The questions here involved arise under the Copyright Law (17 USCA § 1 et seq.) in its relation to motion pictures, infringement' of which the plaintiffs allege in each of the-four eases which have been consolidated and heal’d ’as one. ’ .The material facts are "as follows: Plaintiff^'are proprietors and distributors of various copyrighted motion pictures/' Defendants own ,ánd operate a theater in .the' town df'Greeensbo'ro and. also one in the town' of Centreville, Md. 'At the theater in Greens/”' boro, a number of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted motion pictures were exhibited without a license, the films having come into the defendants’ hands pursuant to a contract made with one of the defendants which permitted only limited exhibitions of the films at tbe theater in Centreville; vice versa, a picture of one of the plaintiffs (RKO Productions, Ine.), delivered to tbe theater in Greensboro under a license, contract for a single day’s exhibition at that theater alone, was exhibited by the defendants at the theater in Centreville. This practice of exhibiting motion pictures at times or places prohibited by the license agreements is commonly known in the industry as holding over or bieycling. • The films are not produced for sale by the plaintiffs, but are ■distributed, pursuant to so-ealled standard exhibition contracts (the form of which was adopted at a general trade conference in 1^-27); through numerous exchange centers, located throughout the United States. The right, of .the exhibitor signing such contract to exhibit, the film is strictly limited as to time and place. It further appears that a picture of one of the plaintiffs, namely, Warner Bros. Pictures, Ine., was exhibited at the Greensboro theater after the defendants had1 been served with a complaint by the plaintiffs on account of an alleged similar infringement by exhibition of another of its pictures. In all four suits the relief sought is an - injunction and damages under the Copyright Law.
Prior to answering the bills of complaint tbe defendants moved to dismiss them on the ground of lack of jnrisdietiofi. After hearing, these motions were denied, answers were filed, and testimony taken, as a 'result of which three questions have been -presented to the court- for 'decision. First, does the Copyright Law give a right of action because of unlicensed exhibition of copyrighted motion pictures? Second, does plaintiffs’ 'refusal to arbitrate their claims against the defendants* in accordance with the arbitration provisions in the licensed contracts, preclude plaintiffs from the right'to resort to' the present action? Third, assuming that plaihtifls-are entitled to damages, must the court) As-they contend,-grant them an election to take the minimum statutory damages of $250 for ekeh infringement in lieu'of dctual damages,, oi’, !as defendants contend, may the court award nominal damages for‘each infringement as the actual damages sustained?'
While, similar suits appear to have been, brought'' in several pther federal courts, they were' for the most parti uneontested, and no- *913 reported opinions dealing with these precise points existed when the eases were heard. The questions will be considered in the order above stated. We therefore come to the first question, namely, Does the Copyright Law give a right of action because of unlicensed ■exhibition of copyrighted motion pictures?
The provisions of the Copyright Law per* tinent to this inquiry are the following:
“Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right:
“(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work. * * *
“(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama or, if it be a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any manuscript or any record whatsoever thereof; to make of to procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever. * * *" 17 USCA § 1.
“Application for registration shall specify to which of the following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs: * * *
“(d) Dramatic or dramatieo-musical compositions; * * *
“(Z) Motion-picture photoplays;
“(m) Motion pictures other than photo-plays.
“The above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter of copyright as defined in section 4 of this title, nor shall any error in classification invalidate or impair the copyright protection secured under this title.” (17 USCA § 5).
“Copyright may also be had of the works of an author, of which copies are not reproduced for sale, by the deposit, with claim of copyright, of one complete copy of such work if it be a lecture or similar production or a dramatic, musical, or dramatieo-musical composition; of a title and description, with one print taken from each scene or act, if the work be a motion-picture photoplay; * * * of a title and description, with not less than two prints taken from different sections of a complete motion picture, if the work be a motion picture other than a photo-play. * * *” (17 USCA § 11).
The classifications (Z) and (m) above quoted of section 5, and the quoted provision of section 11 prescribing the method for registering copies of motion pictures, were brought into the Act of March 4, 1909, by amendment in 1912 (35 Stat. 1075-1088; 37 Stat. 488). Defendants contend that these amendments of 1912 indicate that motion pictures then came for the first time under the protection of the copyright laws; that the protection thereupon granted was limited, namely, that it was merely against duplica•tion or vending of films, and that an unlicensed exhibition of a copyrighted picture is not within the scope of the protection afforded. In short, defendants contend that the exhibitions here complained of are neither a “publication” nor a “copy” within the meaning of section 1 (a) of the act, and further contend that a motion picture cannot be classed as a “dramatic work” as that phrase is used in section 1 (d).
The question whether the exhibition or display of a moving picture is a “copy” within the meaning of section 1 (a) of the act is probably disposed of by the Supreme Court in the case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,
Turning next to the question whether the exhibition of a moving picture is a “publication” within the meaning of section 1 (a) of the act, the decision of the Supreme Court in the last-mentioned ease is also strongly persuasive of a negative answer to this question, although the generally recognized definition of the word “publication” would seem to warrant a contrary conclusion. In its ordinary acceptation the word “publication” means “to make public; to make known to people in general * * * to bring before the public, as for sale or distribution; especially (a) to print, or cause to be printed, and to issue from the press either for sale or general distribution, as a book, newspaper, piece of music, engraving, ete.” Webster’s International Dictionary. “To make public, to make known to people in general; * * * to exhibit, display, disclose or reveal.” Century Dictionary. Sale is, of course, not an essential element. If, where the question is whether an author has lost his common-law or statutory copyright, publication is accomplished by placing a book in a library (Jewelers’ Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers’ Publishing Co.,
In Universal Film Manufacturing Co. v. Copperman (C. C. A.)
However, assuming, without deciding, that the exhibition here complained of was neither a “publication” nor a “copy” within the meaning of section 1 (a) of the act, there would seem to be no escape from the conclusion that the plaintiffs are nevertheless entitled to invoke the protection of section 1 (d) on the ground that a “motion-picture photo-play” is a “dramatic work.” They are both cognate forms of production. It is no longer open to question that a moving picture presentation of an author’s copyright-work is a dramatization of such work (although dramatic and motion picture rights may be made the subject of independent contract), and that the person producing the films for such pictures and offering them for sale or exhibition, without a license so to do, even if not himself exhibiting them, is liable for infringement. This was decided in Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,
To the contention that, since section 5 has separate classifications for dramatic or dram-atieo-musieal compositions and for motion picture photoplays, therefore section 1 (d) is not to be interpreted as embracing the latter, it is sufficient to point out that the classification of section 5 is merely for the convenience of the copyright office and of applicants for copyrights. Such interpretation is strengthened by the last paragraph of section 5.
The ease of Littleton v. Oliver Ditson Co. (C. C.)
We find nothing in the congressional debates which indicate a different legislative intent. In fact, the question appears not to have been discussed when sections 5, 11, and 25 were amended in 1912. The debates that occurred with respect to prohibiting and penalizing the unauthorized exhibition, through moving pictures, of copyrighted plays and books, are obviously not apposite to the precise point. Since, then, a motion picture photoplay is to be considered as embraced within the term “dramatic work,” as used in section 1 (d), and since, if copyrighted, it is an infringement for one without permission “to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever,” projecting it upon the screen is of course within the prohibition. The fact that the construction of the statute here adopted excludes motion pictures other than photoplays may produce an undesirable or even inequable result. But that is a practical, not a legal objection, properly to be addressed to the lawmakers, not to the courts. Only photoplays are here involved.
We now turn to the second question, namely, Does plaintiffs’ refusal to arbitrate their claims against the defendants, in accordance with the arbitration provisions in the license contracts, preclude plaintiffs from the right to resort to the present action ?
Since the present case was submitted, two decisions have been rendered which set at rest any further controversy on this point, and require that the question be answered in the negative. One of these decisions is by the Supreme Court, Paramount Famous Las-ky Corporation v. U. S.,
“The judge below sustained the demurrer on the ground that the arbitration provision was a condition precedent to the bringing of any suit on the contract, notwithstanding the injunction, which prevented arbitration, and based his opinion upon a number of authorities holding that, where the condition precedent to the bringing of suit was prevented from being carried out by some unlawful act of the parties seeking to set up the injunction as a reason for not carrying out the condition, the excuse or reason could not be availed of by the parties seeking to bring the action. An examination of the authorities relied upon by the court below shows that the act of the party making it impossible to carry out the condition precedent to suit was either a subsequent act or at least not the act itself of incorporating the unlawful condition in the contract sued upon. * * * These cases are easily to be distinguished from the instant case, where a clause of the very contract itself entered into by both parties has been declared unlawful and enjoined. Certainly, it eanndt be said, especially in view of the clause in the decree above quoted, exempting the rest of the contract from the taint of unlawfulness, that the whole contract is void, and that in case of breach by either party no remedy could be had.
*916 “The record also shows that, because of the injunction secured by the United States government, the machinery for arbitration set up in the contract had ceased to exist, and the rule that an act of law, due to the aet or default of one of the parties, cannot be relied upon as an exeuse for his nonperformance of the contract, has no application to the facts in this ease. * * *
“It would, therefore, seem, in view of the cases herein cited, that the proper rule of law is that, where the obligation itself is unlawful and cannot be performed, such performance should be excused, provided the contract is divisible and the remainder of the contract is lawful. It is certainly an anomalous situation in which this plaintiff finds itself under the ruling of the court below. It is enjoined from performing a condition precedent, but no relief is aeeorded it, because it does not perform the condition.
“Again we think that the learned judge below was in error for another reason, and that is that the contract, as far as it related to the lawful and unlawful parts, was divisible. That this was the opinion of Judge Thaeher, in the ease of United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation [(D. C.)34 F.(2d) 984 ], supra, is shown by the excerpt from his decree. That such a provision, as the one in question here, is separable from the rest of the contract, is borne out by a number of decisions. * * * ”
The contention that plaintiffs, by intrusting their films to defendants, pursuant to the terms of their contracts, have made an election of remedies, namely, have waived their right to sue in tort under the Copyright •Law, and are relegated to a suit in assumpsit on the contract, is unsound. While it is true that the suit in the last-named case was an action in assumpsit, that form of action is merely an alternate remedy, and nothing which the plaintiffs in the present ease have done precludes them from their right to resort to the remedy provided under the Copyright Law. Henry v. Dick,
Plaintiffs’ right to invoke the Copyright Law, therefore, being clear, and it being equally clear that on the admitted facts in all four cases infringement has occurred, we come to the final question of what damages plaintiffs are entitled to. They contend that they have the right to elect to take the minimum statutory damages of $250 for each infringement in lieu of actual damages, which have not been proved, while defendants contend that the court may award nominal damages for each infringement.
The pertinent provisions of the Copyright Law are the following:
“If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable:
“(a) To an injunction restraining such infringement;
“(b) To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement * * * or in lieu of actual damages and profits such damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and in assessing such damages the court may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, but [here follow limitations applicable specifically to newspaper reproductions of photographs, and certain motion picture infringements of undramatized or nondramatio work and of copyrighted dramatic or dramatico-musical work], and such damages shall in no other case exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250, and shall not be regarded as a penalty. But the foregoing exceptions shall not deprive the copyright proprietor of any other remedy given him under this law, nor shall the limitation as to the amount of recovery apply to infringements occurring after the actual notice to a defendant, either by service of process in a suit or other written notice served upon him. • * *
“Fourth. In the case of a dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or orchestral composition, $100 for the first and $50 for every subsequent infringing performance; in the case of other musical compositions $10 for every infringing performance.” 17 USCA § 25.
This final question is disposed of in favor
*917
of the plaintiffs by the very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. v. Gene Buck,
“In a case disclosing infringement of a •copyright covering a musical composition, there being no proof of actual damages, is the court bound by the minimum amount of $250 set out in the so-called ‘no other case’ ■clause of section 25 (b) of the Copyright Act (17 USCA § 25), reading, ‘and such damages shall in no other ease exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250, and shall not be regarded as a penalty?’ ”
“Is section 25 (b) Fourth of the Copyright Act (17 USCA § 25), applicable in the discretion of the Court, to a ease disclosing infringement of copyright covering a musical composition, there being no proof of actual damage?”
“In section 25 (b) of the Copyright Act (17 USCA § 25) is the clause reading, ‘nor shall the limitation as to the amount of recovery apply to infringements occurring after the actual notice to a defendant,’ confined in its scope to the particular cases of infringement theretofore specifically mentioned in said section 25 (b) ?”
Answering the first question in the affirmative, the court said: “The Copyright Act confers two monopolies — that of making ■copies and that of giving public performances for profit. It was settled in Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co.,
“The history of the section, as revealed in the extended hearings which preceded the act of 1909, makes the contrary clear. We are of opinion that the maximum and minimum provisions were intended to be applicable alike to all types of infringement except those for which the section makes other specific provision.
“It is urged, however, that under such interpretation the suggested measure of $10 a performance, scheduled in the fourth subdivision of section 25, would not be applicable unless more than twenty-five infringing performances were proved. This appears to be the meaning of the section, read as a whole, particularly since the amounts in the scheduled subdivisions appear to have been inserted merely as an aid to the court in awarding such damages as ‘shall appear to be .just.’ The definite specification of a maximum and minimum in every ease, is not contradicted in any way by these legislative suggestions as to what may be deemed reasonable allowances in eases falling within the prescribed limitations. See Westerman v. Dispatch Printing Co.,249 U. S. 100 , 106, 109,39 S. Ct. 194 ,63 L. Ed. 499 . If, as applied to musical compositions, the provisions of the entire section have proved unreasonable, the remedy lies with Congress.”
Substituting the words “dramatic compositions” for the words “musical compositions” in the last sentence quoted, the statement of the Supreme Court is an equally complete answer to the defendants’ arguments in the present cases.
The Supreme Court also answered in the affirmative the second question above quoted' which was certified to it, saying: “This question has in part been necessarily answered by
*918
our discussion of question II, for, unless the number of infringing performances of a copyrighted musical composition exceeds twenty-five, the minimum allowance of $250 must be made. ' Where more than twenty-five infringing performances are proved, and there is no showing as to actual loss; the court must allow the statutory minimum, and may, in its sound discretion, employ the scheduled $10 a performance as a basis for assessing additional damages. See Westerman v. Dispatch Printing Co.,
In declining to answer the last question (above quoted) certified to it, the court said: “Inasmuch as the plaintiffs did not ask for more than the minimum statutory damages of $250, and did not appeal from the decree awarding only this sum, the question whether the court might have awarded more than the maximum of $5,000 is not properly raised upon the facts presented in this certificate.”
Although in one instance the present defendants made an infringing exhibit of a picture after being notified in writing by the plaintiff copyright owner not to do so, no claim is made for more than the statutory damages of $250 for each infringement. Accordingly, the damages will be so decreed in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants (they being treated as joint tort-feasors in each suit), in addition to an injunction as prayed, and also costs and an attorneys’ fee in the aggregate sum for all four suits of $1,-000,.pursuant to the provisions of section 40 of the Copyright Act (17 USCA § 40).