Tingle v. StateTingle v. State
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard B. Martell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
SHARP, Judge.
Tingle appeals his conviction for sexual battery of a child under the age of eleven years.1 He raises several points regarding admissibility of hearsay evidence, and instructions to the jury, which we affirm. However, the point raised on his request for a hearing to determine competency to stand trial merits discussion. We reverse the trial court‘s imposition of costs as being unconstitutional because the crimes were committed prior to the effective date
Defense counsel filed two motions regarding Tingle‘s competency. The first was filed September 5, 1985, and it is labeled “Motion to Determine Competency to Stand Trial.” It makes an explicit reference to
On September 21, 1985 defense counsel filed another similar motion in which she recited she believed her client was hallucinating and mentally ill. Reference in that motion was to
(b) If before or during the trial the court of its own motion, or upon motion of counsel for the defendant or for the State, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to stand trial, the court shall immediately enter its order setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant‘s mental condition, ... and shall order the defendant to be examined by no more than three nor fewer than two experts prior to the date of said hearing.
Such a written motion filed by defense counsel shall certify in good faith the attorney‘s belief that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, and recite the attorney‘s observations of the defendant, which support this belief.
Both motions in this case appear to comply with all of the requirements of
Tingle also argues that the motions were filed, not only pursuant to
(a) When in any criminal case counsel for a defendant adjudged to be indigent or partially
indigent, whether public defender or court appointed, shall have reason to believe that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial or that he may have been insane at the time of the offense, he may so inform the court who shall appoint one expert to examine the defendant in order to assist his attorney in the preparation of his defense.
Although both motions in this case recite that the defendant may have been incompetent at the time of the offense, defense counsel did not seek to raise an insanity defense at any time. Further, the thrust and purpose for both motions were apparently understood and accepted by both defense counsel and the trial court as having been made pursuant to
Except for the cost assessment, the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRM IN PART; VACATE COST ASSESSMENT.
COBB, J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs in conclusion only.