Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order entered by the trial judge granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10), the court finding no genuine issue of material fact.
It appears that the defendants Dasher and Mate owned the premises in fee simple at 1374 Cleveland in Lincoln Park, Michigan, and on December 22, 1980, sold the property to plaintiff, Travis Tidwell, and defendant Marie Tidwell, who at that timе were husband and wife, for the sum of $42,-500 with a $7,500 cash down payment and the balance to be paid on land contract at $350 per month, including ten percent interest.
On October 9, 1981, plaintiff secured a judgment of divorce from defendant Marie Tidwell, who has failed to enter an appearance or file a brief in this matter on appeal. In the judgment of divorce, she was given the real estate free and clear of any *382 claim on the part of the plaintiff, subject to the land contract encumbrance and any home improvement loan or loans thereon which she was to assume and agree to pay and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. Then the judgment provided: "It is further ordered and adjudged that the above described property should be subject to a lien in the sum of seven thousand ($7,000) dollars in favor of the plaintiff, Travis Tidwell and said lien shall be payable when the marital home is sold or within the period of ten (10) years, whichever event occurs first.” According to plаintiffs brief, the divorce judgment was recorded in the Wayne County Register of Deeds office on November 26, 1981, in Liber G62321268, p 749692. Defendant Tidwell, as vendee, defaulted on the land contract and also failed to pay taxes and water bills. On November 12, 1982, she filed for bankruptcy and listed the plaintiff as a creditor in her bankruptcy schedule for the $7,000 on the property settlement, and also listed as creditors the vendors for the debt owed under the land contract. Counsel stated at oral argument and alleged in the briefs filed that the trustee of the bankruptcy estate abandoned any interest in the land cоntract as having an inconsequential value. On March 17, 1983, defendant Tidwell, as vendee, was discharged in bankruptcy of her debts.
On February 5, 1983, the vendee executed a quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure to the vendors to clear the title. Plaintiff filed the complaint which is the subject of this case to foreclose his divorce judgment lien on October 4, 1983, naming the vendors and the vendee as defеndants, and the vendors filed a countercomplaint against the plaintiff for a bill to clear the cloud on the title. In February, 1985, the parties agreed that plaintiff would discharge his lien claim on the rеal estate *383 so that the property could be sold, and the property was subsequently sold to a third party for $39,000 with the sum of $8,000 placed in an escrow account pending judicial determination оf the rights of the parties.
After hearing oral argument on April 5, 1985, the circuit judge denied plaintiffs motion for summary disposition and granted the vendor defendants’ motion for summary disposition based on no disputed issue of material fact, and also ordered that the plaintiffs complaint be dismissed.
Plaintiff on appeal alleges that the quitclaim deed from the vendee to the vendors in lieu of foreclоsure does not extinguish his recorded junior judgment lien, and also alleges that her discharge in bankruptcy does not discharge the interests of the judgment lien recorded prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
The defendant vendors in this case allege that the lien imposed by the divorce judgment is not enforceable against them because they were not parties to the divorce and thе lien attached only to the defendant wife’s equity interest in the real estate and, because her equity is zero, there is no interest to be attached by plaintiffs lien.
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10) should not be grаnted if a genuine issue exists as to any material fact. The test as stated in
Rizzo v
Kretschmer,
Though the former wife of plaintiff had been discharged in bankruptcy, the law seems quite clear that a discharge in bankruptcy does not affеct a lien of a mortgage, as a discharge is no bar to a subsequent foreclosure but only relieves the discharged bankrupt from personal liability on the obligation. See
First State Bank v Zoss,
Just as the vendors’ interest was not discharged by bankruptcy proceedings, neither can it be found on the state of facts as existed when the matter was argued before the trial court that the lien provided in the judgment of divorce was dischargеd as it affected the property. See also
Mary v Lewis,
A question is also raised in this case as to whether the defendant vendors are on notice of the lien created by the divorce judgment. There is no question but what the vendors were aware of the plaintiff’s having an interest in the premises because he was an original signatory with them and with his ex-wife to the land contract which is the subject matter оf this case. Michigan law is quite clear that, when property is sold on a land
*385
contract, legal title is retained by the vendor and an equitable title or interest is obtained by the vendee. See
General Electric Co v Levine,
The principal issue in this case, which is not adequately dealt with by either side in the briefs, is the question as to whether there was a mergеr of the vendor’s lien upon the quitclaim deed’s being given by Marie Tidwell to the vendors and, thus, how the intervening liens are affected. 1 The question of intention of a mortgagee or vendor is a question of fact which must be developed from evidence produced to show what that intention was at the time the acts were done, and is not something that can be summarily dealt with as was done in this case.
*386
In land contract law, the Legislature and the court cases have provided a number of remedies for vendors. It has been said that nearly a dozen remedies traditionally have been availаble to foreclose on land contracts. See
Gruskin v Fisher,
The vendors in this case also argue that the plаintiff’s lien attached only to the vendee’s equity interest in the real estate and, since there was no equity interest in the land contract in the ex-wife, there was nothing for the lien to attach to at thе time of its imposition. The Michigan Supreme Court in
Hooper v Van Husan,
Equitable title generally gives the right of possession, and thus a vendee in a land contract has morе than merely an equitable title. It is accurate that a vendee can give a lien on his property only to the extent of the interest the vendee holds. See 53 CJS, Liens, § 7, p 852. In this case, the fact thаt a vendee may or may not have had an equity in the property at the time it was sold by the vendors after the vendee’s default is of no consequence, *387 because the vendors took a reassignment of the vendee’s interest and did not pursue a foreclosure action.
Reversed and remanded for trial of the fact issues.
Notes
See Anno:
Deed from mortgagor to mortgagee or from purchaser to vendor as merger of mortgage or of vendor’s lien as regards intervening liens,