for the Court:
¶ 1. Issac M. Tillman appeals the judgment of the circuit court dismissing his lawsuit filed against the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Tillman alleged that MDOC failed to release him from incarceration upon completion of his sentence. He asserted claims of negligence, false imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The circuit judge granted MDOC’s motion to dismiss, finding Tillman’s claims were barred by Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-9(l)(m) (Supp.2011) of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act because he was an inmate at the time his claims arose. Tillman disagrees that his claims are barred, and he filed this appeal. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. On August 29, 2000, Tillman entered a guilty plea on two counts of armed robbery. He was sentenced to serve ten years for each count, with the sentences running concurrent with each other and with a previous sentence that Tillman was already serving.
¶ 3. The complaint further states that Tillman’s original sentence expired on September 12, 2008; however, it claims that Tillman served an additional 478 days for the time during which Tillman had escaped from custody.
¶ 4. On January 19, 2011, Tillman filed his complaint asserting claims of negligence, false imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress for the three and a half months he claims that he was unlawfully held in custody by MDOC. There is no evidence in the record that Tillman sought administrative or other relief during those three and a half months he claims he was unlawfully detained. See Miss.Code Ann. § 47-5-803 (Rev.2011) (requiring use of administrative procedures to preserve any cause of action against MDOC).
¶ 5. MDOC filed a motion to dismiss claiming it had no liability for Tillman’s claims because section ll-46-9(l)(m) provides an exemption from liability for all claims brought by inmates. After a hearing, the circuit judge granted MDOC’s motion to dismiss and dismissed Tillman’s complaint without prejudice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 6. This Court employs a de novo standard of review for analyzing a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss. Smith v. City of Saltillo,
ANALYSIS
¶ 7. Section ll-46-9(l)(m) states the following:
*718 (1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:
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(m) Of any claimant who at the time the- claim arises is an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution, regardless of whether such claimant is or is not an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution when the claim is filed.
¶8. Tillman argues that the Tort Claims Act does not define the term “inmate.” He claims that an inmate is one who is lawfully held in the custody of MDOC. Because he contends that he was held unlawfully, he claims he was not an “inmate” under section ll-46-9(l)(m).
¶ 9. Tillman cites the supreme court’s holding in Love v. Sunflower County Sheriffs Department,
¶ 10. Tillman argues that he, unlike Love, had completed all the necessary steps to be released because he had served the entirety of his sentence. He asserts in his brief that MDOC had ignored his demands to be release from incarceration. But we again point out that the record shows no evidence that Tillman filed for any type of administrative relief within MDOC.
¶ 11. Section 11^6-9(l)(m) has been applied broadly to “any claim of any claimant who was an inmate at the time the claim arose.” Wallace,
¶ 12. The supreme court further stated: “This Court cannot presume the Legislature intended to limit liability to only those inmates on the premises but must presume the words in the statute were ‘intended to convey their usual meaning absent some indication to the contrary.’ ” Id. at 1208 (¶ 17) (quoting Buelow v. Kemp Co.,
¶ 13. In Liggans v. Coahoma County Sheriff’s Department,
¶ 14. Like Tillman, the plaintiff in Brooks v. Pennington,
¶ 15. Just as in the cases cited above, we decline Tillman’s request to narrow the definition of “inmate” to exclude an offender who alleges his sentence was calculated incorrectly. As MDOC states in its brief: “Tillman’s allegation that the MDOC incorrectly calculated the amount of time he should have served does not change his status as an inmate.” Tillman was unquestionably a person confined in the custody of MDOC when his claims arose. He had the opportunity to challenge the computation of his sentence through administrative review. Instead, he chose to wait until he was released and file a negligence claim against MDOC that is barred by section 11^6-9(l)(m) of the Tort Claims Act.
¶ 16. We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Tillman’s complaint.
¶ 17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
Notes
. Tillman's discharge certificate shows that he was also sentenced to serve two years for possession of cocaine.
. The record shows no prosecution for this escape.
. This Court held that the immunity provided in section ll-46-9(l)(m) did not apply in Brooks because the plaintiffs claims arose before he became an inmate. Brooks,