Timothy WOODARD v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
Record No. 2048-11-3.
Court of Appeals of Virginia.
March 26, 2013.
739 S.E.2d 220
Andrеw G. Wiggin (Andrew G. Wiggin, P.C., Chesapeake, on brief), for appellant.
Steven A. Witmer, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: PETTY and CHAFIN, JJ., and BUMGARDNER, S.J.
PETTY, Judge.
Timothy Woodard was convicted in a bench trial of felony murder, in violation of
I. Background
“On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.‘” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va.App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)).
On November 16, 2010, Kayla Beame and Cynthia Crumpton were shopping at a store in Danville, Virginia. While there, Beame called Eldesa Smith to see if she could arrange a purchase of ecstasy2 from Woodard. Smith called Woodard and arranged the purchase. Woodard picked up Smith on his way to the store.
Woodard and Smith pulled up to the entrance of the store where Beame was waiting. Beame got into the backseat of Woodard‘s car. Woodard parked his car in the store parking lot. Woodard then sold Beame tеn to fifteen star-shaped ecstasy pills. After completing the transaction, Beame exited the car and Woodard and Smith left the parking lot. All of this occurred at approximately 7:00 p.m.
Beame and Crumpton then met in the parking lot and got into Crumpton‘s van. Beame showed the ecstasy to Crumpton, but neither Beame nor Crumpton ingested any of the pills at that time. Beame, Beame‘s daughter, Crumpton, Crumpton‘s fiancé, and Smith‘s daughter then met for dinner at a restaurant. Beame consumed alcohol with her dinner. After dinner, Crumpton and Beame stopped at a convenience store and purchased beer and cigarettes. They then went to Crumpton‘s apartment in Danville. Smith arrived at the apartment later in the evening. Beame and Smith took some of the ecstasy pills. Smith left the apartment with her daughter at approximately 10:00 p.m.
Crumpton fell аsleep at approximately 11:00 p.m. Beame woke Crumpton up between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. Sometime around 4:30 a.m., Beame and Crumpton fell asleep. Crumpton slept until approximately 1:00 p.m., when she was awakened by her fiancé, who expressed concern about Beame‘s condition.
Beame was not breathing correctly. Crumpton‘s fiancé called 911 while Crumpton started CPR. Beame was in cardiac arrest and was not breathing when the paramedics arrived. Beame remained unresponsive on the way to the hospital, although her heart started beating again. Shortly after arriving at the hospital, Beame was found to be brain dead. Beame was pronounced dead on November 18, 2010.
A search warrant was executed at Woodard‘s home. A large quantity of ecstasy pills and powder were found at the home. Woodard was arrestеd, and he was interviewed by Detective Goins of the Danville Police Department. Woodard made a verbal statement and signed several written statements. Woodard admitted meeting Beame and selling ecstasy to her. Woodard knew that Beame had never taken ecstasy before and that Beame was going to “party.” Woodard further admitted that he was a past user of ecstasy and he knew “that ecstasy can kill a person.”
At trial, the evidence indicated that Beame‘s blood contained .48 mg/liter of ecstasy, which was a lethal level of the drug. Beame‘s blood also contained a non-toxic level of methadone. The Commonwealth presented an expert witness, Dr. Suzuki, who testified that Beame‘s death was caused by ecstasy intoxication. After hearing the evidence, the trial court held that there was a sufficient “causal connection” and “temporal connection” between the sale of the ecstasy
Accordingly, the trial court convicted Woodard of felony murder in violation of
II. Analysis
On appeal, Woodard argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his felony-murder conviction. We agree and reverse the conviction.
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict in a bench trial, ‘the trial court‘s judgment is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.‘” Burrell v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 417, 433, 710 S.E.2d 509, 517 (2011) (quoting Hickson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 383, 387, 520 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1999)). It is the prerogative of the trier of fact “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 178, 185, 692 S.E.2d 271, 274 (2010) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).
The sufficiency of the evidence in this case is controlled by the felony-murder statute,
To convict a defendant of felony murder, however, the killing must be committed “while in the prosecution” of the underlying offense, or as it is often said, within the res gestae of the underlying offense. In other words, the killing must be “‘so closely related to the felony in time, place, and causal connection as to make it part of the same criminal enterprise.‘” Montague, 260 Va. at 701, 536 S.E.2d at 913 (quoting Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033, 1043-44, 243 S.E.2d 477, 483 (1978)); see also Montano v. Commonwealth, 61 Va.App. 610, 617, 739 S.E.2d 241, 244 (2013) (holding that the felony-murder rule elements were met where the underlying felony of driving while intoxicated was “inextricably linked and integral to the victim‘s death“). Notably, “[T]he required elements of the [res gestae] rule, i.e., time, place, and causal connection, are stated in the conjunctive. Therefore, all three elements must be established for the felony-murder statute to apply.” Montague, 260 Va. at 702, 536 S.E.2d at 913. Accordingly, if the underlying felony and the killing are separated by time, place, or causal connection, then they аre “not ‘parts of one continuous transaction,’ [Haskell, 218 Va. at 1041, 243 S.E.2d at 482], and the killing did not occur ‘in the prosecution of some felonious act’ in violation of
The underlying offense on which Woodard‘s felony-murder conviction was predicated was the sale of ecstasy in violation of
The time element was not established in this case. The killing must be related in time to the underlying felony. See Montague, 260 Va. at 702, 536 S.E.2d at 913 (holding that the time element of the felony-murder rule was not established because the underlying felony took place elevеn hours before the killing). Here, the killing occurred after the sale of ecstasy. Beame purchased the ecstasy from Woodard at approximately 7:00 p.m. Beame then went to dinner, stopped at a gas station for cigarettes, and went to Crumpton‘s apartment. Beame did not ingest the ecstasy until approximately 9:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., over two hours later.3 Thus, the underlying felony and the killing did not occur at the same time, and accordingly, the time element of the felony-murder rule was not established.
The place element was also not established in this case. The killing must occur in the same place as the underlying felony. Id. (holding that the place element of the felony-murder rule was not established because the underlying felony transpired in a different part of the city than the killing). The underlying felony took place in the store parking lot. Beame did not ingest the ecstasy until she was at Crumpton‘s apartment. Thus, the underlying felony and the killing did not occur at the same place, and accordingly, the place element of the felony-murder rule was not established.
Therefore, we hold that the killing in this case did not occur during the prosecution of the sale of ecstasy because the time and place elements of the felony-murder rule were not established.4
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has held
that where, as here, death results from ingestion of a controlled substance, classified in law as dangerous to human life, the homicide constitutes murder of the second degree within the intendment of
Code § 18.2-33 if that substance had been distributed to the decedent in violation of the felony statutes of this Commonwealth.
Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 405, 323 S.E.2d 90, 95 (1984). This holding, however, must be viewed in light of the facts of Heacock, which are distinguishable from this case. We tie the holding to the facts because of the limiting language in the holding itsеlf: “[W]here, as here, death results from ingestion of a controlled substance....” Id. (emphasis added). The holding merely reflects the fact that the time, place, and causal connection elements of the felony-murder rule were established in Heacock.
In Heacock, the defendant, Heacock, supplied a quantity оf cocaine to a “drug party.” Heacock did not just supply the cocaine—he also cut the cocaine into separate portions on a table and invited the party guests to help themselves. A little later in the evening, Heacock went to an upstairs bedroom with a number of other guests. While in the bedroom, Heacock and another guest took a spoon and prepared some cocaine to be intravenously injected. A party guest was injected with the cocaine and died from an overdose.
The facts of Heacock establish every element of the felony-murder rule. The underlying offense, distribution of cocaine, occurred
Our recent ruling in Hylton v. Commonwealth, 60 Va.App. 50, 723 S.E.2d 628 (2012), is also inapplicable to this case. Hylton was convicted of felony murder under
Here, Woodard ceаsed to possess the ecstasy as soon as the transaction with Beame was completed in the store parking lot. The holding in Hylton is entirely dependent upon Hylton‘s continuing possession of the methadone. Such a holding cannot be extended to this case. The facts in this case, unlike those in Hylton, are missing the essential elements of time and place.
The felony-murder statute is designed to punish those persons who cause a killing that occurs during the furtherance of a felony. That killing, however, must be so closely related in time, place, and causal connection as to be part of the same felonious criminal enterprise. Here, because the felonious criminal enterprise, the distribution of ecstasy, had clearly ended prior to the killing, the trial court‘s conclusion that the killing was part of the same criminal enterprise was plainly wrong and without evidence to support it. Because the evidence is insufficient to convict Woodard of felony murder, we reverse Woodard‘s conviction for that offense.5
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Woodard‘s conviction.
Reversed.
Notes
“If the mortal wound is inflicted at [the time of the commission of the underlying felony], but X lingers for a few days before he dies, at which time A, having fled the scene, is many states distant, the homicide is nevertheless in the commission of the [underlying felony]; it is the infliction of the fatal wound, not the actual death, which must occur in the commission of the felony.”
Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 462 n. 96 (2d ed. 2003). Throughout thе opinion we use the statutory term “killing” rather than the more grammatically acceptable term “death” in order to avoid conflating the two.