*1 Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Timothy Luckey appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his Title VII action alleging discrimination and retaliation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
In an order screening Luckey’s third amended complaint, the magistrate *2 judge found the complaint only included Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims and did not include a breach of contract claim. Luckey waived his right to appeal the magistrate judge’s order because Luckey failed to file a timely objection to it. See Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp. , 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A] party who fails to file timely objections to a magistrate judge's nondispositive order with the district judge to whom the case is assigned forfeits its right to appellate review of that order.”). Thus, we do not consider Luckey’s arguments regarding his breach of contract claim.
We do not consider Luckey’s Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims because Luckey does not challenge the district court’s summary judgment in his opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (court does not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief).
AFFIRMED.
2 15-17507
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).