64 So. 653 | Ala. Ct. App. | 1914
Defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree and convicted of murder in1 the second degree. It is urged in the . brief of appellant’s counsel that, under the authority of Sylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 17, the judgment of conviction should be reversed, because of the failure of the record to affirmatively show that the defendant was personally present in court when the court entered the order setting the day for her trial and drawing' the special venire therefor. We are of opinion that this order- does show the personal presence of the defendant at that time, and that the contention of her counsel is therefore without merit. This order, among other things, recites: “Defendant [naming her] is arraigned and pleads not guilty. It is therefore ordered,” etc. To “arraign,” which is the term used in the order, as observed, is nothing else but to call the prisoner to the bar of the court to answer the matter charged upon him in the indictment. —See 1 Words & Phrases, p. 498, and the long list of cases there cited. The recitals of the record in this case, being different from the case cited, therefore affirmatively show that, at the time of the mating of the order mentioned, the defendant was present in court and pleaded not- guilty; for to say, as the record does, that she was “arraigned” imports that she was personally present, since she could not otherwise be “arraigned.”
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.