TINA M., рarent of and Next Friend to S.M.; SHANNON M., parent of and Next Friend to S.M., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ST. TAMMANY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-30220.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 23, 2016.
57
For the reasons given, we affirm the district court‘s decision to dismiss the Hospital System‘s claim for a writ of mandamus.
III
Cape Fear Health System also sought “a declaratory judgment in its favor that HHS‘s delay in adjudication of Medicare appeals violates federal law.” Because we affirm the district court‘s conclusion that the Hospital System failed to state a claim upon which mаndamus relief could be granted, it follows that we must also affirm the district court‘s dismissal of the Hospital System‘s declaratory judgment claim. See Medtronic Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 660, 134 S.Ct. 843, 849, 187 L.Ed.2d 703 (2014) (recognizing that the Declaratory Judgment Act is only “procedural” and does not create “substantive rights” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
* * *
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Wayne Thomas Stewart, Esq., Melissa Losch, Esq., Hammonds, Sills, Adkins & Guice, L.L.P., Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before DAVIS, PRADO, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellees Tina M. and Shannon M. brought suit on behalf of their minor son seeking attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act‘s (“IDEA“) fee-shifting provision. The district court held that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party by virtue of having obtained a “stay-put” order under the IDEA and awarded Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees. Because we hold that obtaining a stay-put order undеr the IDEA is not sufficient to qualify a litigant as a “prevailing party,” we reverse.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs-Appellees Tina M. and Shannon M. are the parents of S.M., a minor with a disability under the IDEA. In response to an incident that occurred away from S.M.‘s school, Defendant-Appellant
In a letter to the Louisiana Department of Education, Plaintiffs’ attorney requested a due process hearing regarding Defendant‘s decision to change S.M.‘s educational program. A hearing was scheduled, and approximately one day before thе hearing was to be held, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law arguing that pursuant to the IDEA‘s stay-put provision, S.M. should be permitted to attend classes at the school pending resolution of the dispute.
Shortly after the hearing was held, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ“) issued a ruling granting Plaintiffs’ request for a stay-put order. Citing thе IDEA, the ALJ directed that S.M. be permitted to continue with his in-class educational program until a decision on the merits of the dispute was rendered. As the ALJ explained, “[u]nder [the] IDEA, a stay-put order is not a final adjudication of the merits of the issue of retention but serves as injunctive relief during the pendency of the due process action to maintain the status quo.” Following this order, the parties reached a settlement through mediation, and Plaintiffs moved to terminate the pending administrative hearing on the merits. Pursuant to Plaintiffs’ request, the ALJ terminated the matter and never reaсhed the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana seeking attorneys’ fees related to the administrative proceedings and any additional fees incurred in the instant suit pursuant to the IDEA‘s fee-shifting provision,
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to
“We review a district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Morris v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 457 F.3d 460, 464 (5th Cir. 2006). A court should grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
III. DISCUSSION
Under the IDEA, a court may “award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs ... to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.”
Contrary to the district court‘s conclusion, the ALJ‘s stay-put order was not a ruling on the merits. The IDEA‘s stay-put provision provides in relevant part that “during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this sectiоn, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child.”
Nor is the stay-put order a “similаr form of judicially sanctioned relief” sufficient to confer prevailing party status. In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court held that to be a prevailing party a litigant must have achieved a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass‘n v. Garland Indеp. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)). This “requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.” Id. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987)). Unlike a judgment on the merits or a consent decree, the relief obtained here was an automatic stay that did not address the merits оr permanently alter the legal relationship of the parties. Rather, it merely provided that S.M. could continue with his prior educational program until a decision on the merits was made.
We also disagree with the district court‘s reasoning that the stay-put order was essentially a рreliminary injunction and that pursuant to our case law in this context, Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys’ fees. A party that successfully obtains a preliminary injunction must have “establish[ed] that he is likely to succeed on the merits.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Conversely, as the ALJ explained herе, the IDEA‘s stay-put provision is an “automatic” “procedural safeguard.” As such, obtaining a stay-put order under the IDEA does not require a showing on the merits. See, e.g., Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A motion for stay put functions as an ‘automatic’ preliminary injunction, meaning that the moving party need not show the traditionally required factors (e.g., irreparable harm) in order to obtain preliminary relief.“); Wag-ner, 335 F.3d at 301 (explaining that a party seeking a stay-put order need “not meet the usual requirements for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief” (quoting Drinker ex rel. Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3rd Cir. 1996))).
Moreover, in Davis v. Abbott, we recently reitеrated the importance of a party having achieved relief on the merits for the purposes of determining prevailing party status in the context of interlocutory injunctive relief. See 781 F.3d at 216. As we noted, “to qualify as a prevailing party in the preliminary-injunction context,” the prеliminary injunction must have been “based upon an unambiguous indication of probable success on the merits of the plaintiff‘s claims as opposed to a mere balancing of the equities in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 2008)). Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that they were the prevailing parties, we held that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy this requirement because in ruling on the preliminary injunction, “the district court‘s analysis did not touch the merits ... in any way.” Id. at 217. Rather, like the ALJ here, the district court in Davis repeatedly noted that its order for interlocutory relief “[was] not a final ruling on the merits of any claims assertеd by the Plaintiffs in this case or any of the other cases associated with this case.” Id. at 218.
Our holding that Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party by virtue of having invoked the IDEA‘s stay-put provision is consistent with several other circuit courts that have addressed this issue.* For instance, in Board of Education of Downers Grove Grаde School District No. 58 v. Steven L., 89 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 1996), the school district decided to alter the educational program of a student who was partially learning disabled. Id. at 465-66. The student‘s parents objected and invoked the IDEA‘s stay-put protections. Id. at 468. Based on their successful request for a stay-put order, thе parents sought attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. Id. at 468-69. The Seventh Circuit rejected their claim, holding that “[t]he law does not view [the student‘s] parents as a prevailing party ... because their only ultimate victory under the IDEA is the invocation of the stay-put provision.” Id. at 469.
J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Township Board of Education, 287 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2002), similarly mirrors the case at hand. In J.O., the school district sought to change the student‘s educational program from in-class to at-home instruction. Id. at 270. The student‘s mother petitioned the New Jersey Department of Education seeking an interlocutory order requiring the defendant to allow the student to return to school. Id. After this request was granted, the student‘s mother filed suit seeking attorneys’ fees. Id. at 270-71. The district court denied the claim for attorneys’ fees and the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 272, 274. In doing so, the Third Circuit rejected an argument nearly identical to the one advanced by Plaintiffs here: that they are the prevailing party because getting their child back into the school pending resolution of the matter was one of their primary goals. See id. at 272-74. As the Third Circuit explained: “We do not deprecate the importance of interim relief of the type received by apрellants. The maintenance of a child‘s educational placement is an important aspect of [the] IDEA.” Id. at 274. However, “a party cannot be a prevailing party if the interim relief received is not merit-based.” Id. at 273.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court is reversed and judgmеnt is rendered for Defendant and against Plaintiffs.
Kosoul CHANTHAKOUMMANE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-70007.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 25, 2016.