Tina Elizabeth LEE, Appellee, v. STATE of Iowa and Polk County Clerk of Court, Appellants.
No. 14-1386.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Feb. 12, 2016.
WIGGINS, Justice.
Paige Fiedler and Brooke Timmer of Fiedler & Timmer, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, - for appellee.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The Polk County Clerk of Court employed Tina Lee until November 2004, when the clerk terminated her employment with the state judicial branch after she took leave to treat her anxiety disorder. In January 2006, Lee filed suit against the State of Iowa and the Polk County Clerk of Court,2 alleging violation of her statutory rights under the self-care provision of the FMLA found at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The State asserted the affirmative defense of state sovereign immunity in this case. The district court denied summary judgment, finding Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity in enacting the self-care provision of the FMLA.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Lee on her claims of wrongful termination and retaliatory disсharge in violation of the FMLA. In October 2007, the district court entered judgment in favor of Lee, awarding her money damages for the wrongful discharge, liquidated damages, reinstatement, and $78,844.21 in attorney fees and costs. The court also ordered the State to train its employees on FMLA compliance. The State filed a notice of appeal and moved to stay the judgment pending appeal without filing a supersedeas bond. Lee agreed to stay collection of the monetary judgment but resisted the motion to stay as to the reinstatement. The district court denied the motion as to the reinstatement, noting Lee would suffer substantial harm if the court furthеr delayed her receipt of salary, and benefits. Lee moved for an award of the attorney fees and costs she incurred in resisting the stay. The district court granted Lee’s motion in March 2008, ordering the State to pay $8803.40 to cover the attorney fees and costs Lee incurred between October 2007 and February 2008.
The State then requested this court to stay the judgment pending the appeal. We granted the State’s request and transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed the district court. We granted the State’s application for further review but held the case in abeyance pending the United States Supreme Court’s deсision in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012).
In considering the State’s appeal, we determined the State preserved its sovereign immunity arguments but incorrectly identified the Eleventh Amendment as the source of its sovereign immunity. Lee v. State (Lee I), 815 N.W.2d 731, 738-39 (Iowa 2012). After noting the Supreme Court held in Coleman that Congress failed to validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in passing the self-care provision of the FMLA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, we proceeded to consider the other ground upon which the district court had denied the State’s sovereign immunity defense. Id. at 739-43 (citing Coleman, — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1332-33, 1335, 182 L.Ed.2d at 300-04). Though we determined the State had not constructively waivеd3 state sovereign immunity, we noted state employees may nonetheless seek injunctive relief in suits against state officials responsible for violations of the self-care provision of the FMLA under Ex parte Young. Id. at 743.
1In this case, the judgment entered by the district court was predicated on legal error. Accordingly, the noninjunctive relief granted in the judgment cannot stand, and we must reverse the district court. We remand the case to the district court to determine what relief granted in its judgment is still available to Lee within the framework of this lawsuit, findings of the jury at trial, and the cloak of immunity protecting the State. The district court shall permit the parties to be heard on this issuе and enter a new final judgment for such relief.
2II. Issues. This appeal presents three issues for us to consider. First, we must determine the source of authority for the award of prospective relief to Lee. Second, we must determine whether state sovereign immunity bars an award of attorney fees and costs to Lee. Third, we must decide whether Lee is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under the FMLA.
III. Scope of Review. “We generally review decisions concerning attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.” Fennelly v. A-1 Mach. & Tool Co., 728 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Iowa 2007). However, when we review a ruling on a motion, the scope of our review depends on the grounds raised in the motion. See, e.g., Clinton Physical Therapy Servs., P.C. v. John Deere Health Care, Inc., 714 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Iowa 2006). Whether a particular remedy is available under Ex parte Young is a question of law. Lee II, 844 N.W.2d at 674. Accordingly, we review the district court’s legal conclusions for correction of errors at law.
The State alleges the source of authority for the award of prospective injunctive relief to Lee is unclear, but it acknowledges the source of authority for the award must be Ex parte Young, the FMLA, or both. Regardless of the source of authority for the award, however, the State contends it is not liable for attorney fees because Lee is not a “prevailing party” under the FMLA and Ex parte Young cannot authorize an attorney fee award in Iowa.
We begin our disсussion by clarifying the source of authority for awarding Lee prospective relief in her FMLA action brought under Ex parte Young. The district court concluded the FMLA authorized the prospective relief awarded to Lee.
The constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity reflects fundamental implications of our federal constitutional design and recognizes that inherent in the nature of sovereignty is some degree of immunity from suit. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-30, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2254-55, 144 L.Ed.2d 636, 662-63 (1999). Because the principle of state sovereign immunity reflects fundamental aspects of state sovereignty affirmed by, rather than originating from, the Eleventh Amendment, states may invoke sovereign immunity in both federаl and state courts.4 Id. at 713, 728-29, 754, 119 S.Ct. at 2246-47, 2254, 2266, 144 L.Ed.2d at 652, 662, 678.
3 4For example, “Congress may abrogate the States’ immunity from suit pursuant to its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Coleman, — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1333, 182 L.Ed.2d at 301. But the question of whether the States may expressly waive state sovereign immunity in federal and state court. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675-76, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2226, 144 L.Ed.2d 605, 616 (1999). And states may constructively waive state sovereign immunity by impliedly consenting to suit under limited circumstances. Lee I, 815 N.W.2d at 741-42.
The Ex parte Young doctrine serves as a means or mechanism for overcoming state sovereign immunity that allows a party to maintain a suit to enforce federal law against a state. Determining whether suit lies under Ex parte Young does not require analysis of the merits of the federal law claim for which a party seeks relief. Id. at 646, 122 S.Ct. at 1761, 152 L.Ed.2d at 883. But the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief turns on the merits of the underlying federal law claim. See Lee II, 844 N.W.2d at 680.
The Supreme Court has often considered the propriety of awarding attorney fees in the context of аctions against states maintained under Ex parte Young, but the Court has not considered the propriety of awarding attorney fees in the context of an action brought under the self-care provision of the FMLA. The first major case addressing attorney fees in the Ex parte Young context was Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). In Hutto, the Court affirmed two attorney fee awards in an Ex parte Young action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce constitutional rights. Id. at 680, 700, 98 S.Ct. at 2568, 2578, 57 L.Ed.2d at 528, 540.
The Hutto Court first affirmed a district court award of attorney fees pursuant to an express finding that state officers acted in bad faith by failing to cure unconstitutional conditions of confinement in state prisons. Id. at 684-85, 689-92, 98 S.Ct. at 2570, 2572-74, 57 L.Ed.2d at 530-31, 533-35. The Court rеasoned the “power to impose a fine is properly treated as ancillary to the federal court‘s power to impose injunctive relief.” Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2574, 57 L.Ed.2d at 534. Thus, the Court held that Congress may authorize awards of attorney fees as part of litigation costs without expressly stating it intends to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id. at 696-97, 98 S.Ct. at 2576-77, 57 L.Ed.2d at 538.
5The Court reaffirmed sovereign immunity “has no application to an award of attorney‘s fees, ancillary to a grant of prospective relief, against a State.” Id. at 280, 109 S.Ct. at 2467, 105 L.Ed.2d at 238, 240. The Court thus held state sovereign immunity does not bar an award of fees including “an enhancement for delay.” Id. at 284, 109 S.Ct. at 2469, 105 L.Ed.2d at 240.
The Court has repeatedly considered yet declined to countenance the argument that states may be ordered to pay attorney fees only in actions brought to enforce Section 5 legislation. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 278-79, 109 S.Ct. at 2466-67, 105 L.Ed.2d at 236-37; Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 130, 100 S.Ct. 2575, 65 L.Ed.2d 653, 661-62 (1980).
The State nоw makes essentially the same argument it made in Lee II when it contended Lee I reversed the October 2007 order in its entirety. Lee II, 844 N.W.2d at 681. Critically, we specifically rejected the notion that the 2007 judgment had no impact on the rights and obligations of the parties in Lee II: the same case. [The State‘s] arguments rest on a flawed premise—that we did not uphold the reinstatement remedy in Lee I. [The State is] technically correct that Lee I did not “affirm” the district court‘s 2007 judgment. Our decision stated that it reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings, ordering the district court to “enter a new final judgment.” But, we agree with the district court‘s interpretation of our remand: “None of the trial court‘s holdings regarding equitable relief were specifically overruled, and as law of the case, they must still be enforced.” We specifically held only the “noninjunctive relief granted in the judgment cannot stand.” We limited the district court‘s task on remand to “determin[ing] what relief granted in its judgment is still available to Lee within the framework of this lawsuit, findings of the jury at trial, and the cloak of immunity protecting the State.” The district court was therefore responsible only for categorizing the elements of the 2007 order as injunctive or noninjunctive. In “the framework of this lawsuit,” the district court‘s 2012 ruling correctly concluded the 2007 reinstatеment order is relief granted in that judgment that is still available to Lee. Id. at 681-82 (final alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Lee I, 815 N.W.2d at 743). We therefore upheld the 2012 order awarding Lee lost wages and benefits from the date of the 2007 order because we determined “the 2007 order imposed prospective injunctive relief from defendants’ violation of the FMLA, creating an obligation to reinstate Lee.” Lee II, 844 N.W.2d at 682.
Just as the matters decided in Lee I controlled as the law of the case in Lee II, those matters decided in both Lee I and Lee II control in the appeal before us. In Lee II, we determined Lee I established the equitable relief included in the district court judgment had never been specifically overruled and therefore remained enforceable as the law of the case. Lee II, 844 N.W.2d at 681. In holding Lee was entitled to prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young from the date of the 2007 order forward, we necessarily determined the 2007 order created an obligation to reinstate Lee that remained in force. Id. at 681-82, 684.
Because the FMLA mandates an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff, only the amount of attorney fees awarded is within the district court‘s discretion. Dotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 303 (4th Cir. 2009); see Dutcher, 546 N.W.2d at 895. When a party challenges the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees and costs, we ordinarily review the amount of the award for an abuse of discretion. Equity Control Assocs., Ltd. v. Root, 638 N.W.2d 664, 674 (Iowa 2001). In this case, the State did not contest the reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs before the district court, nor did the court address this issue in its ruling. Consequently, the State has not preserved this issue for our review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).
Accordingly, we conclude state sovereign immunity did not bar the district court from awarding Lee attorney fees and costs she incurred in seeking prospective relief to remedy violations of the self-care provision of the FMLA in her action against state officials under Ex parte Young.
The FMLA fee provision provides that courts shall award reasonable attorney‘s fees and costs to plaintiffs аwarded any judgment in an FMLA action. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). Federal courts interpreting the FMLA acknowledge its fee provision makes awarding attorney fees mandatory rather than discretionary. See, e.g., Franzen v. Ellis Corp., 543 F.3d 420, 430 (7th Cir.2008) (“Unlike most other statutory fee-shifting provisions, section 2617 requires an award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff when applicable.“).
Consequently, we must determine whether Lee met the statutory prerequisite for an award of attorney fees based on her FMLA claim—a judgment in her favor on that claim. If so, the district court was obligated to award Lee attorney fees and costs, and its discretion was limited to the amount of the award. See id. The FMLA does nоt define the term judgment. See id. § 2611. Generally, the term “judgment” refers to a “final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a case.” Judgment, Black‘s Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014); cf. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.951 (“Every final adjudication of any of the rights of the parties in an action is a judgment.“). Applying recognized conflict-of-law principles, however, we conclude that in order to determine whether the district court order awarding prospective relief to Lee constitutes a judgment in her favor for purposes of the FMLA fee provision, we must determine whether it constitutes a valid judgment by applying state law. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 92 & cmt. c, at 272-73 (1971) (“A judgment, to be valid ..., must be in force in the state where the judgment was rendered.“).
At the conclusion of Lee I, we remanded this case to the district court “to determine what relief granted in its judgment” was still available to Lee under Ex parte Young. Lee I, 815 N.W.2d at 743. The State argues Lee is not entitled to attorney fees under the FMLA because this court wholly reversed the district court judgment in Lee I. It further argues our holding in Lee II that the date of the October 2007 order is the date from which prospective relief should be determined is irrelevant to the question presented in this appeal. We disagree.
Applying these principles to the circumstances before us, we conclude the district court was correct that it was required to award Lee attorney fees and costs under the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). We necessarily determined in Lee II that the 2007 order constituted a valid judgment awarded to Lee that remained in force. See Lee II, 844 N.W.2d at 681-82; see also Restatement (Second) § 92 & cmt. c, at 272-73; Judgment, Black‘s Law Dictionary. As the law of the case, that determination controlled here as to whether Lee qualifies for attorney fees and costs under the FMLA.
Because the FMLA mandates an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff, only the amount of attorney fees awarded is within the distriсt court‘s discretion. Dotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 303 (4th Cir.2009); see Dutcher, 546 N.W.2d at 895. When a party challenges the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees and costs, we ordinarily review the amount of the award for an abuse of discretion. Equity Control Assocs., Ltd. v. Root, 638 N.W.2d 664, 674 (Iowa 2001). In this case, the State did not contest the reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs before the district court, nor did the court address this issue in its ruling. Consequently, the State has not preserved this issue for our review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).
VII. Did the District Court Correctly Determine the Amount of the Attorney Fee and Costs Award?
Because the FMLA mandates an award of reasonable аttorney fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff, only the amount of attorney fees awarded is within the district court‘s discretion. Dotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 303 (4th Cir.2009); see Dutcher, 546 N.W.2d at 895. When a party challenges the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees and costs, we ordinarily review the amount of the award for an abuse of discretion. Equity Control Assocs., Ltd. v. Root, 638 N.W.2d 664, 674 (Iowa 2001). In this case, the State did not contest the reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs before the district court, nor did the court address this issue in its ruling. Consequently, the State has not preserved this issue for our review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).
However, the State challenges the amount of the fees awarded on another ground. Specifically, the State argues state sovereign immunity bars any award of attorney fees and costs to Lee in this action. As we already decided, state sovereign immunity does not prevent courts from awarding attorney fees and costs incurred in seeking prospective relief in actions brought against state officials under Ex parte Young. Espinoza v. Tex. Dep‘t of Pub. Safety, No. CIV.A.3:00-CV-1975-L, 2002 WL 31191347, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2002) (rejecting the argument that only injunctive relief is permitted under Ex parte Young in the context of an action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990). Because attorney fees constitute reimbursеment of expenses incurred in seeking prospective relief, not retroactive liability for prelitigation conduct, courts may award them under Ex parte Young.
Accordingly, we conclude state sovereign immunity did not bar the district court from awarding Lee attorney fees and costs she incurred in seeking prospective relief to remedy violations of the self-care provision of the FMLA in her action against state officials under Ex parte Young.
In determining an appropriate fee award in this case, the district court should consider the general principles governing attorney fee awards in actions in which plaintiffs are only partially successful. Thus, to the extent Lee‘s unsuccessful claims for retroactive relief wеre unrelated to her successful claims for prospective relief, the court may not award fees or costs she obviously incurred in pursuing only the unsuccessful claims. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-36, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, 76 L.Ed.2d at 51-62, 64-65. But to the extent counsel devoted time “generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis,” the court may “focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, 76 L.Ed.2d at 51-52. The court may properly award any fees incurred in the litigation involving “a common core of facts” or “based on related legal theories.” See id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, 76 L.Ed.2d at 51; see also Marez v. Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc., 688 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir.2012); Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 464 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Iowa 1990); Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.W.2d 891, 897 (Iowa 1990).
The court ultimately must consider the reasonableness of the hours expended on the litigation as a whole in light of the degree of success actually obtained. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d at 52. Where a plaintiff is deemed “prevailing” even though he succeeded on only some of his claims for relief, the district court may consider whether the plaintiff failed to prevail on claims unrelated to those on which he succeeded and whether the plaintiff achieved a level of success that makes the hours rеasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award. Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, 76 L.Ed.2d at 51 (footnote omitted). On remand, the district court may consider not only the significance of the success obtained to Lee personally, but also the degree to which her core claim served to vindicate the public interest. Lash v. Hollis, 525 F.3d 636, 642-43 (8th Cir.2008); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Barton, 223 F.3d 770, 773 (8th Cir.2000).
As we have previously recognized, the precise methodology the district court employs to determine a reasonable fee award consistent with the principles outlined above is within its broad discretion: There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations. The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. The court necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment. Vaughan v. Must, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 533, 541 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d at 52); see Schaffer v. Frank Moyer Constr., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 11, 22 (Iowa 2001) (acknowledging the district court has broad discretion as to the amount of an attorney fee award even when awarding fees is mandatory).
We reverse the district court order of June 27, 2014, as to all attorney fees and costs it ordered the State to pay. On remand, the district court should enter an order awarding Lee attorney fees and costs she incurred in sеeking prospective relief in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion.
Costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to each party.
REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
WIGGINS
Justice