130 Ky. 281 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1908
Opinion of the Court by
Reversing.
In 1875 Nimrod A. Tilton, a widower, and Nancy F. Morand, a widow, both residents of Robertson county, Ky., entered into the following contract: “This indenture made and entered into this third day of July, 1875, by and between Nimrod A. Tilton and Mrs. Nancy F-. Morand, both of the county of Robertson and State of Kentucky: Witnesseth, that for and in consideration of the said Tilton to lawfully marry the said Nancy F. Morand, said marriage as aforesaid to take place during the year 1875, and the further consideration that the said Tilton has this day given to the said Mrs. Nancy F. Morand one Singer sewing machine, of the value of $80.00 (eighty dollars) and one black mare, of the value of one-hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00). Now in consideration of said marriage to take place or happen as aforesaid, and the consideration of said sewing machine and said mare, the receipt of which, that is, said machine and said mare, is hereby acknowledged by the said Mrs. Nancy F. Morand. The said Mrs. Nancy F. Morand for and in consideration of the premises aforesaid, does by these presents release, confirm and.forever release
Most all of the proof that has been taken relates to the home life of Judge Tilton, especially during the last few years thereof, when he was sick, afflicted with a cancer, and a good part of the time confined to his bed, almost helpless. Further than to show the devoted, untiring, and constant service which Mrs. Til-ton rendered her husband in his sad affliction, this evidence has little bearing on the question before us.
It is not difficult, to understand how, under the circumstances, this could be done. She was a poor, uneducated woman, dealing with a man whom she was shortly to marry. Eecognizing that from the force of circumstances by which she was compelled to labor for a living she had been placed in a position where, she was being subjected to severe criticism, and, perhaps, more to avoid this criticism than from any sentimental motive, she had agreed to marry Judge Tilton as the only feasible solution of the difficulty in which the situation had placed them. In this way only could the tongue of the scandal monger be silenced. There then arose, as may be inferred from the testimony of Dr. Brown, the objection to the marriage on the part of the children, of Judge Tilton. This objection could only be overcome by the execution of a marriage contract. Under these circumstances we find the judge arranging for a draft of this
11 Courts of equity will take into consideration the adequacy of the provision for the wife, since ante-nuptial agreements wherein the wife releases her rights in the husband’s estate should be reasonable in their terms.*290 To determine the fairness and reasonableness of the agreement of all of the circumstances, such as the wealth of the husband, the existing means of the wife, the age of the parties, and the prospective wife’s full and clear knowledge and understanding of the nature and meaning of the terms of the contract are properly regarded. Good faith is the cardinal principle in such contracts. If the provision made for the wife is unreasonably disproportionate to the means of the husband, the presumption of designed concealment is raised, and the burden of disproving the same is upon him. ’ ’
This principle is in perfect accord with the reported decisions of our courts. In the case of Maze’s Exor. v. Maze, 99 S. W. 336, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 679, the marriage contract, unfair to the wife in its terms, was set aside because of the failure of the representatives of the husband to show that it was understood by the wife at the time she ’signed it. In Brooks v. Brooks, 58 S. W. 450, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 555, the contract was set aside because the wife had been induced to sign it to pacify the opposition of her husband’s children by a former marriage, and that it was executed for such a purpose. In Simpson v. Simpson’s Exor., 94 Ky. 586, 23 S. W. 361, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 353, the ante-nuptial contract, which made some slight provisions for the wife, was set aside because, judging- from the contract itself and the circumstances under which it had been executed, the wife was overreached. ' The principles announced in these three foregoing cases are in harmony and accord with the opinions of courts •of last resort in other States, notably New York and Pennsylvania. The contract under consideration is very unreasonable, inequitable, and unfair in dealing with the wife. In fact, it is more unconscionable and
Lastly it is urged in argument that, after the execution of the contract, appellee had more than two months within which to advise herself as to her rights before she entered into her marriage with the judge, and that therefore she must have been satisfied, else she would have made complaint. This argument is without force.- The contract had been signed, and passed from her, and undoubtedly the same influence which induced her to sign it operated to lull her into silence and acquiescence, not only during the two succeeding months, but. during the 32 years which followed. The question is not, was she satisfied? but, was she deceived? It was not until after her husband’s death that she realized and understood how cruelly she had been imposed upon and deceived in the execution of this contract, and how helpless and poverty stricken it left her in her old age, after a life of service and devotion. Equity to the wife demands that this contract be canceled and held for naught, and appellee awarded that interest in the estate of her husband to which, under the law, she is entitled.
The judgment is reversed and cause remanded, with instruction to the trial court to enter judgment in conformity with this opinion.