Tiburcio Garcia v. BondiTiburcio Garcia v. Bondi
Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA Francisco T., File No. 25-CV-03219 (JMB/DTS)
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General ; Kristi ORDER Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security ; Department of
Homeland Security, Todd M. Lyons, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Sirce Owen, Acting Director
for Executive Office for Immigration
Review ; Executive Office for Immigration
Review; Peter Berg, Director, Ft. Snelling
Field Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ; and Joel L. Brott, Sheriff of
Sherburne County ,
Respondents. David L. Wilson, Cameron Lane Youngs Giebink, and Clara Ester Fleitas-Langford, Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner Francisco Javier Tiburcio Garcia. Ana H. Voss and Lucas B. Draisey, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Pamela Bondi, Attorney General, Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security, Todd M. Lyons, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Sirce Owen, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Peter Berg, Fort Snelling Field Office Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Joel L. Brott, Sherburne County Sheriff’s Office.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Francisco T.’s motion for a preliminary injunction against Respondents Pamela Bondi, Attorney General, Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Todd M. Lyons, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Sirce Owen, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), Peter Berg, Fort Snelling Field Office ICE, and Joel L. Brott, Sherburne County Sheriff’s Office (together, Respondents). (Doc. No. 3.) For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the motion.
BACKGROUND
A. Petitioner’s Arrest and Detention
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection more than a decade ago and has resided in the United States ever since. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 32, 37; Doc. No. 7-2.) On July 25, 2025, agents of the Grand Forks Sector Border Patrol and ICE St. Paul Field Office arrested Petitioner at a gas station by for being illegally present in the United States. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 45; Doc. No. 7-3 at 2.) Respondents served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court, thereby initiating removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Doc. No. 7-2.)
On August 3, 2025, Petitioner requested a bond redetermination hearing before the Immigration Court in Fort Snelling, Minnesota. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 48; Doc. No. 7-4.) On August 5, 2025, after a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the requested redetermination on the grounds that Petitioner was “properly categorized as an applicant for admission, and the Court does not have jurisdiction to release [him] under INA Section 235(b)(2).” (Doc. No. 7-5 at 3.)
Two days later, Petitioner appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Doc. No. 7-6.) While that appeal is pending, Petitioner remains detained at Sherburne County Jail.
B. This Action
On August 12, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Petition). (Doc. No. 1.) The Petition seeks various forms of relief, including: (1) an order restraining Respondents from attempting to move him from the State of Minnesota while this petition is pending; (2) an order requiring Respondents to provide seventy-two hours’ notice of their intent to move him; (3) expedited review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1657; (4) an order directing Respondents to hold a bond hearing or to release Petitioner immediately; (5) declarations that Respondents’ refusal to provide Petitioner a bond hearing is arbitrary and capricious and violates applicable regulatory, statutory, and constitutional requirements; and (6) reasonable attorney fees and costs. (Doc. No. 1 at 31–32.) On that same day, Petitioner also filed an emergency motion seeking injunctive relief; specifically, he sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin Respondents from moving him outside of the District of Minnesota for the duration of this action and to require Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) within seven days. (Doc. No. 3 at 3).
The following day, the Court granted Petitioner’s TRO in part; the Court enjoined Respondents from removing him from this District (TRO Order). (Doc. No. 10.) However, the Court reserved ruling on Petitioner’s request for Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing until it received further briefing and the parties came before the Court for a hearing on August 27, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 11, 14, 16.)
DISCUSSION
Petitioner now asks the Court to convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction and to modify the relief requested to include an order requiring Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A). Respondent argues that section 1226 does not apply to Petitioner.
When considering a motion for a preliminary injunction, courts consider the
following four familiar factors: “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the
state of balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on
other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the
public interest.”
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc.
,
A. Probability of Success on the Merits
The Court first considers the Petitioner’s probability of success on the merits of his
underlying Petition.
Dataphase
,
Petitioner contends that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Section 1226 sets forth a discretionary process for the apprehension and detention of noncitizens who are already present in the United States and eligible for removal, and states that, except as provided in section 1226(c), [4] “the Attorney General ‘may release’ [a person] detained under § 1226(a) ‘on . . . bond’ or ‘conditional parole.’” Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting § 1226(a)). As a result, Petitioner contends that he is not subject to mandatory detention and is instead entitled to a bond hearing.
For their part, Respondents contend that Petitioner is not detained under section 1226. Instead, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which requires mandatory detention pending removal proceedings. Section 1225 provides in relevant part that, “in the case of [a person] who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the person] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the [person] shall be detained for a proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). [5] In other words, detention under section 1225(b)(2) is mandatory.
Thus, the Court must evaluate the contrary interpretations of sections 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a) and determine the likelihood that Petitioner can prevail in his argument that, as a matter of law, he is detained pursuant to section 1226(a) and not pursuant to section 1225(b)(2) as Respondents suggest. The Court concludes that this factor favors Petitioner for three reasons.
First, Petitioner is likely to prevail because of the plain meaning of the terms used
in sections 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a). When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word
of a statute should have a meaning.”
United States, ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res.,
Inc.
,
Here, the parties agree that Petitioner has resided within the United States for the
past ten years. Therefore, Petitioner is not currently “seeking admission” into the United
States, based on the plain meaning of that term. Comparatively, as a noncitizen who is
already present in the United States and may be eligible for removal, Petitioner more
clearly falls under a plain text reading of section 1226(a). As other courts have observed,
“[t]aken together these two statutes principally govern the detention of non-citizens
pending removal proceedings—section 1225 governs detention of noncitizens ‘seeking
admission into the country,’ whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens
‘already in the country.’”
Romero v. Hyde
, No. 25-11631-BEM,
Second, Petitioner is likely to prevail because Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section 1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section 1225 was correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have not been admitted would have already been ineligible for bond under section 1225(b)(2)(A).
Third, the Court concludes that Petitioner is likely to prevail because other courts
have already interpreted the statute as Petitioner does. Although Respondents’ arguments
are aligned with the Department of Homeland Security’s current interpretation of
immigration statutes, many courts have rejected Respondents’ interpretation of sections
1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a).
See Aguilar Maldonado v. Olson
, No. 25-CV-3142, 2025 WL
2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025);
Romero
, 2025 WL 2403827, at *9;
see also, e.g.
,
Martinez v. Hyde
, No. 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025);
Vazsquez v. Bostock
, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC,
The Court concludes that Petitioner has demonstrated a high probability of success on the merits of the Petition.
B. Threat of Irreparable Harm
The Court next considers whether Petitioner has demonstrated that, absent the
requested relief, he will suffer irreparable harm.
Dataphase
, 640 F.2d at 114. Since
Petitioner’s detention on July 25, 2025, Petitioner has been held at the Sherburne County
Jail, which is similar to a criminal detention, under the pretense that his detention is
mandatory and that he is not entitled to a bond hearing. A loss of liberty has been
recognized as a significant irreparable harm.
Matacua v. Frank
,
C. Balance of Harms and Public Interest
Last, the Court considers the balance of harms and the public interest.
Dataphase
,
640 F.2d at 114. The balance of harms and the public interest “merge when the
Government is the party opposing the preliminary injunction.”
Morehouse Enters., LLC v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives
,
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Petitioner Francisco T.’s Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED as follows:
1. Respondents shall not remove, transfer, or otherwise facilitate the removal of Petitioner from the District of Minnesota during the pendency of this action. However, Respondents may request permission from this Court to move Petitioner if unforeseen and emergent circumstances require Petitioner’s removal from the District.
2. Respondents are enjoined form denying Petitioner a bond hearing on the basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to Petitioner and Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) within seven days of this Order.
3. Respondents shall file notice with the Court within twenty-four hours of the occurrence of the bond hearing. Such notice shall inform the Court when the bond hearing occurred and the outcome of the bond hearing.
Dated: August 29, 2025 /s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan United States District Court permission from the Court to move Petitioner at least 72 hours prior to transporting Petitioner. Any such request must include an explanation for the request as well as a proposed destination. The Court will then determine whether to grant the request and permit transfer of Petitioner.
Notes
[1] The motion was initially filed by Petitioner as an Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. ( See Doc. No. 3.) Since that time, counsel for Respondents entered their appearances and responded to Petitioner’s motion, and, at the hearing on this motion on August 27, 2025, the parties agreed to construe the motion as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
[2] INA § 235(b)(2) is codified within 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner explains that the IJ’s determination was made pursuant to a policy memorandum announced by ICE, “in coordination with” the Department of Justice, on July 8, 2025, entitled, “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” which claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) as “applicants for admission.” (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 40–41; Doc. No. 5 at 3; see also Doc. No. 7-7.)
[3] The Court also ordered Respondents to file a letter indicating whether they would agree not to move Petitioner outside of the District of Minnesota pending resolution of his Petition. (Doc. No. 10 at 6.) Respondents thereafter filed a declaration agreeing not to remove Petitioner from this District pending the resolution of Petitioner’s habeas proceeding with the caveat that ICE may still give seventy-two hours’ notice to obtain permission from the Court to move Petitioner in the event of “unforeseen circumstances or contingencies.” (Doc. No. 12 ¶ 14.)
[4] The exception under § 1226(c) applies to noncitizens who have committed certain
criminal offenses or terrorist activities not at issue in this case.
Jennings
,
[5] Both parties agree that detention under § 1225(b)(1) is inapplicable.
[6] After the August 27 hearing on this motion, both parties agreed that the relief previously ordered by the Court in the TRO Order should be modified to include this exception. If Respondents determine that transferring Petitioner out of the District of Minnesota is necessary due to some unforeseen or emergency circumstance, Respondents shall request