co. 261 Ga. 837 Preferred 430) (1992); App. SE2d v. Fid. Smith Southeastern 708) (1984); GEICO, 26 Garner v. 350) (1973). However, property this case involves insurance insur- rather than automobile the ambit of within OCGA § 33-24-45. At all relevant provisions of OCGA ance controlled § comparable to that times, no in OCGA 33-24-46 language there was (f) (3), render automatic re- which would of OCGA 33-24-45 (d) inapplicable in case provision of OCGA newal willingness its renew.” “manifested wherein the has (b) to OCGA 33-24-46 posits that the amendment majority (1), July comparable on constitutes which became effective (f) (3). However, assuming even that of OCGA 33-24-45 language to interpretation is in of the substantive majority correct its amendment, applicability It is the latest it no here. effect has Gunn v. applicable expression legislative intent which controls. Balkcom, 500) (1972) (holding that there at the time defining law the crime of foeticide the crimi- valid he was of that nal defendant committed the acts for which convicted crime). (b) (1) may be the latest The amendment OCGA § intent, applicable legislative it not to the reso- expression of the this, case, ex- such is controlled the law as it lution as construction, prior July 1, involving statutory isted cases interpretation not unless the lan- give this Court will a retroactive interpretation. Wilmoth guage of the enactment itself mandates that Henry County, There (b) nothing in to OCGA 33-24-46 language the amendment prior application occurring which mandates to events its that, notice of its intent to re- regardless 1995. It follows of Insurer’s new, property policy in this case was renewed automati- give cally on June as the result of Insurer’s failure of nonrenewal accordance with OCGA 33-24-46 automatically one-year for a policy Since Insured’s was renewed July 5, policy on term June would be effect prop- unless it interim. No cancellation had been cancelled erty be within the ambit OCGA 33-24-46 “shall prescribed in 33- effective unless Code Section mailed delivered (c) (1). (d), 24-44.” a fail- Under OCGA 33-24-44 part payments on the insured make authorizes ure policy by giving days’ the insurer to ten written notice. cancel the Thus, notwithstanding the automatic renewal nonrenewal, resulting give from Insurer’s failure to days upon Insurer have within ten based could cancelled the However, premium. timely paid Insured’s failure to have the renewal no- undisputed it is that Insurer did not Insured and Lienholder (d). It fol- tice of cancellation in accordance with OCGA 33-24-44 that, validly automatically lows was not because the renewed fire, correctly granted cancelled to the date the trial court *5 of and on the issue summary judgment favor Insured Lienholder Co., supra v. Cotton States coverage. See Bank Toccoa Mut. at I hold erred in Accordingly, Court judgment respectfully I must to the reversing correct and dissent majority’s contrary holding.

I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice join Thompson in this dissent. —

Decided December 1995. denied December Reconsideration Franklin, Taulbee, Rushing, Brogdon, Brogdon, Bunce & W. M. Jr., appellants. for Childs, Groover, Jr., Newton, Smith,

Groover & Denmark Dur- den, Rice, Wilson, Smith, & R. appellee. for Kaufold Norman, Long, Huie, Aldridge & W. Stell amicus curiae.

S95A1453. TRICE THE STATE. THE

S95A1454. HEAD v. STATE. Justice. Carley, Appellants Stephen William jointly Trice and Head were tried jury. before guilty Trice was found of malice murder and armed robbery, guilty felony Head was found murder while in the com- mission robbery, armed and were guilty burglary, both found aggravated possession battery, a firearm while the commission of crime, possession and firearm convicted felon. The trial court judgments entered of conviction and jury’s sentences on the guilty verdicts, including sentences of life imprisonment on mur- Thereafter, der separate and, counts. motions for trial new were filed when denied, separate those motions were appeal notices of were filed.1 The appeals two disposition for single consolidated in this opinion.

1. The produced State showing evidence that Trice and Head The crimes on occurred November and indictment was returned on Feb ruary 9, guilty judgments 1994. The verdicts were returned March on and the April 11, conviction and were on sentences entered 1994. Trice’s motion for new trial was 14,1994, April 20,1994 April filed on Head’s motion new trial was filed on and amended April 7,1995, May 18,1995. appeal and both motions were denied on Head’s May May filed on followed Trice’s 1995. The cases were docketed Court on were submitted for decision on

Case Details

Case Name: Tippins Bank & Trust Co. v. Southern General Insurance
Court Name: Supreme Court of Georgia
Date Published: Dec 4, 1995
Citation: 464 S.E.2d 381
Docket Number: S94G1341
Court Abbreviation: Ga.
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