572 F. App'x 949
11th Cir.
2014

Tijuana TUGGERSON-BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-14168

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

July 24, 2014.

572 Fed. Appx. 949

Non-Argument Calendar.

unless such waiver is explicitly and definitely stated to be a waiver of the immunity of the state and its agencies from suit in federal court. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(18) (emphasis added).

The consent-to-suit provision at issue, section 112.044(4), contains language authorizing suit “in any court of competent jurisdiction,” but the Supreme Court has held such language is ambiguous and insufficient to indicate a state‘s intent to be sued in federal court. See ; . Similarly, we have rejected consent-to-suit provisions providing a state may be sued “in all courts of law and equity.” . Accordingly, the district judge erred by denying FAU‘s motion to dismiss Crisman‘s FL-ADEA claim.

In addition, we have found no other textual evidence showing Florida has consented to suit in federal court to resolve FL-ADEA claims. See . Moreover, section 768.28(18) explicitly states no provision of the Florida Statutes may be construed to waive the State‘s Eleventh Amendment immunity unless the waiver is explicitly and definitely stated to be a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(18). FL-ADEA does not explicitly and definitely state Florida consents to suit in federal court. See Fla. Stat. § 112.044. Therefore, FAU is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on Crisman‘s FL-ADEA claim. We vacate the district judge‘s denial of FAU‘s motion to dismiss based on the FL-ADEA and remand with instructions to dismiss that claim.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

N. Albert Bacharach, Jr., N. Albert Bacharach, Jr. PA, Gainesville, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jeffrey Shaun Wilson, Laura Anne Verduci, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Atlanta, GA, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, John F. Rudy, III, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before PRYOR, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Tijuana Tuggerson-Brown appeals from the district court‘s affirmance of the Social Security Commissioner‘s (“Commissioner“) conclusion that she was not entitled to disability benefits. On appeal here, Tuggerson-Brown raises two arguments: (1) that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ“), at step two of the sequential analysis, erred in concluding that her depression, lumbar degenerative disc disease, back, neck, and leg pain, and diabetes, separately or combined, did not constitute a severe impairment, and (2) that the ALJ failed to consider those impairments in conjunction with others at the latter stages of the sequential analysis.

We review the Commissioner‘s decisions with deference to factual findings and close scrutiny of legal conclusions. . Factual findings are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence, or enough evidence such that a reasonable person would find it adequate to support the conclusion.

According to administration regulations, once before an ALJ, the evaluation of an alleged disability should follow a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also . At the second step, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the applicant‘s impairments, and, if he finds that an applicant does not have a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, he should conclude that there is no disability. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). We have described step two as a “filter” requiring the denial of any disability claim where no severe impairment or combination of impairments is present. . We have also described step two as designed to screen out groundless claims, where the applicant‘s medical problems could not possibly prevent her from working. . To proceed to step three of the evaluation process, an ALJ need only conclude that an applicant had “at least one” severe impairment. .

Where an applicant has multiple impairments, the ALJ considers the combined effect of all impairments without regard to whether any individual impairment would demonstrate disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. At step three of the sequential process, the ALJ determines whether an applicant has “impairment(s)” that meets one of the listed disabilities. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The regulations state that, where no individual impairment meets a listing, the ALJ will consider whether a combination of impairments is medically equivalent to a listing. Id. § 404.1526; see also .

At step four of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ considers his assessment of the applicant‘s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC“) and past relevant work to determine whether the applicant can return to her former work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). In determining RFC, the ALJ considers all medically determinable impairments. Id. § 404.1545(a)(2). At the fifth step, the administration considers the same RFC assessment and other information to see if the applicant can adjust to other work in light of her “impairment(s).” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1).

In Wilson, the ALJ acknowledged that Wilson suffered multiple injuries and then stated that he “did not have an impairment or combination of impairments” that equaled a listing. (emphasis omitted). We held that statement was sufficient to demonstrate that the ALJ considered the cumulative effect of the applicant‘s impairments. ; see also (reaching the same conclusion based on similar language).

As we have described, step two of the sequential evaluation acts as a “screening” or “filter” to eliminate groundless claims. See ; . Accordingly, we have recognized that step two requires only a finding of “at least one” severe impairment to continue on to the later steps. See . Further, the regulations state that the only consequence of the analysis at step two is that, if the ALJ finds no severe impairment or impairments, he should reach a conclusion of no disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Here, the ALJ found multiple severe impairments and accordingly proceeded to step three of the evaluation. Based on our precedent and the regulations, therefore, it is apparent that there is no need for an ALJ to identify every severe impairment at step two. Accordingly, even assuming that Tuggerson-Brown is correct that her additional impairments were “severe,” the ALJ‘s recognition of that as a fact would not, in any way, have changed the step-two analysis, and she cannot demonstrate error below.

While the ALJ did not need to determine whether every alleged impairment was “severe,” he was required to consider all impairments, regardless of severity, in conjunction with one another in performing the latter steps of the sequential evaluation. Despite Tuggerson-Brown‘s arguments to the contrary, it is apparent from the face of the ALJ‘s decision and the RFC report relied upon by the ALJ that the ALJ did, in fact, consider all medical evidence in combination in concluding that Tuggerson-Brown was not disabled. In performing his analysis, the ALJ stated that he evaluated whether Tuggerson-Brown had an “impairment or combination of impairments” that met a listing and that he considered “all symptoms” in determining her RFC. Under our precedent, those statements are enough to demonstrate that the ALJ considered all necessary evidence. See . The ALJ went beyond those statements in his analysis, specifically discussing evidence of Tuggerson-Brown‘s depression, diabetes, leg, neck, and back pain, and mild degenerative disc disease. The RFC report likewise addressed many of the same symptoms. Accordingly, the record sufficiently demonstrates that the ALJ properly considered all of Tuggerson-Brown‘s impairments, even those not specifically found to be severe, in reaching a conclusion that she was not disabled. Tuggerson-Brown does not specifically challenge or assert that the ALJ‘s ultimate conclusion was not based on substantial evidence in some other regard, and therefore we affirm the denial of disability benefits.

AFFIRMED.

PER CURIAM

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