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Tingley v. Harrison
867 P.2d 960
Idaho
1994
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*1 presents award. this ease sation Because Court, private

novel issue whether may be allowed in a situation

condemnation benefit, and

involving purely personal brought frivolously, we reverse the trial attorney Costs on

court’s award fees.

appeal appellants. TROUT,

McDEVITT, C.J., J., and

REINHARDT, Tern., J. Pro concur.

BAKES, (Ret.), recused. J. TINGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

John O.

and Plaintiff,

Mary Kamer,

Terry and Doe E. HARRISON Jane

Harrison, wife, husband and

Defendants-Respondents, Doe L. Herndon and

Steven Jane

Herndon, wife, husband and

Defendants.

No. 19964. Idaho,

Supreme d’Alene, 1993 Term.

Coeur October 6, 1994.

Jan. *2 complaint dis-

November on Rule 41 of Idaho Rules missed based prosecute. Procedure failure Civil later, February January or years two Over Tingley that he *3 Harrison informed dis- thought had had the case Herndon during deposition his missed. When asked underly- of the possible about dismissal action, replied ing that he sure was had at that case been dismissed time.

Shortly learning of the dismissal after action, personal injury Tingley filed a his Missoula, MT, Molodragovich, Dye, Dale & pursuant Chapter 7 of the Bank- petition Radakovich, Lewiston, Danny and for J. ruptcy Act in the United States Reform ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​​‍argued. plaintiff-appellant. Binnеy, R. John Bankruptcy for the District of Mon- Smith, Hull, (“Bin- Quane, & d’Al- attorney Howard Coeur through Binney R. tana Jon ene, defendants-respondents. K. ney”). Tingley for Susan instant unresolved listed the Servick, argued. against and Herndon on claim Harrison contingent B-2 as a claim. On

Schedule 9, 1987, McDEVITT, Earner March and filed F. Chief CHAS Justice. through attorney their cause of action instant ap- Tingley (“Tingley”) Appеllant, John (“Radakovich”) against Danny J. Radakovich granting peals order of the trial court an Herndon, alleging that Harri- Harrison and by respondents, Terry Harrison motions professional and Herndon committed son (“Hern- (“Harrison”) and Herndon Steven malpractice fraudulently their and concealed don”), summary judgment legal in mal- for underlying foreknowledge personаl that the practice ruled as a action. The trial court pur- injury going to be dismissed limitation of law that the statute of matter to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. suant malpractice Tingley, action. who barred the 1988, 2, granted court On March district April in almost bankruptcy declared counsel, foreign motion for association of filed, year present bеfore the action was Binney permitting to serve as associate coun- of limitation does contends that statute with Radakovich. On sel not bar the action. asserts bankruptcy in filed Ratification the trustee estate, bankrupt action is cause of authorizing bring Agreement Tingley to subject and thus to an alternative “though in name suit is suit his own bankruptcy code that hаs under subject property the estate and to distri- yet run. We affirm. pursuant 726.” bution U.S.C. 1, 1988, Judge Magnuson On November BACKGROUND summary for respondents’ denied motions injury personal July arises out of a judgment May This case of 1988. filed granted Herndon re- by attorneys Judge subsequently suit Harrison and filed Eosonen summary spondents’ and his former wife motions on behalf of renewed 11, 1990, (“Earner”). in- on judgment, filed December bаsed Mary Tingley was Earner of limitation. Ridge running statute jured fighting a fire while Cedar grant- order Tingley appeals the trial court’s Athol, Idaho, July 1979. Mill near respondents. judgment ing summary retained the services Tingley and Earner represent them a suit Herndon ON APPEAL ISSUES damages for the Ridge to recover Cedar injuries a com- rul- Herndon filed sustained. the district court erred I. Whether Dur- July ing limitation barred plaint their behalf on 1981. that the statute of suit, pursuing appellant became ing course of the Harrison cause of action. Tingleys. for the On associated as counsel malpractice pro- II. Whether the district court erred in rul- causes of action. It also ing that 11 U.S.C. extends the at the vides that the cause of action accrues statute of limitation to a trustee occurrence, act, time of the or omission com- finding and in that the trustee failed to plained of. case extends the time Idaho law join timely this cause of action under 11 plaintiff of accrual to the date when the ratify or to the cause of damaged negligence continuing. where 17(a). action under I.R.C.P. Nash, Griggs v. Tingley asserts that 124-25 STANDARD OF REVIEW questiоn concerning of fact there is A summary judgment motion for “shall be of ac- accrual date of the cause pleadings, deposi- rendered forthwith if the *4 summary judgment precludes tion that tions, file, together and admissions on with this ease. He contends that evidence show- affidavits, any, if show that there is no ing underlying that he did not know that the genuine any issue as to material fact and that personal injury action had been dismissed moving party judgment is entitled to a as 1986, April genuine until of creates a issue as 56(c). a of Upon matter law.” I.R.C.P. a to the exact date this cause of action accrued. summary motion judgment, both the dis- disagree. Griggs We The court acknowl- trict Supreme upon court and the re- edged interpreted that this Court has I.C. view, liberally disputed must construe all 5-219(4) § require damage” “some before non-moving party. facts favor of the Bonz period the action accrues and the limitation Sudweeks, 589, 541, 119 Idaho 808 P.2d begins to run. Id. (1991). See also Chicoine v. 876, 878 All reasonable inferences 482, 483-84, Bignall, 122 Idaho 835 P.2d that can be made from the record shall be 1293, Sudweeks, (1992); made in party opposing favor of the 1294-95 Bonz v. 119 (1991). proving 539, 542, 876, motion. Id. The burden of Idaho 808 P.2d 878 absence of a material fact rests at all times However, interpreted this Court has not I.C. upon moving party. G & M Farms v. 5-219(4) § require plaintiff that the has Co., 514, 517, Funk Irr. 119 Idaho 808 P.2d damage discovered the as contends. (1991). 851, However, 854 opposing par- Clements, 906, Martin v. 98 Idaho 575 P.2d ty’s case speculation. must not rest on mere (1978). Martin, plaintiffs brоught 885 a A mere scintilla of enough evidence is not attorney, seeking cause of action an genuine create a issue of fact. Id. The damages resulting alleged legal from mal- opposing party’s case must “set forth the practice probate in the of their father’s es- particularity; facts with general for if aver- deciding tate. when the cаuse of action ments were sufficient summary judgment purposes applying § accrued for of I.C. 5- procedure utility. would lose its The re- 219(4), this Court refused to infuse the I.C. quirement specificity of is underscored in 5-219(4) § with a “discov- moving cases where the defendant has estab- Martin, 910, ery” exception. 98 Idaho at 575 lished, facie, prima grounded a defense P.2d at 889. See also Theriault v. A.H. the statute of limitations.” Theriault v. A.H. Co., 303, 308, 365, Robins 108 Idaho 698 P.2d Co., 303, 306, 365, Robins 108 Idaho 698 P.2d (1985). 370 (1985) Gorton, (quoting 368 Johnson v. 94 595, 598, (1972)). 1, Idaho 495 4 dispute any Where there is no as to

ANALYSIS of regarding issue material fact when the ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​​‍accrues, of question cause action is one of

I. by law for determination the court. Reis THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN Cox, 438, NOT 46, 104 Idaho 50

GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT case, law, In this as a matter of BASED ON THE THE RUNNING OF possible Tingley’s malprac latest date that OF STATUTE LIMITATION § tice cause of action accrued under I.C. 5- 219(4) 5-219(4) November provides

Idaho Code the date the two-year professional statute of limitation for underlying personal injury action was dis- date, then, following particular

missed. It was on that of it at time.” sure negligent Tingley deposition either far at that he removed antecedent also stated continuing or negligenсe respon- act of asked Herndon about the dismissal after dents, Bonz, damaged. knowledge See Harrison warned him of it. This (determina- by 119 Idaho at 808 P.2d at as shown “damage” prima tion of what constitutes must be record established facie defense presented in grounded decided on circumstances indi- the statute of limitation. See case). 5-219(4) Robins, vidual The I.C. limitation Theriault v. AH.

period applicable to this P.2d at 368. The burden then shifted to 16,1985, and, expired consequent- Tingley sufficient November to come forward with con- ly, Tingley’s complaint, genuine travening bars which he did not evidence to create issue file until March 1987. fact. this bur- Id. met year from-January or den. had Tingley’s claim ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​​‍for relief is barred bring February his cause action. grace period even under al the extended bring He did not the cause of action until 5-219(4) lowed under I.C. for cases where beyond date. March the limitation fraudulently knowing the defendant has Thus, Tingley’s the statute of limitation bars ly damage fact concealed the *5 Summary judgment respondents claim. injured above, party. As noted this Court appropriate. was 5-219(4) § engraft refused I.C: with Howevеr, discovery Tingley argues alternatively rule. the statute itself that discovery estoppel prevents provides plaintiff equitable rule the doctrine of when alleges respondents asserting the mal from the statute of fraudulent concealment of defense, practice. relying The statute makes clear that limitation as on this when holding professionаl malpractice Hosp. fraudulent in Twin Falls Clinic & involves Court’s Hamill, 19, wrongdo Bldg. Corp. or concealment of the v. 103 Idaho 644 P.2d intentional (1982). Hamill, Court, ing, wrongdoing is in deter even when the initial 341 this merely negligent, mining the legislature the statute of limitation Idaho did not 5-219(4) right plain any way § is until limit in the of contained tolled the intend to I.C. equitable injured estop party “knows or the exercise of tiffs to invoke the doctrine of Code, put by enacting § the pel care should have been on 5-219 of Idaho reasonable following inquiry regarding complained the ... forth the as the elements of matter set date, equitable estoppel: of.” After that the statute of limitation year, period after which an action for (1) is or representation false concealment [A] McCoy v. professional malpractice is barred. construc- of a material fact with actual or 765, 772, 360, Lyons, 120 820 P.2d Idaho 367 truth, (2) knowledge party the the tive of (1991). asserting estoppel did or could not know truth, (3) repre- not discover the false Tingley sufficiently alleges fraudulent con- sentation or concealment was made with application of cealment to warrant this (4) upon, be the intent that it relied discovery exception. v. limited See Theriault person representation to whom the was Co., 303, 306, AH. Robins 108 Idaho 698 from facts were con- made or whom the (1985) 365, (party alleging fraud P.2d 369 cealed, represen- upon the relied and acted constituting fraud must state circumstances prejudice. tatiоn or concealment to.his particularity). Johnson v. with See also Gor- (1972). Hamill, 598, 1, 22, ton, 595, at 344. 4 103 Idaho at 644 P.2d 94 Idaho 495 P.2d Theriault, 307, However, 108 698 indisputable, Ting- it is also Idaho at based See Anderson, 369; deposition, v. 116 ley’s Tingley P.2d Anderson affidavit and 364, 1201, (1989); 359, 1206 placed inquiry of the dismiss- Idaho 775 P.2d knew or was 323, 325, 1986, Blakely, 114 757 by February Harrison met Idaho al when Williams (1988). 186, estop- no P.2d 188 There can be him and informed him the dismissal. with Tomerup any оf elements. deposition pel he absent When asked at whether Albertson’s, 6, 1055, 1, 101 thought Idaho had been dismissed after lawsuit (1980). so, Estoppel may prevent a defen- “I 1060 said answered Harrison

91 (9th Cir.1986). asserting statutory dant from bar when 09 See also Scarlett v. Barnes, (Bankr.W.D.Mont. representations his or 121 conduct dissuade a Bankr. 578 1990) plaintiff prosecuting (legal malpractice рroperty from a cause of action estate). 108(a) Theriault, during bankrupt provides of limitation. Section may bring that a an action that (citing 108 Idaho at 698 P.2d at 369 trustee Iwasa, 179, 183, bankrupt years Holmes v. estate within two (1983)); relief, Fairway bankruptcy if Dev. Co. v. of the court order for Petersen, original governing Idaho 865 P.2d 957 statute of limitation proper expired This invoking is not a casе for cause of action has not when estoppel petition bankruptcy. doctrine. A search of the claimant filed the record case, application reveals no evidence that exer- this would defendants any filing cised influence over extend the time limitation for the cause dissuade 18, 1988, years him bringing April his of action to two from causе of action within statutory period. granted. the date relief was II. The record reflects that commenced ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​​‍this cause of action March THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY two-year well within the extended limi INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 11 However, period. tation the record also re 108(A) U.S.C. AND I.R.C.P. bring flects that the trustee did not that, argues next because action; rather, Tingley cause of did. The his claim Harrison and trustee did not enter the scene until property Herndon bankrupt estate four months too late. pursuant to 11 quali the claim maintains that the trustee initiated the mal *6 fies for the period alternative limitation har practice Tingley’s action in for name the 108(a), § in bored 11 U.S.C. which had not agreed, by benefit of the estate and ratifica yet run at the time filed his com tion, by to bе bound the results of such plaint. agree malpractice We that the claim Furthermore, contends, action. the part bankrupt is of the estate and thus clears fact that the trustee ratified the cause of application the first hurdle to the of the 2,1988, August enough action on is to induce 108(a) § 11 peri extended U.S.C. limitation recognition party of the trusteе in as the real However, od. the brought by claim was not 17(a). disagree. interest under I.R.C.P. We trustee, the which is essential to clear the 108(a) applying § second hurdle in limita 17(a) provides Rule that no action 108(a) period. only tion Section tolls the ground shall be dismissed on the that it is respect statute of limitations with to the prosecuted not in party the name of the real debtor-in-possession, trastee or not the debt- in party interest until the interested a has Engine or. See Rebuilders v. Seven Seas objection ratify reasonable time after Merc., Import-Export & 189 Mont. commencement of the action. The rale fur 871, 874 (1980); Besing Seeligson, v. ther states that ratification shall have the 822 (Tex.Ct.App.1991). S.W.2d 107 There same effect if as the action had been com fore, we hold that the action does party in the menced name of the real in 108(a) qualify for the section extended Tingley’s interest. claim that the trustee’s period. original pleadings ratification relates back to 17(a) estate, bankrupt which is creat under I.R.C.P. because the trustee was upon bankruptcy party ed thе commencement of a in the real interest fails for three rea action, First, legal equitable respondents objected includes all or inter sons. by grounds party

ests held the debtor at the time the action on the that he was not the real 541(a). 11 complaint commenced. The in in interest their answer to the action, 17(a) scope of 541 August includes causes of re filed 1987. Rule a affords gardless of whether the action is transferra “reasonable” amount of time to correct an assignable. ble or Sierra naming party plain Switchboard Co. v. inadvertent error in Westinghouse Corp., Joining party Elec. 789 F.2d tiff. 708- the trustee as a at the 92 summary of re- granted judgment in favor not “reason-

late date of 1988 was running of the stat- spondents based able.” in 11 U.S.C. of limitation harbored ute 17(a) Second, only allows retro Rule 108(a). there was a mistake active ratification where naming original party. in United States respondents. appeal Costs & 890 F.2d Use CM A of Benefit Wulff (9th Cir.1989); 1070, 1074 Sec. Bank v. First SILAK, BISTLINE, and JJ. TROUT 221 Gary, Mont. 718 concur. appellant asked Wulff, JOHNSON, Justice, concurring and legal effect of an the court to consider one-year dissenting. complaint filed after the amended run in a statute of limitation had cause opinion, I concur in I of the Court’s originally brought within the limitation part II. respectfully must from but dissent complaint period. named The amended incorrectly view, applied my the Court has allegedly on Miller Act new claim based affirming trial court’s I.R.C.P. assigned plaintiff. Ninth Circuit to thе The summary judgment. com Court refused to treat amended Tingley’s first that The Court concludes assign- plaint specific by as ratification joining delay year the trustee as of one right the cause or of the to maintain Wulffs’ 17(a), party in interest was not “reasonable.” stating real under of action I.R.C.P. given for the conclusion No rationale purpose prevent of the rule is forfei time. year of the was an unreasonable of an action when determination ture the trial when an I wonder what standard right party to sue is difficult or can made, glean and and of the bar will understandable mistake been courts members opinion that of our assignor reading it was the of this that was clear that Partnership the time the only party Appeals entitled to sue at in Conda (Ct. Co., Wulff, original action. P.2d 920 filed the Wulffs Const. The noted that Appeals “[r]ule F.2d at 1074. court con- App.1989), where the Court salutary princi years is the codification an unreason- that two was not cluded ple forfeited that an action should not be party add real time in which to able *7 mistake; 17(a). it is not a because of an honest In pursuant to Con- interest I.R.C.P. by cir provision parties be distorted to da, to Appeals lack the Court of focused period.” Id. at 1075. cumvent the limitations raising the real prejudice party to the he was mis has failed to show that objection. party in interest Id. trustee, in lieu takenly party a case, named In this makes at 922. Court application of rule invoking or that he is Harrison, prejudice to is reference to nor no 17(a) escape than to any other reason any prejudice. evidence of there 5-219(4) period. I.C. Next, lack of a focuses the Court Third, 17(a) applies Rule when naming original party. in No- mistake complaint time barred. original is not 17(a) in is reference made where I.R.C.P. (11th Eddy, 689 F.2d Cir. Hess applicatiоn prerequisite as to the mistake a 1982). case, is Tingley’s In claim ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​​‍time naming of real back of the of the relation belatedly at barred. he party in interest. I could understand party in join trustee as a tempted to mistake, dealing were with if we reference to bar. This the time order circumvent defen- of a claim the relation back manipulate will not allow in incorrectly identified been dant who had 17(a). purpose of Rule the benevolent 15(c) to mis- complaint. I.R.C.P. refers chang- of an amendment in context take discretion trial did not abuse its The court is 17(a) party against claim assert- ing the whom finding relation back in the Rule view, my application of I.R.C.P. no ed. apply not where there was doctrine did require- 17(a) by the same naming governed mistake in not a factual evidence of Apparently, the Court of mistake. properly ment plaintiff Tingley, and therefore require rewritten I.R.C.P. a mistake naming plaintiff party

in who is the real

in interest before there can be a relation naming party

back of an amendment the real

in interest. premise

The ruling third of the Court’s opinion II of the is that I.R.C.P.

only applies original complaint when the

not time ignores unique barred. This By

circumstances this case. virtue of 11 108(A), the trustee had a viable

claim at the complaint, time filed the

although Tingley Obviously did not. Harri-

son knew the party trustee was the real

interest complaint, when filed the alleged

because Harrison in the answer that party was not the real in interest. unique circumstances,

Under appli- these by

cation of the rule cited the Court is erro-

neous.

867 P.2d 967

Leroy MULCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, R. MULCH,

Karen J. Defendant-

Respondent.

No. 19840.

Supreme Idaho, Court of d’Alene,

Coeur Oct. 1998 Term.

Jan. 1994.

Case Details

Case Name: Tingley v. Harrison
Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court
Date Published: Jan 6, 1994
Citation: 867 P.2d 960
Docket Number: 19964
Court Abbreviation: Idaho
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