Timothy Koback v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island.
No. 2019-423-M.P. (16-7082)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
June 24, 2021
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The respondent, Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island (MERS),1 seeks review of a decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC), awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to the petitioner, Timothy Koback. The respondent claims the WCC and its Appellate Division lack the statutory authority to award attorneys’ fees and costs. The respondent also maintains that even if attorneys’ fees are proper, the petitioner did not submit legally sufficient evidence to support such fees under
our precedent. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we quash the decree of the Appellate Division of the WCC.
Facts and Travel
The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. The petitioner was employed as a firefighter by the City of Woonsocket. On March 24, 2012, during the performance of his duties as a firefighter, he sustained a herniated disc injury to his lower back while assisting in a patient transfer. The petitioner filed his application for accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits with the respondent retirement board on September 19, 2013. As mandated by
On November 10, 2015, the retirement board denied petitioner‘s ADR application, finding that petitioner had failed to prove that his injury arose out of and in the course of his duties as a firefighter. The retirement board instead approved petitioner‘s application for ordinary disability retirement. The petitioner requested reconsideration of the decision; and in a letter dated November 18, 2016, the retirement board affirmed its decision to deny petitioner‘s ADR application.
The petitioner then appealed the retirement board‘s adverse ruling to the WCC. In accordance with the WCC‘s rules, practices, and procedures, the matter
was assigned to a trial judge. On May 23, 2017, the trial judge issued a pretrial order denying the petition, from which petitioner filed a timely claim for a trial de novo.
After a full trial, the trial judge issued a written decision granting petitioner‘s petition seeking ADR benefits and awarding a counsel fee to petitioner‘s counsel. In support of his application for attorneys’ fees, petitioner‘s counsel submitted a fee affidavit, detailing the work his office performed and the hours spent on the case, along with a list of fees and costs incurred, for a
The respondent then filed an appeal to the Appellate Division, challenging only the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to petitioner‘s counsel, and contesting the WCC‘s authority to award attorneys’ fees and costs in ADR claims.
In its decision, the Appellate Division rejected respondent‘s arguments, finding that the WCC had statutory authority to award fees and costs in ADR cases. The Appellate Division reasoned that appeals in such cases may be considered “proceedings” and the notice of appeal to the WCC may be considered a petition, within the meaning of
The Appellate Division then considered respondent‘s argument that the affidavits submitted by petitioner‘s attorney were insufficient to support an award of
attorneys’ fees. The decision observed that the affidavits were never “formally introduced as exhibits for the court to review.” Thus, the Appellate Division reasoned, there was no need for a disinterested attorney to vouch for the reasonableness and necessity of fees contained in a fee affidavit. Despite the absence of a formally introduced affidavit, the Appellate Division upheld the fee awarded by the trial judge and imposed an additional fee of $2,500 for counsel‘s work before the Appellate Division. A final decree was entered on October 22, 2019, and respondent filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari with this Court. We granted the petition on November 18, 2019, and the writ of certiorari issued on that same day.
Standard of Review
This Court‘s “review of a case on certiorari is limited to an examination of the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.” Lang v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 222 A.3d 912, 914-15 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Plante v. Stack, 109 A.3d 846, 853 (R.I. 2015)). The Court will “examin[e] the record for judicial error * * * [and] inspect the record to discern if there is any legally competent evidence to support the findings
Additionally,
“[u]pon petition for certiorari, the [S]upreme [C]ourt may affirm, set aside, or modify any decree of the appellate
commission of the workers’ compensation court only upon the following grounds:
“(1) That the workers’ compensation court acted without or in excess of its authority;
“(2) That the order, decree, or award was procured by fraud; or
“(3) That the appellate division erred on questions of law or equity, the petitioner first having had his objections noted to any adverse rulings made during the progress of the hearing at the time the rulings were made, if made in open hearing and not otherwise of record.”
Section 28-35-30(a) .
Furthermore, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Lang, 222 A.3d at 915. “In so doing, [the Court‘s] ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.” Id. (quoting Bluedog Capital Partners, LLC v. Murphy, 206 A.3d 694, 699 (R.I. 2019)). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court will “interpret the statute literally and * * * give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting In re B.H., 194 A.3d 260, 264 (R.I. 2018)). “The Legislature is presumed to have intended each word or provision of a statute to express a significant meaning, and the Court will give effect to every word, clause, or sentence, whenever possible.” Id. (quoting In re B.H., 194 A.3d at 264). However, “this Court will not construe a statute to reach an absurd result.” Id. (quoting In re B.H., 194 A.3d at 264).
Finally, we note that this Court has “staunchly adhered to the ‘American rule’ that requires each litigant to pay its own attorney‘s fees absent statutory authority or contractual liability.” Tri-Town Construction Company, Inc. v. Commerce Park Associates 12, LLC, 139 A.3d 467, 478 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 8 (R.I. 2015)). We have also concluded that “when a rule is silent regarding attorneys’ fees, there is ‘no room for implication by judicial construction’ and attorneys’ fees are not available under the statute.” Shine, 119 A.3d at 10 (quoting Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc., 576 A.2d 1217, 1221 (R.I. 1990)).
Discussion
On certiorari, respondent raises three arguments. The respondent first claims that the WCC and its Appellate Division lack the authority to award attorneys’ fees and costs following an appeal from a decision of the retirement board pursuant to
Statutory Authority to Award Attorneys’ Fees
Because this Court is tasked with determining the interplay between several statutory provisions to resolve this case, we think it is necessary to provide a brief
Prior to July 1, 2011, a party wishing to challenge an adverse ADR decision made by the retirement board was required to file an administrative appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to
For example,
“(f) In the event that any party is aggrieved by the determination of the retirement board pursuant to
§ 45-19-1 , for an injury occurring on or after July 1, 2011, the party may submit an appeal to the Rhode Island workers’ compensation court. The appellant shall file a notice of appeal with the retirement board and shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal upon the opposing party.“(g) Within twenty (20) days of the receipt of the notice of appeal, the retirement board shall transmit the entire record of proceedings before it, together with its order, to the workers’ compensation court.
“(h) In the event that a party files a notice of appeal to the workers’ compensation court, the order of the retirement board shall be stayed pending further action by the court pursuant to the provisions of Rhode Island general law
§ 28-35-20 .“(i) Upon receipt of the record of proceedings before the retirement board, the court shall assign the matter to a judge and shall issue a notice at the time advising the parties of the judge to whom the case has been assigned and the date for pretrial conference in accordance with Rhode Island general law
§ 28-35-20 .“(j) All proceedings filed with the workers’ compensation court pursuant to this section shall be de novo and shall be subject to the provisions of chapters 29 to 38 of Title 28 for all case management procedures and dispute resolution processes, as provided under the rules of workers’ compensation court. Where the matter has been heard and decided by the workers’ compensation court, the court shall retain jurisdiction to review any prior orders or decrees entered by it. Such petitions to review shall be filed directly with the workers’ compensation court and
shall be subject to the case management and dispute resolution procedures set forth in chapters 29 through 38 of title 28 (“Labor and Labor Relations“).
“(k) If the court determines that a member qualifies for accidental disability retirement, the member shall receive a retirement allowance equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3 %) of the
rate of the member‘s compensation at the date of the member‘s retirement, subject to the provisions of § 45-21-31 .”Section 45-21.2-9 (as amended by P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 8 (effective June 29, 2011)).
In addition to amending
Further,
“(c) At the pretrial conference, the judge shall make every effort to resolve any controversies or to plan for any subsequent trial of the case. * * * Subject to the provisions of
§ 45-21.2-9(j) , the pretrial order shall be effective upon entry. Any payments ordered by it including, but not limited to, weekly benefits, medical expenses, costs, and attorney‘s fees, shall be paid within fourteen (14) days of the entry of the order.”Section 28-35-20 .
In comparing the previous avenue of relief afforded to aggrieved parties in disputes concerning an appeal of ADR benefits available in the Superior Court through the APA to the present avenue of relief offered in the WCC, it is clear that
the General Assembly intended to provide a more expansive forum within which claims for ADR benefits are decided and adjudicated. Litigants are now provided with a de novo review of the retirement board‘s decision, which allows the parties to utilize all of the practices and procedures of the WCC. This includes allowing the parties access to the internal workers’ compensation court procedures consisting of a pretrial conference as set out supra in
However, nowhere in
As stated supra,
The next subsection,
the Appellate Division concluded that attorneys’ fees can be awarded to an applicant for ADR benefits on appeal from the retirement board.
However, nothing in
If the WCC was independently authorized to award attorneys’ fees and costs by virtue of reference to
required strict construction of
The petitioner argues that Lang, cited supra, provides binding authority that attorneys’ fees are to be awarded in successful ADR benefits cases. In Lang, this Court considered whether the WCC had subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal filed by a firefighter after the retirement board denied his application for ADR benefits based on occupational cancer. Lang, 222 A.3d at 914, 916. In that case, Mr. Lang applied for ADR benefits in accordance with
We observed in Lang that the Legislature used broad language in
Although we concluded in Lang that there was subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Lang‘s claim, we nowhere concluded that
Again, our Court‘s “staunch[] adhere[nce] to the ‘American rule’ that requires each litigant to pay its own attorney‘s fees” requires that there be explicit statutory authority for the award of attorneys’ fees. Tri-Town Construction Company, Inc., 139 A.3d at 478. The General Assembly‘s deliberate silence and the absence of any explicit authority concerning the award of counsel fees and costs in
are not found in the statute.“) (quoting Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I. 1996)).
Thus, it is clear to us that the General Assembly has not conveyed specific statutory authority upon the WCC to award attorneys’ fees and costs in successful ADR appeal claims. See Eleazer, 576 A.2d at 1221 (concluding that “the right to collect attorney‘s fees did not exist at common law and that * * * consequently such fees may be taxed only when there is either specific statutory authority or contractual liability“). We therefore conclude that the Appellate Division of the WCC acted in excess of its statutory authority in concluding that
Other Issues
In light of our holding in this case, we need not, and shall not, reach the other issues raised by the respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we quash the decree of the Appellate Division of the WCC. The record may be returned to the WCC with our decision endorsed therein.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK‘S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
| Title of Case | Timothy Koback v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island. |
| Case Number | No. 2019-423-M.P. (16-7082) |
| Date Opinion Filed | June 24, 2021 |
| Justices | Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. |
| Written By | Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata |
| Source of Appeal | Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court |
| Judicial Officer from Lower Court | Associate Judge Debra L. Olsson Associate Judge Robert E. Hardman Associate Judge Alfredo T. Conte |
| Attorney(s) on Appeal | For Petitioner: John M. Harnett, Esq. For Respondent: Michael P. Robinson, Esq. |
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)
Notes
“In proceedings under this chapter, and in proceedings under chapter 37 of this title, costs shall be awarded, including counsel fees and fees for medical and other expert witnesses, including interpreters, to employees who successfully prosecute petitions for compensation; petitions for medical expenses; petitions to amend a preliminary order or memorandum of agreement; and all other employee petitions, except petitions for lump-sum commutation * * * .”