Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United StatesTim Wargo & Sons, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States
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Tim Wargo and Sons, Inc., appellant, appeals from a decision denying its motion to set aside an order confirming a sale in foreclosure. On appeal, appellant advances two issues in which it contends that the confirmation of the sale was void, arguing that the chancery court was divested of jurisdiction upon the filing of its petition in bankruptcy and that the action of the court was in violation of the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code. We affirm.
The history of this case needs to be set out for a full understanding of the questions presented on appeal. On April 11, 1986, appellee, The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, filed a complaint in foreclosure in the Chancery Court of Desha County pursuant to a deed of trust it held on farmland owned by appellant. The following September, the chancellor entered a decree of foreclosure and on November 24, 1986, a sale of the property was held wherein Mankin Farms, Inc. was the purchaser as the highest bidder. Thereafter, on Decern-ber
It is undisputed that, unbeknownst to the chancellor, appel-lee and Mankin Farms, appellant had earlier that morning filed yet another petition in bankruptcy, this time under Chapter 11. It was not until September 9,1988, that appellant filed notice in the chancery court of the latest bankruptcy proceeding. Appellant’s bankruptcy action was dismissed with prejudice by order of the bankruptcy court on October 16, 1989, in which the court expressed the reason for the dismissal as being appellant’s “continuing pattern of delay, abuse of the bankruptcy system, inattention and negligence.” In re Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc., 107 B.R. 622, 625 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Ark. 1989). On December 1, 1989, appellee filed a motion to distribute the purchase money funds of the foreclosure sale which had been held in escrow since the time of the sale. Two weeks later, appellant responded with a motion objecting to the distribution of the funds and seeking to set aside the order confirming the sale of August 31, 1988. After a hearing, the chancellor refused to grant appellant’s motion as reflected by his order on March 9, 1990. It is from this order that appellant brings this appeal.
As it did below, on appeal appellant maintains that the chancellor’s act of confirming the foreclosure sale was void because the court was without jurisdiction due to the filing of bankruptcy proceedings, and furthermore that the confirmation of the sale violated the automatic stay. Appellant bases its argument on the principle that a sale in foreclosure is not complete until confirmation, citing Fleming v. Southland Life Insurance Co., 263 Ark. 272, 564 S.W.2d 216 (1978). Although it is not expressly stated, based on this principle appellant assumes, or is implying, that it retained an interest in the
The identifiable interests appellant may have had in the property are the statutory and equitable rights of redemption. The statutory right of redemption is found at
We have had difficulty in evaluating this aspect of the case because the actual record on appeal includes neither the deed of trust nor the foreclosure decree. Thus, we do not know whether
Even assuming that appellant retained an interest in the property, we find no merit in its argument that the trial court erred in failing to set aside the order confirming the sale. As stated earlier, it is the appellant’s contention that the confirmation was void ab initio based on the theory that the filing of its petition in the bankruptcy court deprived the chancery court of jurisdiction over property included in the bankrupt estate. In support of its position, appellant places reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). There it was held that under § 75 of the then existing Frazier-Lemke Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 203, the bankruptcy court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and his property upon the filing of a petition, and thus declared that foreclosure proceedings taken in a state court afterwards were “beyond its power, void, and thus subject to collateral attack.” Id. at 438.
Under current law, however, authorities appear to be split as to whether an action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void or voidable. In re Bresler, 119 B.R. 400 (Bkrtcy. E.D.N.Y. 1990). The courts finding violations of the stay to be void rely on the decision in Kalb.3 In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450
Courts adhering to the view that acts in violation of the stay are voidable, base this holding primarily upon statutory construction.
In the case of In re Germer, 107 B.R. 217 (Bkrtcy. D. Neb. 1989), the court reached the same conclusion based on its interpretation of sections 542(c) and 549(c) of the bankruptcy code. Under
Even those courts which ascribe to the rule that acts in violation of the stay are void recognize that the rule is not without exception. It has been said that those courts following the rule that an act in violation of the stay is void expressly state that the rule is a “general rule,” and many of these courts treat an act as voidable for numerous reasons. In re Germer, supra. For example, in the decision of In re Wingo, 89 B.R. 54 (Bkrtcy. 9th Cir. 1988), the court determined that
In denying appellant’s motion, the chancellor here based his ruling on
Since we have concluded that the transfer at issue was voidable, we point out an additional reason for affirmance. Under
On cross-appeal, appellee has presented a question with regard to its claim of entitlement to the interest earned on the purchase money funds held in escrow. Since appellee filed no notice of cross-appeal, we do not address this issue. Broadhead v. McEntire, 19 Ark. App. 259, 720 S.W.2d 313 (1986).
Affirmed.
Cooper and Mayfield, JJ., agree.
Notes
With certain exceptions not applicable here, the bankruptcy estate is comprised of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” In re Wingo, 89 B.R. 54 (Bkrtcy. 9th Cir. 1988);
Interpreting Arkansas law, the bankruptcy court in Booth v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 18 B.R. 816 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Ark. 1982), determined that the debtor had no interest in foreclosed property to be included in the bankruptcy estate under the statutory right of redemption when there had been no offer to pay the purchase price. See also In re Mueller, 18 B.R. 851 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Ark. 1982).
While at least one court has specifically noted that the reasoning in Kalb retains vigor, In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450 (Bkrtcy. D. Md. 1990), another has pointed out that its precedential effect is eroded by the fact that it was decided at a time when bankruptcy referees did not have the power to annul the automatic stay. In re Schwartz, 119 B.R. 207 (Bkrtcy. 9th Cir. 1990).
We are not unmindful that principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel might have been asserted as a bar to the litigation of this issue in the chancery court. See In re Germer, supra. This point has not been argued.