delivered the opinion of the court.
In an action like the present,'brought to recover that which is substantially a statutory penalty, the statute must receive a strict, that is, a literal construction. The defendant is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it. The question, therefore, is whether the thirtieth section of the act of Congress of June 3d,
1864,
relative to National banking associations, clearly prohibits such associations in the State of Missouri from re
The position of the plaintiff is, that the general provision' of the act of Congress that National banking associations may charge and receive interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State where they are located, has no application to the case of these defendants, and that they are restricted to the rate allowed to banks of issue ,of the State, that is,„ to 8 per cent. This, we think, cannot be maintained. The act of Congress is an enabling statute, not a restraining one, except so far as it fixes a maximum rate in all cases where State, banks of issue are not allowed a greater. There are three provisions in section thirty, each of them enabling. If no rate of interest is defined by State laws, 7 per cent, is allowed to be charged. If there is a rate of interest fixed by State laws for lenders generally, the banks are allowed to charge that rate, but no more, except that if State banks of issue are allowed to reserve more, the same privilege is allowed to National banking associations. Such, we think, is the
The result of this is that the defendants, in receiving 9 per cent, interest upon the loans made by them, have not transgressed the act of Congress, consequently they are under no liability to the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.
