Dеfendants appeal from an order of the Windham Superior Court enjoining them from using an alleged easement across plaintiffs’ land. On a previous appeal in this matter we returned the case to the lower court, since it had failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law after an appropriate request had been made.
Timney
v.
Worden,
Admittedly the findings are not a paragon of completeness and clarity, but it is the duty of this Court to look for all reasonable inferences to support the rеsult reached if it can reasonably do so.
Frost
v.
Tisbert,
A review of the record discloses that in 1947 Harold Deyo and his wife obtained title to a 5.1 acre parcel of land hаving no frontage on a public highway but having a right of way along its northern border extending easterly to Vermont Route 30. In 1948, the Deyos conveyed the southerly 3.1 acres to parties named Varnum, defendants’ predecessors in title. Included in the deed was аn appurtenant easement “in common with others, of a right of way 20 feet in width to be travelled on foot or by vehicles, over the remaining land of the Grantors, for the purpose of ingress or egress from the main highway to the above granted prеmises.” The same easement was also granted in the deed by which defendants received title.
In 1952, the Deyos further conveyеd the approximately one acre parcel of land lying next to and immediately to the north *446 of the Varnum tract to persons named Thomas, plaintiffs’ predecessors in title. In this conveyance they granted an easement for “the use, in common with others, of a right of way 20 feet in width to be travelled on foot or by vehicles over remaining land of the Grantors, over the route of the present existing roadway, for the purpose of ingress or egress from the main highway to the abovе premises.” The Deyos retained for themselves the northernmost acre of the original 5.1 acre parcel.
Given these facts it is apparent that the easement in question traversed the land sold by the Deyos to the Thomases (now owned by the Timneys) and the land retained by the Deyos, and linked up with the original right of way obtained by the Deyos in 1947. As a result, the court had to conclude that the easement now claimed by the defendants did exist in 1948. The court concluded, however, that the defendаnts did not have an easement by express grant. On its face this conclusion is inconsistent with and not justified by the facts recited. But althоugh this conclusion was erroneous, it is not fatal to plaintiffs’ case, since the court further concluded that if the easement had been granted it was abandoned. And the court’s conclusion regarding abandonment, or in this case more acсurately extinguishment by adverse user, is supported by the evidence. V.R.C.P. 52;
Tallarico
v.
Brett,
It has long been the law of this state that an appurtenаnt easement can be defeated either by abandonment on the part of the grantee of the easement оr by extinguishment by the conduct of the owner of the servient estate. See, e.g.,
Russell
v.
Pare,
It is obvious that an easement can be extinguished аs well as acquired by adverse possession for fifteen years under our statute. Our rule for gaining title to land by adverse possеssion is that a possession that will work an ouster of the owner must be open, notorious, hostile, and continuous. [“]The tenant must unfurl his flag on his land, and keep it flying so that the owner may see, if he will, that an enemy has invaded his dominions and planted his standard of cоnquest. [”] Wells v. Austin,59 Vt. 157 , 165,10 Atl. 405 . Adverse possession, in order to be effective to extinguish an easement, must be open, unequivocal, continuеd, and equivalent to an ouster of the dominant owner, and incompatible with the possession and use by ■him.
Id.
at 286,
Defendants argue, and we think rightfully, that the findings and evidenсe were insufficient to sustain the conclusion that the easement was abandoned by the defendants or their predecessors in title. We disagree, however, with defendants’ second argument that the findings and evidence were insufficient to sustain the сonclusion that the easement was extinguished by plaintiffs and their predecessors in title.
The lower court made the following findings:
10. During the 1950’s, Thomas [plaintiff’s predecessor in title] dug a cellar hole on what is now Plaintiff’s lot which would block any alleged easement or right-of-way. ....
13. During 1971 one Cobb [also plaintiff’s predecessor in title] constructed a dwelling on the cellar hole dug by Thomas ....
Although the court did not explicitly stаte that these findings constituted an extinguishment, when viewed in light of the
*448
supporting evidence that conclusion is inescapablе. It is difficult to conceive of a situation more open, notorious, and hostile than the digging of a cellar hole direсtly in the path of the alleged'easement and the subsequent construction of a house thereon. Certainly there was nothing stealthy or hidden about these acts that would serve to negate their openness and notoriousness. Similarly the recоrd indicates that plaintiffs and their predecessors used their land in a manner inconsistent with the continuance of the eаsement. The use was not pursuant to permission granted by defendants or their predecessors, but rather was plainly hostile. Finаlly, the evidence reveals that the use continued for the requisite fifteen-year period. See
Wells
v.
Austin,
Affirmed.