82 U.S. 410 | SCOTUS | 1873
TIFFANY
v.
LUCAS.
Supreme Court of United States.
*421 Mr. S. Knox, for the appellant; Mr. T. Gantt, contra.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
There would seem to be no difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of Congress on the subject embraced in the 35th section of the Bankrupt Act (in contravention of which this sale is alleged to have been made), in its application to this case. Clearly all sales are not forbidden. It would be absurd to suppose that Congress intended to set the seal of condemnation on every transaction of the bankrupt which occurred within six months of bankruptcy, without regard to its character. A policy leading to such a result would be an excellent contrivance for paralyzing business, and cannot be imputed to Congress without an express declaration to that effect. The interdiction applies to sales for a fraudulent object, not to those with an honest purpose. The law does not recognize that every sale of property by an embarrassed person is necessarily in fraud of the Bankrupt Act. If it were so, no one would know with whom he could safely deal, and besides, a person in this condition would have no encouragement to make proper efforts to extricate himself from difficulty.
It is for the interest of the community that every one should continue his business, and avoid, if possible, going into bankruptcy, and yet how could this result be obtained if the privilege were denied a person who was unable to command ready money to meet his debts as they fell due, of making a fair disposition of his property in order to accomplish this object.
It is true he may fail, notwithstanding all his efforts, in keeping out of bankruptcy, and in that case any sale he has *422 made within six months of that event is subject to examination. If it shall turn out on that examination that it was made in good faith, for the honest purpose of discharging his indebtedness, and in the confident expectation that by so doing he could continue his business, it will be upheld. On the contrary, if he made it to evade the provisions of the Bankrupt Act, and to withdraw his property from its control, and his vendee either knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that his intention was of this character, it will be avoided. Two things must concur to bring the sale within the prohibition of the law: the fraudulent design of the bankrupt and the knowledge of it on the part of the vendee, or reasonable cause to believe that it existed.
The evidence in this case, fairly weighed, negatives both these conditions. If Darby's conduct was unwise, it was prompted by correct motives. There could have been no intention, on his part, of violating any of the provisions of the bankrupt law, for he did not contemplate the necessity of going into bankruptcy. His action was not based on the idea, even, that he was in a bankrupt condition. On the contrary he believed his property, if converted into money, would pay his debts, and this belief induced him to set to work to accomplish that object. There was no thought of preferring one creditor over another, because he was convinced of his ability to pay all. In the execution of his purpose to sell his property and pay his debts, the sale was made to Lucas, and it cannot be impeached because it turns out that Darby was mistaken in his calculations. There is no arbitrary rule by which the good faith of a transaction can be tested. It may be that ordinary men in similar circumstances would have acted differently, but this is no reason to condemn the conduct of men like Darby. Possessed of uncommon energy and great business capacity; having in previous crises of his fortune surmounted difficulties of equal, if not greater, magnitude, he was not appalled by a state of affairs which, to a man not above the common level would have been a hopeless undertaking. That he failed proves nothing, for other men, whose integrity was *423 above suspicion, have also failed. It would have undoubtedly been better for some of his creditors if he had taken a less hopeful view of his situation, but they cannot on this account attack the sale in controversy. It was made in good faith for an honest purpose, and is not within the condemnation of the law.
If Darby did not intend to defraud his creditors by withdrawing his property from the operation of the Bankrupt Act, it is not easy to see how Lucas can be charged with aiding him to do it, even if at the time he suspected his insolvency. But it is unnecessary to consider this point, for, in our opinion, the evidence fails to establish that, at the time Lucas purchased the property, he had reasonable cause to believe Darby to be insolvent, or to be acting in contemplation of insolvency. If he believed him insolvent, why trust him to pay six thousand dollars due for interest in a few days after the sale, instead of retaining in his own hands enough money to pay it. His conduct on that occasion cannot be explained on the theory of his belief in Darby's insolvency; but we are not concerned with his actual belief on the subject. The real inquiry is, had he good grounds for believing that insolvency existed. It appears that Darby's banking paper had been met up to the date of the sale, and it is a fair inference that the real estate paper secured by deed of trust, which was overdue, remained in that condition by consent of parties. Britton, the president of the National Bank of the State of Missouri, located in St. Louis, considered Darby to be wealthy, and was a good deal surprised when he heard of his failure. This reputation for wealth was not confined to Britton, but was shared by others on account of a supposed ownership of a large amount of real estate. The Third National Bank and the Traders' Bank, a short time preceding the sale, took his exchange on New York at the usual rates, and others dealt with him as if he were entirely solvent. Polk, a leading lawyer of the city, held his certificate of deposit for forty thousand dollars, and Knox and Brotherton, prominent citizens, were in the habit of indorsing his paper. These parties, from their *424 course of dealing, of necessity regarded him as a solvent man. If so, why should Lucas suspect his condition to be otherwise?
All of them had equal opportunities with Lucas of knowing his real condition, and some far better, for Knox and Brotherton were on terms of intimacy with him, while Lucas was not. If they were ignorant of the exact state of his affairs, how can Lucas, with less familiarity with them, be supposed to be in a different condition. It is claimed, however, that Lucas is chargeable with notice that Darby's paper was in the hands of street brokers, because the Boatman's Institution, of which he was a director, purchased it from them, and that paper put on the street in this manner is evidence that the maker is insolvent. This conclusion by no means follows, for a man may sell his paper on the street at a great sacrifice to effect a purpose deemed beneficial by him, and still not be insolvent. This proceeding undoubtedly tended to show that Darby was embarrassed, but, if his paper bore the indorsement of good men of reputable standing and recognized wealth, it is reasonable to suppose they were satisfied with his pecuniary status. This supposition is verified in the case of Knox, one of the indorsers, who, when asked by the president of the institution "how good is Darby?" replied, "as good as anybody." It is fair to infer that this information quieted any misgivings which this officer had about purchasing the paper, and that Lucas, with the other directors, was told what Knox said. If so, it is idle to say that the confidence of Lucas in Darby's solvency had nothing to rest on. If it be conceded that the mode of raising money adopted by Darby had a tendency to create distrust in the mind of Lucas, it is nevertheless apparent that the fact of two men of substance indorsing his paper, coupled with the broad declaration of one of them on the subject of his pecuniary condition, was well calculated to remove this distrust and establish his credit.
It is contended, however, by way of impeachment of the good faith of the transaction in controversy, that the property was sold for less than its value, but we are by no means *425 satisfied that this is so. The evidence on this subject consists chiefly of the opinions of witnesses upon the relative and prospective values of corner lots upon rival streets. This mode of ascertaining the worth of property is necessarily uncertain and speculative. It is undoubtedly true that every person who buys property in a growing city like St. Louis expects it to rise in value, and that this consideration is more or less an element in every purchase. This expectation, however, is more particularly applicable to unproductive and unimproved property. It rarely occurs that valuable ground in the heart of a city, on which costly buildings are erected, is purchased on any other theory than that it will pay, from the time of its purchase, a fair return on the investment. Of course the purchaser looks forward to a gradual rise in the value of the ground which will compensate for the deterioration of the buildings, but the basis of the purchase, as a general thing, is the present rental value. He takes the risk of a change of business from the particular locality, which, as is well known, oftentimes works a serious injury. There is nothing to show that the property in question was not rented to as good an advantage as it could be, and, clearly, the net income received from it demonstrates that it was not sacrificed. Besides, Darby had been trying to sell it, but was unable to get more for it. There are plenty of witnesses who say it was sacrificed, but no one is produced, having the ability to buy, who testifies he would have given more for it than Lucas did. If, as is contended, Robert Campbell, a gentleman of large means, who had the purchase of the property under consideration when the negotiations with Lucas were concluded, would have paid a higher price for it, why is he not called to testify to that fact? In the nature of things, in a city like St. Louis, if this property could have been sold for more money than Lucas gave for it, direct proof was obtainable to show it. In the absence of this proof it is a reasonable presumption that the sale cannot be impeached because of inadequate consideration.
It is insisted, however, that Lucas was precluded from *426 purchasing at a sum less than $300,000, because he certified with Britton, in 1868, on the occasion of the negotiation of the loan of $150,000 by Darby, that the property was worth that sum. It is undeniable that this certificate was carelessly and loosely signed, because the parties making it had no good reason for saying the property was worth twice the money proposed to be lent on it. Britton says he makes a practice of regarding values with extreme liberality, when he knows the inquiry is made for the purpose of a loan and the property offered is abundant security for it. This is all wrong, and cannot be justified by any of the supposed exigencies of business. Lucas, in vindication of his action, tells us he was unaware at the time of the faulty construction of the building and the small amount of rents received, and, besides, that he had heard that some one had offered the sum named in the certificate for the property, though it turns out no such offer was made.
These things relieve him from the charge of making a certificate with intent to procure for Darby a credit to which he knew him not to be entitled, but they do not furnish a case of justification, as, manifestly, certificates to character or value should not be given unless they are known to be true. It cannot be doubted, from the evidence, that neither Lucas nor Britton meant to do anything wrong, and, if so, we know of no principle of law which would estop Lucas from disputing the correctness of the valuation named in the certificate in order to show his good faith and fair dealing in his transaction with Darby.
It is hardly necessary to say, in concluding this case, that the sale of real estate by Darby was not out of the usual course of business within the meaning of the Bankrupt Act.
DECREE AFFIRMED.