Tillman v. StateTillman v. State
Assault and battery; sentence: ninety days and a fine of $500.
The trial judge refused Charge No. 15 requested by the defense, which was as follows:
“The Court charges the jury that if you have a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt growing out of the evidence or any part of it, you must acquit him.”
The trial court did not instruct the jury that a reasonable doubt may arise from only a part of the evidence. Neither was
In Rakestraw v. State,
“ ‘If, after considering all the evidence in the case, you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant Jim Rake-straw growing out of any part of the evidence, you should find him not guilty.' ”
Citing Rakestraw as authority, this court in Sanford v. State,
“ ‘The Court charges the jury that, if the jury, upon considering all the evidence, have a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt, arising out of any part of the evidence, they should find him not guilty.’ ”
The opinion in Sanford sets out a lengthy history of the charge, citing numerous cases wherein the substance of the charge in question had been approved.
In Johnson v. State,
“ ‘7. The court charges the jury, if the jury upon considering all of the testimony, have a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt, arising out of any part of the evidence, they should find the defendant not guilty.’ ”
In Smith v. State,
“‘3. The court charges you, gentlemen of the jury, that if, upon considering all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the Defendant, arising out of any part of the evidence, you must find the Defendant not guilty.’ ”
More recently, reversible error was found by this court in Bryant v. State, Ala.Cr.App.,
“. . . ‘. . .If you have a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt growing out of the evidence or any part of it, you must acquit him.’ ”
Our most recent holding in this regard is found in Richards v. State, Ala.Cr.App.,
“ ‘D. 4 I charge you that if you have a reasonable doubt of James Richards’ guilt growing out of the evidence or any part of it, you must acquit him.’ ”
Based on the foregoing authorities, we find that the appellant in the instant case was entitled to have the jury charge that a reasonable doubt as to his guilt may grow out of any part of the evidence. The refusal to so instruct the jury mandates a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.