56 S.E.2d 624 | Ga. | 1949
Where lands of a city are dedicated to a particular public use, and citizens contribute money for necessary improvements to effectuate such use, the city may not revoke at will the dedication or license.
The petitioners prayed that the defendant be temporarily and permanently enjoined from making the alterations proposed, and from interfering with the use and occupancy of the building by the petitioners and others entitled to its use, and for other *291 relief. The general demurrers of the defendant were sustained, and the petition was dismissed. The exception is to that judgment. The authority of municipalities and cities of this State to accept donations and act as trustee in certain instances was granted by an act of the General Assembly of 1892 (Ga. L. 1892, p. 104), now Code §§ 69-501 and 69-502. Section 69-501 provides: "All incorporated towns and cities are authorized to receive any donations or gifts of real or personal property which may be made to them by deed of gift, will, or otherwise, and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the instrument giving or donating the property, if the governing body of such town or city shall approve of such conditions."
The governing body of a municipality receiving a gift must approve the conditions imposed by the persons making the gift. This is the sole restriction of § 69-501. It necessarily follows that any condition might be imposed that would not conflict with either the constitutional or general law of the State. If the construction of "civic hall" in the manner alleged in the petition should be construed as a gift to the City of Athens, with the condition or limitation that it should be used by civic groups and as a meeting place for the citizens of Athens, such condition or limitation is not shown by any allegation of the petition to violate any constitutional or statutory law. The judgment of the trial court sustaining the general demurrer of the defendant and dismissing the petition, appears, however, to have been limited to the proposition that "the plaintiffs are not one of those for whom the defendant is authorized to act as trustee . . [and] the court is without authority to grant the relief sought."
The Code, § 69-502, is as follows: "The incorporated towns and cities may act as trustees under any conveyance or will donating or giving property for charitable or eleemosynary purposes." The Constitution of 1877, art. 7, sec. 6, par. 1, limited *292 appropriations of money by municipal corporations to purely charitable purposes. The Code, § 108-203, enumerates proper subjects of charity, one of which is stated in the following language: "Other similar subjects, having for their object the relief of human suffering or the promotion of human civilization." Civilization, as applied to human society, designates an advanced state of material and social well-being. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.), p. 493.
It is alleged in the petition that the purpose of the Chamber of Commerce of the City of Athens is to promote the material well-being of the citizens of Athens. If "the promotion of human civilization" is a proper subject-matter of charity, as declared by the Code section cited, the City of Athens would not be prohibited from acting as trustee and holding the legal title to "civic hall" for the use and benefit of the Chamber of Commerce, civic groups, and citizens of the City of Athens. Such a rule would not conflict with Atlanta Chamber of Commerce v. McRae,
The foregoing expresses purely views of the writer and in no sense is to be construed as a ruling by this court. Our decision in the present case is controlled by statutes and decisions applicable to the dedication of lands by the owners for public use.
"If the owner of lands, either expressly or by his acts, shall dedicate the same to public use, and the same shall be so used for such a length of time that the public accommodation or private rights might be materially affected by an interruption of the enjoyment, he may not afterwards appropriate it to private purposes." Code, § 85-410.
Under the law of dedication, a State or any political subdivision thereof may dedicate lands to a particular public use. City of Abbeville v. Jay,
In the early case of Mayor c. of Macon v. Franklin,
The minutes of the Mayor and Council of the City of Athens are sufficient to prove ratification of a previous parole agreement dedicating certain lands owned by the City of Athens to a particular public use. If it should be made to appear that there was no express ratification of a parol dedication of the particular lands of the city, this would not defeat the rights of the Chamber of Commerce, for it is alleged that they contributed money, and that other money was contributed by various groups and organizations of the City of Athens for the erection of "Civic Hall," and that the money was used for this purpose. The rule *294 that a parole license is revocable would not apply in this instance, and applies in no case where the enjoyment of a parole license must be preceded by the expenditure of money and the grantee has invested capital in consequence thereof.
In Mayor c. of Macon v. Franklin, supra, in the body of the opinion, at page 244, it was held: "When lands are dedicated, and are enjoyed as such, and rights are required [acquired?] by individuals in reference to such dedication, the law considers it in the nature of an estoppel in pais, which precludes the original owner from revoking it. . . The proprietor is still the owner of the fee and can alien that, or maintain an action for an injury done to the freehold; but the use in the public follows the fee wherever it may go."
The erection of a civic hall as a meeting place for civic groups and for citizens generally is unquestionably a public purpose. But if this were not true, and if the Athens Chamber of Commerce were only a licensee, the City of Athens could not revoke the rights heretofore granted. In Brantley v. Perry,
In Woodruff v. Bowers,
In the present case, it appears that the erection of the civic hall in the City of Athens was brought about on the representation that such hall would be a continuous meeting place for the Chamber of Commerce and other civic groups located in the city. Reverting to the language of Mayor c. of Macon v.Franklin, supra, it would be bad faith to the public and bad faith to the *295 individual contributors to permit a revocation of the use of such building.
The court erred in sustaining the general demurrer and in dismissing the petition.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Atkinson,P. J., who dissents. Duckworth, C. J., concurs in the judgmentonly. *296
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