311 Mass. 572 | Mass. | 1942
This is a petition for assessment of damages to the petitioners’ premises, caused by the construction of a sea-wall under authorization of St. 1937, c. 405. The case was heard upon the report of an auditor and other evidence. The judge found for the respondent, stating that he based his ruling that the petitioners could not recover and his finding for the respondent “entirely on the auditor’s report,” and reported the case for determination by this court.
The report of the judge sets forth that it presents only the following questions of law: “1. Does the failure of John C. Tilton to record his license within one year preclude the . . . [petitioners] from recovering in this action?
The material facts found by the auditor follow: In order to prevent the inundation of the downtown area of the respondent city by the flood waters of the Merrimack River, the city was authorized by St. 1937, c. 405, to enter into a flood control project with the United States. This involved the construction of a sea-wall which ran directly behind the petitioners’ premises. Because of excavations made and pile driving near the foundation of the petitioners’ building in the course of the work, the walls of the building were badly cracked, and the floors were out of level. To restore the building to its previous condition would cost $17,693.52, whereas the diminution in value of the building was $6,800.
Statute 1937, c. 405, § 2, provides, so far as here material, that “. . . any person injured in his property by any act of said city under any provision of this act may recover from said city damages therefor under . . . chapter seventy-nine,” and U. S. G. Sup. V, Title 33, § 701c, provides that the responsible local agency must give assurance to
In 1881 John C. Tilton, a predecessor in title, acting under the provisions" of St. 1872, c. 236, applied to the board of harbor commissioners for a license to extend the wharf on the premises in question to a point below high water mark, in accordance with a plan filed by him with the commissioners, from which it appears that the rear line of the proposed extension coincides with the rear line of Sargent and Holden’s wharf adjoining. A license to extend the wharf in accordance with the petition and plan was granted on November 10, 1881, and was duly approved by the Governor and Council on November 11, 1881.
In pursuance of the license, the licensee extended his wharf to the line set out in the plan “within the time prescribed by statute.” Since the statute did not prescribe the time within which the work should be done, we interpret this to mean that the wharf was extended within the year following the issuance of the license. Later a two-story skating rink, which rested in part upon the wharf, was erected. In 1902 or 1903 the rink burned down. In April, 1903, the present brick building on the premises was erected in accordance with a permit issued by the city authorities.
The licensee, John C. Tilton, did not record the license and plan until January 13, 1883, which was more than a year after the effective date of the license. Statute 1872, c. 236, § 4, however, provided in part that “every license hereafter granted by said board shall be void, unless the same and the accompanying plan are recorded within one year from the date thereof, in the registry of deeds for the county or district within which the work licensed is to be performed.” This provision of St. 1872, c. 236, has remained in force in substantially the same language since its enactment. (See G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 91, § 18.) The petitioners contend that the word void in the statute should be construed as meaning voidable, that the presence of the building is not a nuisance and that the damage to the building is compensable.
Statute 1866, c. 149, provided for legislative authoriza
Statute 1869, c. 432, § 1, provided in part that “All authority or license that has been granted during the present session of the legislature, or that may be hereafter granted by the Commonwealth” to build any structure over tidewaters “shall be revocable at any time, at the discretion of the legislature, and shall expire at the end of five years from its date, except where and so far as valuable structures, fillings or inclosures . . . shall have been actually and in good faith built or made under the same.” This provision has remained in force since its enactment. (See G. L. [[Ter. Ed.] c. 91, § 15, to the same effect.)
The harbor line on the water front of the Merrimack River in the city of Haverhill was established by St. 1883, c. 104, wherein “John C. Tilton’s wharf” (the premises here involved) was referred to as one of the bounds. Section 2 of that statute provided in part that nothing in the act should be construed as authorizing the construction or extension of any wharf or as giving or confirming a right to maintain any structure in or over the tidewaters of the river, or as reviving or extending any grant or license theretofore made or given; and that any license theretofore given to build or extend any structure “beyond the harbor line established by this act is hereby revoked.”
The adoption of St. 1872, to which we have already referred, was recommended by the harbor commissioners in order to “relieve the legislature of a class of applications involving no questions of principle, and which can all be
It is recognized that the “question whether in a statute the term ‘void’ is used with entire technical accuracy, or only in its less strict meaning as voidable, is frequently one of difficulty.” Kelly-Buckley Co. v. Cohen, 195 Mass. 585, 588. We must look to the general rules governing the construction of the words of a statute for guidance. Under these rules “The words of a statute are the main source for the ascertainment of a legislative purpose. They are to be construed according to their natural import in common and approved usage. . . . Statutes are to be interpreted, not alone according to their simple, literal or strict verbal meaning, but in connection with their development, their progression through the legislative body, the history of the times, prior legislation, contemporary customs and conditions and the system of positive law of which they are part, and in the light of the Constitution and of the common law, to the end that they be held to cover the subjects presumably within the vision of the Legislature and, on the one hand, be not unduly constricted so as to exclude matters fairly within their scope, and, on the other hand, be not stretched by enlargement of signification to comprehend matters not within the principle and purview on which they were founded when originally framed and their words chosen. General expressions may be restrained by relevant circumstances showing a legislative intent that they be narrowed and used in a particular sense.” Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 401, 402, and cases cited. Commissioners of Public Works v. Cities Service Oil Co. 308 Mass. 349, 360. The abuses which the statute aims to correct, Cuneo v. Bornstein, 269 Mass. 232, 236, and the purpose sought to be accomplished are to be considered, Nickels v. Scholl, 228 Mass. 205. The intent of the statute is to be
In the present case, as pointed out before, there is nothing in any prior legislation from which to gather an intent that the word “void” in the governing statute was not used in its strict sense. There was no such prior provision of statute. There is nothing in the report of the board that recommended the enactment of the statute to explain why the provision was inserted by the board in the draft act. There is nothing in the progression of that statute through the Legislature
It is true that in certain cases the word “void” in a statute has been interpreted to mean “voidable,” see Smith v. Saxton, 6 Pick. 483, 486; Trask v. Wheeler, 7 Allen, 109, 111; Kelly-Buckley Co. v. Cohen, 195 Mass. 585, 588, and that by recording statutes relative to conveyances of real estate (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 183, § 4), to mortgages of personal property (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 255, § 1), and to conditional sales (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 184, § 13, as now appearing in St. 1937, c. 245, § 1), the failure to record the instruments involved renders them invalid only against those persons who would be most likely to rely upon the recording, and
Moreover, we are of opinion that it cannot be said rightly that a literal interpretation of the word “void” in the statute involved would defeat its purpose, namely, that the license and accompanying plan must be recorded within one year from the date of the license or else be void. In the case at bar to construe the word “void” as meaning merely “voidable” would be to strip it of its force and in effect to ascribe to it the meaning of revocable, a purposeless construction, since the right of revocation was reserved to the Legislature by St. 1869, c. 432, § 1, incorporated in St. 1872, c. 236, under which the license was issued, and which has since been so preserved. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 91, § 15.
It follows from what has been said that since the license in question and the accompanying plan were not recorded within one year from the effective date of the license, as required by the statute, the license became void in the strict sense and that it must be held that thereafter the structure involved was maintained upon lands in control of the
In accordance with the terms of the report, judgment is to be entered for the respondent.
So ordered.
Senate Documents (1872) No. 241. Journal of Senate (1872) 291, 297, 300, 337. Journal of House of Representatives (1872) 399, 405, 410, 433.