*1 matter of defendant acted disagreement. without bona fide Judgment on that claimwas hence defendant's due. an honest and wages sincere belief that owed, contrary claimed were not but on the 127 THE COURT OF APPEALS CIVIL legally summary adjudica sufficient for VACATED; OPINION IS THE TRIAL favor, tion of this issue defendant's The COURTS JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. retirement bank clause and the reimburse Agreement
ment clause of the per could be WATT,C.J., LAVENDER, 1 28 ceived as in conflict if viewed within the HARGRAVE,KAUGER, SUMMERS, previous context of contracts and the sick BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ., policy.25 leave reimbursement The school concur. single
district did plaintiff deny out leave, payment HODGES, him J., for sick but tendered dissents. evidentiary indicating material consis
tently calculated sick payments leave in con
formity policy with the board and its inter
pretation Agreement. of the We hence
agree with
judgment
the trial court that
liquidated damages
issue was defendant's
due.
y temeyer, Mary Pittman, on behalf of similarly themselves and all others situ SUMMARY ated, Plaintiffs/Appellees, ' employment 26 The contract between de- fendant and its teachers for the 2000-2001 'N SIGHT SOUND APPLIANCE CEN year school governing contains two clauses TERS, INC., Corporation, an Oklahoma accumulated, disposition unused sick Sight 'n Warehouse, Sound & Cost d/b/a applicable leave. The clause plaintiff pro- Defendant/Appellant. (10) vides that teachers with at least ten 96,079. No. years of consecutive service in Okmulgee Public Schools shall be upon reimbursed re- Supreme Court of Oklahoma. per tirement at their diem rate for Sept. days accumulated, all unused sick leave in (120) twenty excess of one days. hundred As Sept. Corrected Plaintiff worked for the school district for at (10) years least ten consecutive and accumu- sixty-five
lated one hundred and one-half
(165%) days of unused sick leave. He is
hence entitled to forty- reimbursement (45%)days.
five and one-half Defendant has
paid (18) plaintiff eighteen days. We today affirm the trial judgment court's plaintiff
defendant owes monetary value remaining twenty-seven and one-half (27%)days per rate, diem
$5,614.68. plaintiff's As liquidated claim for
damages, we hold that defendant's refusal to plaintiff
reimburse for all the sick leave the
latter claimed he was owed was based on a Conceding today's that the two holding clauses in the contract litiga- that in the context of this perceived as in conflict does not discredit tion should not be so viewed. *4 and Luke Wallace Humphreys
David OK, Tulsa, Humphreys, Humphreys Wallace LaMu- LaMunyon of Faulkner & and Justin OK, Plaintiffg/Ap- P.L.L.C., Enid, for nyon, pellees. Rieman of Gun- C.
Craig L. Box and Julia
Devoll, P.C,,
Jackson,
&Box
goll,
Collins,
OK, Defendant/Appellant.
Enid,
J.;
LAVENDER,
judge erred
if the trial
here
1 1 We decide
$375,000.00
attorney fees to
awarding
suit
in their class action
plaintiffs/appellees
Sight 'n
defendant/appellant,
brought against
Centers, Inc.,
Sight 'n
Appliance
Sound
d/b/a
the Okla-
under
Warehouse
& Cost
Sound
(OCPA), 15
Act
Protection
homa Consumer
amended.1 We
©.S.1991,
seq.,
§
as
751 et
erred,
and the Court
judge
the trial
hold
mistakenly
(COCA),
I
Division
Appeals
Civil
attor-
only reasonable
affirmed,
because
fee, plaintiffs seek-
is no
ney
in this case
recovering
solely money damages, but
ing
(ie., nothing)
jury ver-
via a
damages
zero
Sight
'n
Tibbetts
also overrule
dict. We
(Tibbetts 1),
Centers, Inc.
Appliance
Sound
(cert.
6 P.3d
APP
2000 OK CIV
COCA,
3-30-00),
Division IV
prior
denied
case,
wrong-
it as
involving the same
opinion
may recover
private
ly
these
held
merely by
case
in this OCPA
attorney fees
without
OCPA
showing a violation
et
as amended.
Consum-
0.$.2001,
of the Oklahoma
at 15
version
seq.,
found
1. The current
(OCPA),
course,
may
Act
er Protection
showing
damages
inju-
attendant
or actual
tion of both fact and
[Christian
law issues
ry.
10, ¶ 43,
Gray,
2008 OK
65 P.3d
ruling
608] and abuse occurs when the
be
T2 This Court's decision in Walls v. Amer-
ing reviewed is based on an erroneous le
Co.,
ican Tobacco
2000 OK
11 P.3d
gal conclusion or there is no rational basis
Beall,
shortly by
followed
Patterson v.
in the evidence for the decision. Fent v.
19 P.3d
held
for a
Gas, Co.,
plaintiff to have a
Oklahoma Natural
claim
viable
under the
2001 OK
¶ 12,
477, 481;
Tisdale,
27 P.3d
Abel v.
plaintiff
OCPA the
must show as an essential
(reversal
claim,
ie.,
element
damages,
of the
actual
injury
proper
abuse of discretion
plaintiffs argue
judge
fact. To the
if trial
extent
clearly
I
is the
makes
case such that the
erroneous
conclusion and
propriety
evidence).
attorney
judgment,
of at
against
least some
fee award
reason and
challenged
not now be
have
Further,
assigned
when an
er
been
prevailing/sue-
determined to be the
ror is one of law a de novo review standard
I,
parties by
cessful
Tibbetts we hold an
applies
Gray, supra,
[Christian v.
exception to the law of the case doctrine
¶
608], non-deferential,
65 P.3d at
applies
palpably
erroneous
plenary
independent
review of the trial
gross
injustice
and a
or manifest
would be
legal ruling.
court's
Samman v. Multiple
done were we to allow the award for fees to
*5
¶ 8
Fund,
Injury
Trust
2001 OK
and n.
clearly
stand when it
not authorized
33 P.3d
Though normally
305 and n. 5.
plaintiffs
and
pre-
cannot be deemed to have
reviewing
when
the reasonableness of an at
vailed
nothing.
because
recovered
torney
appellate
fee award an
court affords
PART I. STANDARDOF REVIEW.
judge's
the
finding(s)
trial
much deference
13 What
a
constitutes
reasonable
because of the
inquiry
nature of the factual
attorney fee is a matter addressed to the
into the factors delineated in State ex rel.
sound discretion of the trial court
to be Burk
City
City, supra,
Oklahoma
in
of
decided based on various
factors
and a
that here
overriding
the
and critical factor of
judgment
awarding attorney fees will not
the
undisputed
results obtained is
and leads
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
only
to
one rational conclusion as to what a
Gas,
Continental Natural
Inc. v. Midcoast
(ie.,
fee),
reasonable fee should be
the
Gas, Inc.,
Natural
APP
CIV
ultimate
decision
this case turns on a
1185, 1188;
985 P.2d
see also State ex rel.
question of law.
Burk v. City
City,
Oklahoma
(review
standard is
PART II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTU-
abuse
discretion when reasonableness of
AL BACKGROUND.
attorney fees
appeal).
awarded is issue on
general matter,
As a
an abuse of discretion
15 The Pre-Trial
Conference Order
(PTO)2
appellate
review standard includes
examina-
filed in
August
the lower court
5(I)
issues,
2. Rule
ing
of the Rules for
legal
District Courts of
including
the factual and
de-
Oklahoma,
0.$.2001, Ch.2, App.,
Rules 1 et
presented.
tails of material evidence to be
The
amended,
seq.,
provides:
present
questions
order shall also
all
of law in
marked,
any
I. Pretrial-Orders. After
the case. All
conference
exhibits must be
listed
rule,
pursuant
held
pretrial
to this
and identified
order shall be
order.
If there is
reciting
entered
the action
This
taken.
order
objection
to the admission
exhibits,
the
subsequent
shall control
grounds
objection
course of the action
for the
specifically
must be
subsequent
unless modified
a
order.
proper objection,
The
stated. Absent
the listed ex-
following
pretrial
order
a final
conference
hibit is admitted when offered at trial or other
only
prevent
shall be modified
proceeding.
to
Attorneys
parties
manifest
ap-
for all
will
injustice.
adopted by
The form
prove
the Oklahoma
presented
the order. The order shall be
Supreme
pretrial
Court for
conference
signature.
orders
to the District Court for
The con-
shall be used
the District
pretrial
Court.
If the
supersede
tents of the
order shall
the
form,
judge deviates
pleadings
from the
he
govern
or she shall in
the trial of the case
writing
show to the
departure
Court the rea-
permitted by
unless
therefrom is
the
sons for such deviation.
injustice.
to
manifest
prevent
Proposed
pretrial
order shall
pretrial
include the results of
(Emphasis
order shall not be filed.
the
regard-
body.)
conference and advice to the court
added to
relief-i.e.,
compensato
damages-both
tary
defen
contended
plaintiffs
indicates
attorneys,
plaintiffs'
ry
punitive. Two of
758(8),
OCPA, §
violated
conduct
dant's
attorney
effect,
at the
their view
voiced
(12).
prohibited
(9)
12 details
Subsection
I,
remand from
hearing held after
advertising, ac
switch
bait and
conduct
injunctive
permit
not
does
that the OCPA
con
of behavior
forms
various
companied
action and the
private consumer
in a
relief
product
selling
supplying
cerning not
injunctive relief was abandoned.
request
9, respective
8 and
Subsections
advertised.
knowingly or
advertising,
unlawful
ly,
tried,
jury
declare
case was
T6 After the
know,
intent
product
three
with
provided
law and
on the
reason to
instructed
not
intent
verdict form
or with
a defendant's
it as advertised
verdict forms:
to sell
public de
jury
reasonably expected
to find the
allowed the
generally
supply the
defendant;
plaintiffs'
limitation of
in favor
the ad discloses
issues
unless
mand
case,
pre
Basically, plaintiffs'
allowing
jury quality.3
generally
form
verdict
fix the
plaintiffs
and to
the advertis
jury,
in favor of the
find
centered
sented
sets,
whole;
then
but
Magnavox television
ing
damages to the class as
amount
brand
damage
to another
Nine
steering the customer
verdict form.
punitive
and a
jury
I, 2000 OK
signed
television, ie.,
members
Goldstar.
1066-1067.4
6 P.3d at
form,
APP
unequivocally
CIV
fixed
but
verdiet
peti
initial October
Although plaintiffs'
nine
The same
damages
at zero.
amount of
prohib
damage verdict
injunctive
jurors
signed
punitive
relief to
requested
had
tion
punitive
amount of
it fixed the
form and
continuing
violate
from
it defendant
verdicts
Based on these
damages
the subse
at zero.
OCPA,
controlled
PTO-which
defendant
jury
found
must assume
action-unequivocally
we
course of
quent
OCPA,
violation of the
engage in some
did
solely
mone
sought
forth
sets
subject
take orders for
August
d.
refusal to
provision existed
The identical
*6
delivery
(PTO)
for
transaction advertised
consumer
not-
Order
Trial Conference
the Pre
when
time,
a reasonable
within
court.
in the trial
text was filed
ed in the
demonstrating
sub-
showing
defective
or
5(D).
e.
0.$.1991, Ch.2, App., Rule
the seller
transaction which
ject
a consumer
of
impracticable
the
for
unusable or
knows is
(12)
753(8)(9)
§
and
O.S.8upp.2002,
3. Title 15
advertisement,
in the
purpose set forth
provide:
subject
deposit
of a
accepting a
the
f.
practice which is
engages
a
person
in
A
charg-
subsequently
and
transaction
consumer
...
item,
[OCPA]
under the
to be unlawful
declared
higher priced
or
buyer
ing
the
business,
of the
course of the
g.
to
deliveries
failure
make
when,
person's
willful
person:
the
within
subject
transaction
of a consumer
otk
work
therefor
a refund
time or to make
reasonable
Advertises, knowingly
to
or with reason
purchaser|{.]
8.
request of the
upon the
know,
subject
PTO,
transaction
of a consumer
the
Conten-
August
[sic]
Plaintiff's
advertised;
(12)
tions,
752(8), (9)
it as
not to sell
OCPA.
with intent
of the
§
cites to
Advertises,
to
knowingly
with reason
or
of the OCPA.
9.
definition section
752 is the
Section
know,
subject
transaction
typographical
of a consumer
er-
Obviously,
the
PTO contains
the
related)
reasonably expected
(or
supply
provisions
ror,
intent not to
switch
with
bait and
as the
(12)
demand,
(9)
753(8),
dis-
§
advertisement
public
unless the
in
are found
sued under
setting
quantity;
out defen-
part
PTO
limitation of
of the
closes a
the OCPA. The
correctly
to
# ok k
refers
Defense
Grounds For
dant's
advertising,
subject of amend-
Employs
and switch"
753 was the
§
"bait
Section
12.
753.
trial
subject
filing
initial
to sell the
the
of an offer
ment after
which consists
jury
and after
petition
the seller does
October 1994
which
in
transaction
court
a consumer
quote
sell,
advertising
early
We
from
accom-
in
trial was held
to
not intend
pertinent subsec-
following prac-
as the
Statutes
2002 Oklahoma
panied by
or more of
one
See 1996
in 1994.
same as
tions remain
tices:
Laws,
3;
Sess.
§
Okla.
Ch.
subject
Sess.
of a consum-
Okla.
a.
refusal
show
advertised,
Laws, Ch.
Sess.
§
2001 Okla.
3;
er transaction
Laws, Ch.
Laws,
§
1;
Ch.
Sess.
subject
2002 Okla.
advertised
disparagement of the
b.
sale,
the terms
transaction
a consumer
as all
class certified
PTO identifies
oth-
4. The
tie-in sales or
requiring undisclosed
c.
Televi-
25" Goldstar
purchased 19" or
that
prior to
those
met
to be
conditions
er undisclosed
January
between
defendant
sions from
subject
a consumer
selling
advertised
through
December
transaction,
plaintiffs
carry
but that
failed to
their burden on the case. We also note the record is
any damages.5 Judgment
to show
was en undisputed
plaintiffs' agreement
that
judge, awarding plaintiffs
tered
the trial
attorney
their counsel as to
fees
ais
contin-
nothing.
attorney
The issue of
fees was geney-based agreement, i.e., plaintiffs have
proper application.
reserved for
responsibility
pay
their counsel attor
ney
Further,
nothing
fees as
was recovered.
sides, plaintiffs
defendant,
T7 Both
Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of
attorney
judge
moved for
Law
fees and the trial
(FF/CL)
requests.
accompanied
denied
appealed
both
Each side
the trial court
COCA,
"Judgement"
awarding
the denials and the
Division
in
IV
fees under
re
I,
effect,
view,
language
decided that
indicates that the amount in controver
761.1(A)
employed §in
OCPA allowed
sy
clearly established,
in this case was never
plaintiffs
attorney
merely by
to recover
but would not
fees
per
have exceeded $25.00
class
showing a violation of the OCPA without an member, a sum that would not have exceeded
showing damages
inju
attendant
or actual
$500,000.00for the
class as whole. Evi
ry.
judge
Tibbetts I remanded for the trial
presented
attorney
dence
at the
hearing,
fee
attorney
determine the amount of
fees.
however, seems
plaintiffs sought
to reveal
This
quest
Court denied defendant's
for cer- about 1 million
in compensatory
dollars
dam
I,
tiorari
to review Tibbetts
re
matter
ages
i.e.,
jury,
from the
apparently about
court,
turned to the trial
and after various
per class member.
$50.00
parties
written
concerning
submissions of the
attorney
appealed
Defendant
evidentiary
issue and an
the award and the
hearing,
COCA,
judge
affirmed,
the trial
entered the
though
ap
award of
Division
$375,00.00
plaintiffs
peared
favor of
recognize
now before
holding
Tibbetts I's
us.6
plaintiffs
attorney
were entitled to
fees
merely
because
bad shown a violation of
$375,000.00
18 The
fee was arrived at
longer
good
light
OCPA was no
judge upon
the trial
a determination that the
Walls,
this Court's
supra,
decision
amount of
attorneys'
reasonable
effect that an
essential element of
time
was 3000 hours and that a reasonable
hourly
damages.
OCPA claim is actual
lawyers
Division
rate for the
I's
involved was an
average
per
hour.7
$125.00
opinion
Plaintiffs at
powerless
determined it
to re
torneys
I,
initially sought
essentially
had
verse Tibbetts
over million
in deference to
attorney
dollars in
doctrine,
fees and
the record con
law of the case
and decided the
attorneys may
tains evidence that said
actu
*7
amount awarded did not manifest an abuse of
ally
spent
have
attorney's
7000 hours in
time
previously granted
discretion.8 We
certiora-
Nothing
jury's
5.
definitively
in the
verdict
attorney
reveals
certiorari-related
fees and remanded to
the extent to
hearing
found defendant
to have
the trial court
proper
as to the
challenge
violated the OCPA nor
amount.
does the decision in
Defendant does not
Tib
said Or-
and,
Centers,
Sight
der
Appliance
appeal
betts v.
here
as we read
'n Sound
its
merit
Inc.
briefs
submissions,
and certiorari
(Tibbetts I),
it does
not seek re-
2000 OK CIV
47,
APP
1051
Act;
in
thing
than a violation
more
injustice
gross or manifest
on
doctrine based
private claim under
the
a
stead for
viable
of attor
award
where
may be warranted
must show
dam
consumer
actual
by any law. OCPA
clearly not authorized
ney fees is
the
necessary element of a claim. 2000
ages as a
Band
Inc. v. Citizen
Enterprises,
L
C &
629-630;
119-18,
at
see
Oklahoma,
P.3d
2002 OK
at
Tribe
Potawatomi
of
Patterson,
supra, 2000 OK
at 11 30-
also
¶¶
20-21,
believe
P.3d
We
(third
plain
a
element of
tection compensate any person necessary for by be person of reasonable ex- payment such investigation penses damages fees incurred sustained; judgments may attorney. Make such orders or Attorney 3. a district General or necessary carry ac- stipula- out a transaction in judgment may be also include consent expecta- person with consumers' reasonable cordance to be made such tion for restitution money, property or other to consumers tions; Appoint order or receiver or things in con- master received from such consumers prevent and also sequestration with a violation of this act the use or nection of assets to through illegal proceeds enjoyment derived specific perform- may stipulation include a expenses of a master or pur- and assess the Any judgment means consent entered into ance. not be deemed to suant to this section shall against defendant; receiver violation, any or autho- Revoke license certificate its unless it does so admit engage rizing person to in business in any judgment entered terms. Before consent state; effective, pursuant be into to this section shall any engaging Enjoin person from approved by be the district court it must required entry manner made thereof in the an state; in this or business appropriate entry judgment. 7. Grant other relief. making Once such received, Con- is filed under the any D. When an action approval of the condi- breach attorney or a district judgment sumer Protection Act shall be treated tions of such consent seeking action General, be order, of a court and shall Attorney as a violation declaratory judgment injunction shall be provided or subject penalties to all the any county in this state or district therefor. filed in other upon or occur- Attorney the same transaction brought by Gen- based C. action occurrences, rence, or may: of transactions attorney, series the court eral or a district of the first allegations the basis judgments which form such orders or 1. Make necessary employment action filed. prevent use or *12 allowing attorney fee and would award regard aggrieved be in such because to be an consumer and to have a viable claim under by any not authorized law. This is some thing requires and we the OCPA nowhere .OCPA, damages actual the must be shown. to the Act to do so.16 decline rewrite damages Plaintiffs no actual to the showed jury. the To extent Tib- satisfaction of the PART V. SUMMARY. by plaintiffs I to the betts is claimed propriety the case such that the of at least solely money sought Plaintiffs dam- attorney some fee award not now be ages brought in their class action lawsuit they against challenged Al- have determined to defendant under the OCPA. been though jury prevailing parties by the returned a verdict which be the or successful violation(s) decision, indicates some of that Act were exception we hold an to the law applies shown, of the case doctrine as Tibbetts is a jury damages. I the found zero verdict case, only attorney fee in this The reasonable palpably gross erroneous decision and a or attorney agreement injustice where fee manifest would be done were we to i.e., contingency-based, their counsel was allow the award for fees to stand when such attorneys plaintiffs their no fees owe because clearly plaintiffs is authorized law and recovery, there was no is no fee at all. prevailed cannot be deemed to have because nothing. recovered over- is I, effect, plaintiffs in held that 26 Tibbetts ruled. attorney merely were entitled to recover fees
by showing in defendant violated the OCPA Accordingly, opinion the way, though they the
some
even
recovered zero
Appeals
damages
Court of Civil
is VACATED and the
and showed themselves entitled to
Walls,
Patterson,
judgment awarding plaintiffs
no other relief.
trial court
at
$875,000.00
torney
fees of
is REVERSED.17
wrong
supra make clear that Tibbetts I was
dissenting
part opinion
postu-
dissenting
part opinion acknowledges
16. The
in
errs in
in
exception
lating
plaintiffs
to
an accrued or
that the
the law of the case doctrine
have
vested
applied
majority
right
attorney
the Court in PART IV of this
to recover
as an element
fees
recently discovered-vintage.
opinion is not of
recovery,
though plaintiffs
In
their
even
owe no
dissenting
part
words,
opinion
footnote 29 the
its
in
attorney
dissenting
fees.
In other
in
dating
shortly
cites cases
back to
after statehood
part opinion seems to fail to realize that
recognize
exception.
the existence of
here,
plaintiffs
contingency
because of their
Although
agree
dissenting
part
we
with the
in
counsel,
attorney
agreement
based
with their
general
opinion's
any exception
tenor that
to the
attorney
owe no
to
fees
their counsel for either
tightly
law of the case doctrine should be
circum-
bringing
litigating
nothing
the case because
or
scribed, recognition
exception essentially
of an
(Le.,
damages)
We
zero
was recovered.
fail to
palpably
gross
based
erroneous and
or
parties
litigation
understand
can have
how
(as
injustice
manifest
standard
set out in 116 of
right
money
accrued or vested
to obtain
as an
majority opinion)
long-standing juris-
is of
defendant,
recovery
money
element
from
cognizance.
prudential
fees,
pay
parties' attorney
to be used to
when
Contrary
dissenting
part opinion's
in
parties
attorney
owe no
fees to their attor-
belief,
majority opinion
does not measure
short,
neys.
plaintiffs
being deprived
legal rights by personal predilection based on an
Further,
nothing.
dissenting
part opin-
in
instead,
empty
shapeless yardstick;
major-
or
view,
effect,
retroactively
ion's
in
that we have
ity opinion has as its foundation sound law that
plaintiffs
abolished a claim of these
applied
light
presented
is
in
of the record
to this
right
recovery
substantive
to counsel-fee
stood
dissenting
part opinion
Court. The
in
would
argument
attached is also mistaken. Such an
gauge legal rights
have us
based on theoretical
fails for the same reason the similar or identical
concepts divorced from the real case that
does,
right argument
accrued
vested
or
to wit:
before this Court. This we will not do.
plaintiffs
attorney
anybody
owe no
fees to
regard
litigation
case
of this
on their
granting
July
17. Prior to our
certiorari on
dissenting
2002, plaintiffs
part opinion
behalf. The
seems to
appeal-related
filed motion for
urge
something
protection of
that does not exist.
attorney
ap-
fees for work
with this
associated
logic,
Neither
nor adherence to common law or
761.1(A)
citing
peal,
§
of the OCPA and 20 O.S.
principles,
plea
constitutional
nor
other
Obviously,
light
disposi-
§ 15.1.
of our
purportedly
legal thought requires
761.1(A)
established
plain
provides
tion it is
basis to
protection.
protect something
warrants such
To
award
such fees.
allows
Section 15.1
enigmatic
attorney
opposing
that has no existence would be
at best
this Court to award
fees to the
appeal
patently
side when an
frivolous. TRW/
gesture,
and,
believe,
we
devoid of
valueless
meaning
and reason.
Brewington,
Reda
Pump
SUMMERS,
HODGES,
WATT, C.J.,
required
harm to their interests.
element of
WINCHESTER, JJ.,
It is the
and Patterson norm that the
Walls
BOUDREAU
today,
claim
even
applies
court
to this
concur.
contrary holding
though
announced
JJ.,
KAUGER,
29 HARGRAVE
controlling
published,
earlier
and un
result.
concur in
(a)
unques
decision
bears
disturbed COCA
(b)
finality,
tionable
attributes
stands
*13
OPALA,V.C.J.,
part.
in
dissents
'I 30
(c)
reports
unrepudiated
in
and
has
directly challenged.6
never been
OPALA, V.C.J., dissenting
part.
in
My
solely
addresses
dissent
itself
today the trial
reverses
T1 The court
today's departure from the
aftermath
plaintiffs and
award to the
court's counsel-fee
I. It deals not
course charted
Tibbelts
statutory-law
expressly
norm
overrules
but rather with
with the new trail we blaze
in the
litigation
this
earlier
announced for
abandoning
the time-
the havoc we wreak
I).1
(Tibbetts
over
The
appeal of this cause
teachings Anglo-American ortho
honored
norm,
initially
green
received
ruled
which
judicature.7 I
doxy
appellate
in
would
of cer-
previous denial
light by this court's
repronounce
court's
apply to this case the
plaintiff's
tiorari, upheld the unharmed
change in
and Pat
ment of its rule
Walls
press
right
claim for the Okla
patently
application
offen
That
is
terson.
2 vio
[Act]
Protection Act's
homa Consumer
only
long-established
sive not
a counsel-fee award
and to receive
lation
Anglo-American
legal
teachings
recovery. By
of their
element
an additional
below,
system
but also to the
discussed
de
counsel fee is now
today's opinion the
expressed
command
state
constitution's
contrary to this court's after-crafted
both
clared
(a)
applica
continued and evenhanded
for
juris
prudence3
in
v. American
Walls
of the substantive
norms of law
tion
and
and Patterson v. Beall5
Tobacco Co.4
"proceeding
begun"
force
when
(in
jury
light
zero-damage
aof
unreasonable
(b)
mandated fundamental-
well as
for the
damages,
actual
finding
rights".
protection of "accrued
). Upon
I
affirmed
Tibbetts
which stands
statutory
after-promulgated
substituting its
I
Patterson)
(of
norm
Walls
HISTORY
CRITICAL LITIGATION
I,
in Tibbetts
was earlier declared
plaintiffs did not have
opines that
court
A.
could
private claim and hence
an actionable
COCA's
litigants in the
regarded as
not be
successful
brought
action
under
T3 In a class
They
failed to show the now-
case.
had
(a
federal certified
OK
COCA's Tibbetts II escape Tibbetts the court can neither consequences of the settled-law-of-the- Upon postremand evidentiary T4 hear (and issue-preclusion case doctrine of the (that ing on the counsel-fee issue occurred bar) nor of Oklahoma's constitutional re promulgation after COCA's Tibbetts I and lawmaking, straints on after-crafted following this court's issuance of its mandate which extend restraints to substantive-law denial), certiorari's the trial court entered an changes by jurisprudence no less than $375,000 plaintiffs' legal award of for the fee. by legislative do to those effected enactme (in II)12 COCA affirmed Tibbeits and we expresses nt.16 This assessment granted opin certiorari for review of that my crux of dissent. ion, which now here for stands decision. II B. FOR ITS REJECTION OF SETTLED Statutory Jurisprudence After-Crafted LAW OF THE THE CASE COURT 15 Walls13and Patterson14 constitute af INVOKES TODAY A STANDARD-
ter-promulgated changes controlling LESS TESTING FORMULA statutory-law pronounced by norm and for I.15 Both post-Tibbetts of these I A. cases declare harm to be an essential ele The Settled-Law-of-the-Case Doctrine ment of a consumer's claim for the explicitly Act's violation. Tibbetts I and I 6 The court to be bound here refuses unequivocally pronounces opposite rejects the settled law of the case. It quantum of awarded counsel fee demonstrates 9. Oklahoma Consumer Act, Protection supra discretion, (3) reviewing an abuse of note 2. panel powerless depart COCA was from the I, 10. Tibbetts note 1. supra earlier settled-law command another COCA panel's opinion. denying 11. The 30 March 2000 order certiorari following Hargrave, bears the vote: Concur: Supra note 4. v.C.J., Watt, Hodges, Boudreau, Opala, Kauger, JJ. Summers, C.J., Lavender, Dissent: Winches- Supra note 5. ter, JJ. Mandate issued 15 May clearly pro- 15. Walls and pronouncement Patterson came to be 12. COCA'S Tibbetts II mulgated unpublished opinion April certiorari was denied and man- of 26 which after by today's disposition. , stands vacated date issued I, in Tibbetts note 1. (1) According opinion to COCA's II set- relitigation upon legislative tled law of the case bars 16. For constitutional restraints fee, (2) attorney's to an entitlement the record enactments with retroactive effect see Parts IV- support argument does not defendant's that the VII infra. law, pos- departure either from settled to this unjust application doctrine as prius proceedings nisi the sine interposed tremand litigation. "Justice" adjudication's qualification stages of an gua non other review follow. effect. departures settled-law I would sanction from settled solely are deter for those issues which op doctrine The settled-law-of-the-case T7 fully fairly" mined not to have been same case of relitigation erates to bar litigated.19 through an finally decided that were issues The earlier decision appellate process.17 subsequent binding in all B.
review becomes
only
stages
the case. The doctrine
"Injustice"-The
Open-ended Judicial
consistency of later with
ensures absolute
Escape
From
Law
Hatch
Settled
resolutions,
guards
it also
issue
former
by prevent
open-
process
Today's pronouncement offers an
against abuse of
T9
ing relitigation of issues settled
judicial escape hatch from the
ended
estab
stage
appellate
of an earlier
course
doctrine
lished restraints that
settled-law
case.18
imposes.
the court
The formula
justifies
departure
its
from settled law-a
the firm
not loosen one iota
T8 would
"injustice"
application-is
manifest
from its
reviewing process of
grip
of control
amorphous.20
patently
Jus
overbroad
postremand
over
correction
now wields
shapeless legal
tice is a vacuous and
norm
proceedings
course stands charted
whose
*15
firmly
antonym
disposition;
that has been dubbed an
of due
by
appellate
I would
an
yardstick much like that of
process.22 Its
is
every
loudly
unauthorized
and
condemn
worthy
are
of
relates
which human interests
to]
Co.,
Line
1996
v. Mid-Continent
17. Nichols
Pipe
and,
being
especially,
prop-
what is their
satisfied
281; Morrow Devel
¶ 24,
272,
933 P.2d
118,
OK
_...
problem
of values is
er order of rank?
Co.,
Bank and Trust
v. American
Corp.
opment
411, 413;
26, ¶ 2,
place
problem
875 P.2d
Panama
of
1994 OK
of conflicts
in the first
values,
by
problem
be solved
and this
cannot
66,
OK.
Co.,
S.A. v. Cities Service
1990
Processes,
¶ 11
cognition. The answer
v.
to
276,
27;
796 P.2d
283 n.
Mobbs
means of rational
27,
n.
149,
5,
¶ 6
P.2d
City Lehigh, OK
n. 655
1982
of
value,
judgment
questions
deter-
is a
of
these
547,
n. 5.
and, therefore,
549
factors,
by
sub-
mined
emotional
only
judging
jective
for the
in character-valid
operates
doctrine
The settled-law-of-the-case
18.
subject,
also
relative
See
and therefore
only."
finally
relitigation
set
issues that
to bar
Macintyre,
of
Weose
Ration-
Alasdair
Justice»
opinion
by
appellate
and
those that the
tled
an
Autry?
("...
(1988)
underlying
diversi-
this wide
1
timely
aggrieved party
to raise in the
has failed
upon particular types
ty
judgments
of issue are
Baird,
appellate contest. Nealis v.
course of
justice,
conflicting conceptions of
con-
a set of
¶ 61,
438, 462;
98,
Barnett v.
996 P.2d
1999 OK
strikingly
ceptions
at odds with one
which are
477;
60, ¶ 13,
473,
Barnett,
917 P.2d
ways").
point
A
a number of
similar
another in
¶ 12
131,
37,
OK
n.
Jones,
Jackson
Wicksell,
by
or Just
A New Prinorete
is made
Knut
37;
1067,
Corp., supra
1074 n.
Morrow Dev.
Tarory
Taxation,
tee
or Pusiic Finance
in Crassics in
¶ 2
2;
at 413 n.
note
n.
Handy
City of
(Richard Musgrave
Peacock
A.
& Alan T.
¶ 13,
Lawton,
835 P.2d
eds., 1958) ("Each attempted
of our
solution
necessarily be
more or
problem will
coloured
III,
NI(C)and
19. See Parts
infra.
philosophy
general
political
social and
less
life,
writer,
and
his
his station
Minter,
Ass'n v.
20. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar
antipathies....
Justice
personal sympathies and
¶ 24
n. 55.
n.
always smacks of condes-
above to below
from
contempt.
to
Justice from below
cension
recognized
ina-
Many
have
our
commentators
synonymous with
only
been
has
too often
above
single concept
justice.
bility
agree upon
revenge.").
anp
Justice, Law,
tHE
Pourrics in
In Waar Is Justice»:
Kelsen,
(1957),
Hans
Mirzor or Science
justice
Supreme Court
of the U.S.
22. At least one
twentieth-century legal philosopher, writes: "No
"justice"
that the term
counseled more than once
passionate-
question
so
has been discussed
other
process.
incompatible
the standard of due
pre-
ly;
question
caused so much
no other
has
View,
Corp.
Bay
Family Finance
Sniadach v.
shed;
tears to be
blood and so
bitter
cious
many
350-351,
89 S.Ct.
395 U.S.
object
question
of so much
has been the
no other
J.,
(1969) (Black,
dissenting).
Jus-
L.Ed.2d 349
thinking by
thinkers
the most illustrious
intensive
the "notions
Kant;
opines in Sniadach that
tice Black
yet,
question and
from Plato
peoples"
justice
English-speaking
or "the
today
[It
as
ever was.
....
as unanswered
it
later-rejected
empty
may pour
vat into which one
con
norm? No matter what
use,
tents at will. It has been defined as a stan-
measuring tape
justice
one will
is but an
product
reasoning
shapeless legal yardstick
empty and
dardless
of the natural-law
whose
by nothing
contours are circumscribed
more
process.23 Subjecting
repeated
settled law
predilection.
than one's individual
I must
serutiny by afterthought based on a vacuous
jus
hence
rather
than embrace
condemn
undermine,
*&auge
surely
if
will most
legal
tice
It
as
norm.
is not concrete
destroy,
indeed
interinstitutional
deference
invoked,
enough.
putty
If
it
becomes
within the
service and
internal
Any
shaping applicator.
hands of the
author
short,
discipline among
join
the courts.
in
departure
ized
from settled law should
many generations
judges
and scholars
stead
rested on the U.S.
Court's
be
rejecting "justice"
acceptable
stan
(for applying
gauge
well-established
issue
departure
dard for
from settled law. As a
preclusion) by which we must first answer
justice
legal gauge,
deceiving
is as
as the
whether
the issue whose resolution is to be
shifting
upon
sands
which it is founded.
fully
fairly
accepted
binding
explored in
If
advance of its settlement.24
C.
so,
not,
govern;
must
if
settled law
be
Gauged by
Justice is
One's Individual
rejected.
injects
To hold otherwise
whim
Predilection
Moreover,
legal system.
into the
I would be
(as
injustice
reject
pretense
1 10 Is
invite
loath to
this State's courthouse
law)
ing
settled
to be measured
an enor
judges
regard
statehouse
themselves
mity
shaping
of the mistake in
flawed
rulings
freed from obedience to
settled
severity
philosophical
they may
norm or
tempted
to condemn as
earlier-adopted
justice.
differences between an
offensive to their sense of
"represent nothing
shock-of-the-conscience test"
Terory
anp
In his treatise, Generar
or Law
State
(Harvard
Press, 1945),
implicit adoption
University
more or less than an
of a
Hans Kelsen
concept
system
justice-the
posits
just
Natural Law
which under our
ideal of a
social or-
judges
power
subjective, socially
judg-
leaves to
alone the
to decide what
der-is
constructed
*16
value,
the Natural Law
place
place
means. These so-called stan-
ment of
which varies
to
from
judges
dards do not bind
within
boundaries
and time to time. It is not determined
means
precisely
that can be
marked or defined
cognition.
words
humanity
of rational
"Since
is divid-
holding
nations, classes,
for
laws unconstitutional.
theOn
con-
many
religions, profes-
ed into
trary,
[judges] wholly
these
on,
tests leave them
free
sions
at
and so
often
variance with one
right
another,
to decide what
are convinced is
great many very
there are a
different
Winship,
fair."
Id. In Matter
397 U.S.
justice;
many
ideas of
too
for one to be able to
377-18,
1068, 1079-80,
S.Ct.
{12 Because, the record before absolutely showing that there is E. plaintiffs' pri- character actionable Impermissibly Pronouncement Act had not been The Court's under vate claim Regime Appellate fully fairly litigated, Recasts Oklahoma's I must consider pronounce- of Post- myself A Cassation-like Model here COCA's Into bound Revolutionary France I. ment in Tibbetts {14 open- court's endorsement The D. repudiate settled law ended freedom "Injustice" Done Here Consists utterly incompatible the basic will Departure This Court's Retroactive judicature An appellate teachings of Law From Settled Today's opin legal glo-American *17 tradition. post-appeal [13 a "injustice" in introduces to State here lies not ion done The now-rejected T4b- jurisprudence of long decisionmaking regime associated COCA's cassation 27-an institution judica Franco-Roman in court's shift of its I but betts ordinarily involves private right of uncertain of action clarification outer reach of a The change settled infrequent It is retroactive regulatory no unfairness. statute not an under a is of controversy. settling subject The U.S. law, of of unsettled law, retroactive (empha- may produce unjust results." Id. recently granted in a case from the certiorari has added). plaintiff, if sis which concludes that Fourth Circuit unharmed, right private action. The of has Ninth, Tenth, Fifth, vastly Eleventh and D.C. Circuits Franco-Roman cassation model 27. The may, plaintiff regime. under Anglo-American an unharmed all held that different from the Act, $1,000 form, Privacy highest recover without original post-revolutionary its - (Cour Cassation) damages. de lacked French court Chao, U.S. of actual Doe proof authority (Mem) binding power decisions. Its to render 156 L.Ed.2d 654 123 S.Ct. -, judgment narrowly quashing (2003). to was limited Court will No matter what ultimately remanding court for case to a lower which es the circuits hold, can be said "unjust" contrary con poused view reached The latter court de novo. reconsideration ? view of the clusion the cassation decision's not bound Comparative Schlesinger, Law law. Rudolf B. (1970). original cassation model Culp AbmtnistRa- 332-333 Davis notes in his 26. As Kenneth Rupert (3d 1972), Cross relaxed. "retroactive has been somewhat at 135 ed. tive Law Textr any jurisdiction symmetry system never followed in within the of Oklahoma's judicature. Anglo-American legal heritage. By over appellate I, turning the law settled 116 COCA's Tibbetts I settled for this has refashioned the institutional court State's legal principle that case the the unharmed judicature private design appellate into a verita had a claim under ancillary absolutely Act with an entitlement to process. Cassation ble cassation attorney's fee. The court renounces its appellate authority court's confines upon obedience to this norm of settled law quashing judgment. It author does not purely shapeless legal vacuous and stan judgment-quashing ize tribunal direct compelled dard. am to stand bound complexion post- either the course or the the settled law of this case.29 proceedings. remand The Oklahoma Court Appeals Civil is mot established on a III Franco-Roman model cassation. It func review THE CLAIM ABOLISHED TODAY IS tions as an intermediate tribunal PROTECTED FROM BELATED JU Anglo-American in the State's tradition. BY THE DICIAL DESTRUCTION Today's reshaping ap of Oklahoma's DOCTRINE OF ISSUE PRECLUSI judicature pellate into a Franco-Roman cas- ON30 generate post- sation model will interminable { (and certiorari was final When denied appeal litigation. judge No courthouse will ity reached), of COCA's decision came to be again ever feel bound an undisturbed the unharmed entitlement pronouncement. design COCA The new will prosecute claim for a mere viola rights long leave valuable in limbo over a (to tion the Act which counsel-fee recov post-appeal stretch of forensic battles at nisi ery stood attached in favor of one declared to sum, prius and elsewhere.28 In the court's emerged prevailing party) have became change retroactive of an effective and protected by settled preclusi the doctrine of issue harm on.31 statutory lasting grave norm deals retrospective lawmaking, PrzcepoENt it should now be rele- Harris, JW. In Encusa Law 10-14. Dictronary (7th ed.1999) tersely gated antiquarian Brack's Law de- lore. (invalidation quashing" fines "cassation" as "a judgment). Id. at 209. preclusion," formerly 30. The term "issue known estoppel, adopted as collateral has been 28. The Franco-Roman cassation model anti- JupemEnts (SEconp)§ Restatement or Comment thetical to the common-law maxim interesse rei (1982). descriptive b The use of the more teerm- publicae ut sit litium. The maxim means finis preclusion-was originally issue advanced in the that "it is in the interest the state that there be Jupica- works of Vestal, Professor Allan D. Res Dictronary litigation." a limit to Brack's Law Inrury TafPrectuston, (1969); Personar Annuar Res (7th ed.1999). It is the paramount concern 47 S. Cal. L.Rev. Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, litigation. the state that there be an end to To- (1974); Judgment State Court as Preclusive in day's opinion nearly 900-year-old offends this Court, Litigation Section 1983 Federal policy assisting of the common law. Instead of (1974). Okla. L.Rev. 185 See Underside La litigation, bringing about an end to the court 6 n. 517 n. throp, by sanctioning extends the life of a forensic battle ¶ 8 Armstrong, 8; Veiser v. n. change a retroactive in an effective *18 P.2d 799 n. 7. 796, finality by norm that attained the court's own to act failure in due time and course of this purpose preclusion 31. The issue of is to 'relieve progress. case's parties multiple of the cost and vexation of lawsuits, resources, departure
29.
by pre
As a basis for
from settled law
conserve
and
decisions,
"justice"
reports by
venting
encourage
was introduced to Oklahoma
inconsistent
reli
Miller,
early post-statehood jurisprudence.
adjudication.'"
Oklahoma
ance on
Miller v.
1998
24, 125,
887,
(quoting
OK
956 P.2d
897
Allen v.
Elec., Gas & Power Co. v.
1908
City
Baumhoff,
90, 94,
411, 418,
McCurry,
449 U.S.
101 S.Ct.
66
19,
758, 760-61,
OK
96 P.
134,
503;
21 Okl.
(1980)); Feightner
L.Ed.2d 308
v. Bank Okla
Co. v. Fonville,
389,
1912 OK
Metropolitan Ry.
of
homa, N.A.,
20, ¶ 15,
624,
2003 OK
65 P.3d
629-
¶ 1,
1126,
125 P.
36 Okl.
Wade v.
1125,
76;
Hope
108, ¶ 14,
549,
30;
Killingsworth,
City
City,
&
1923 OK
213 P.
Tal v.
State ex rel.
Oklahoma
of
551,
1061
relitigation
fully
fairly litigated.34
preclusion
preclusion prevents
18 Issue
and
applicable
doctrine is
whether
the contest
actually litigated
issues
facts and other
of
it is invoked
pro
ed issues
the case
which
necessarily
in an earlier
determined
and
wrongly
rightly or
decided.35
were
parties or their
ceeding
the same
between
(both
preclusion doctrine
privies.32 The
{19
Actionability
plaintiffs' private
applications)
claim and issue
respect
finally
to its
in their favor in
claim was
resolved
affordingfinality
important goal
of
Tibbetts I36 this court's denial of certiorari
fosters
law,
issues,
subsequent
of its mandate.37
and
issuance
of fact or
were
to all
33
enforcing
significant
interchangeably
harm flows from
a rule that
because
trines are often used
litigant only
opportu-
one
and
closely
promote
affords
and both
related
full
fair
issue,
Miller,
nity
litigate
and
there is no
[that]
policy
general public
concerns.
same
burdening the
with re-
sound reason for
courts
22,
at I
at 896.
supra,
added).
petitive litigation." (emphasis
estoppel, like the related doctrine
32. "Collateral
Services,
35. National
Business
Inc. v.
Diversified
purpose
protect
judicata,
the dual
of
of res
has
Inc.,
Corporate
Opportunities,
Financial
relitigating
ing litigants
the burden of
from
(issue
666-67
36, 111,
662,
946 P.2d
preclusion
party
privy
or his
issue with the same
identical
relitigation
operates
to bar
both correct
from
economy by preventing
promoting judicial
and
jurisdictional
resolutions
and erroneous
Co.,
Hosiery
litigation."
Inc. v.
Parklane
needless
Fent,
nonjurisdictional
challenges);
supra note
645, 649,
Shore,
322, 326,
S.Ct.
58
439 U.S.
99
¶
Veiser,
18,
at
note
at
33,
115,
133;
30,
at
supra,
(1979).
Feperar
of those
552
In furtherance
L.Ed.2d
802;
Wright,
Cooper,
Miller &
at
18
has,
anp
Supreme
in recent
policies, the U.S.
Court
(2d ed.2002).
17
Practice
Proceoure
4403 at
years,
scope
the doctrine of
broadened
supra
See
note 1.
36.
beyond
estoppel
common-law lim
collateral
its
by abandoning
require
has done so
its.
It
(Mandate),
terms of Rule 1.16
Oklahoma
37. The
(Blonder-Tongue
mutuality
parties
ment of
Rules, as amended
16 June 2003
Court
Supreme
Laboratories,
University
Illinois Founda
Inc. v.
15,
1,
(2003 62),
Supp.2003, App.
OK
0.8.
Ch.
12
313,
1434,
tion,
91 S.Ct.
The latter act direct remedies available for correction of pronouncement, even if it were Promulgation Statutory flawed Judicial of Juris- by ascribing wrong meaning to the Imparts prudence-i.e., Caselaw That tamper text of the Act. would neither Meaning Legislative to the Text Ac- repudiate nor the command of issue- cording to the Found Intent by retroactively preclusion apply doctrine Lawmaking Assembly-Is Long-rec- finally ing changes after-crafted to a once ognized Legitimate Form of "Intersti- statutory shaped controlling norm of law.38 Lawmaking" by Adjudication tial today's opinion, 20 Under terms Laowmaking monopoly 121 is not again no mandate of this court could ever Legislature. judge engages A in law finality attain the of unassailable status making through adjudication when intersti pronounced rulings for the case. tially filling by formulating gap the law IV rule,39construing a common-law or statute rule, agency by framing a constitutional STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRIC- UPON TIONS RETROSPECTIVE process developing norm.40 Both the APPLY LEGISLATION WITH EQUAL FORCE TO AFTER-PRO- MULGATED SUBSTANTIVE-LAW THAT AD- JURISPRUDENCE (1) VERSELY AFFECTS PROCEED- (2) AND INGS BEGUN ACCRUED
RIGHTS
preclusion
Ascribing lawmaking consequences
ju-
40.
While issue
is an affirmative de
to some
pleaded
proved,
appel
revolutionary analysis.
fense that must be
dicial work is not a new or
Nealis,
may
sponte.
late
Judges
court
raise
sua
development;
make law
common-law
note
at
n.
at
See
v.
151
also
by judicial
Jackson
administrative
tribunals make law
(5th
Towing Corp.,
N. Bank
213 F.3d
889
rulemaking.
development
The common-law
is a
Cir.2000) (the
permitted
court
to raise the
law-generating process
legal
new
creates
judicata
sponte
issue of res
sua
affirm
Culp
norms.
Kenneth
Davis and Richard J.
court);
district
Doe
148 F.3d
Pfrommer,
§
Pierce,
Jr., Abmmustrative Law Treatise
10.6,
(2d Cir.1998);
S.D.,
Indep.
283 v.
Sch. Dist. No.
(3d
Davis,
ed.1994);
Culp
Kenneth
Judicial
(8th Cir.1996) ("Preclusion
88 F.3d
562 n. 5
Notice,
(1955)
55 Colum. L.Rev.
may
be raised
the court because 'benefits of
("When
agency develops
policy,
a court or
law or
precluding relitigation
finally
of issues
decided
acting legislatively;
it is
the courts have created
only
litigants,
run not
but also to the
through
judicial
legisla-
common
"");
judicial system.'
Studio Art Theatre
Evans
tion....").
ville,
Evansville,
Inc.
1063
concretizing the
pronounce
that of
law and
to the view that
these
common
accede
may
applied
ments
be
to this cause.
statutory and constitu
meaning of
textual
interstitial
lawmak
is known as
tional law
particu-
Today's opinion
123
sanctions a
Today's change in
ing by adjudication.41
larly reprehensible
ju-
form of retroactive
statutory jurisprudence
consti
the extant
lawmaking-one
wipes
out ad-
dicial
lawmaking
court's
act
tutes
change
judged rights by a mid-stream
in a
(concre-
by refining
adjudication
through
meaning. The
legislative text's
court abol-
meaning
placed on the
tizing)
to be
finally
plaintiffs'
de-
ishes the unharmed
legislative en
content of a
substantive-law
action,
right
which also
clared
actment.
prevailing party to a counsel-
entitles
element of its
fee award as an additional
B.
recovery.
in contest
Both of the issues
pri-
Lawmaking
character of the
Non-legislative
here-the
actionable
Forms of
All
entitlement
vate action and
Re-
Conform to the Constitution's
must
post-remand pro-
to a counsel-fee award
Enactments
on Retroactive
strictions
by
ceedings-were
finally
settled
lawmaking by
judicial
ad
Legitimate
22
plaintiffs.
Their action-
I in favor of the
exempt from constitutional
judication is not
claim, abrogated today, arose before the
able
itself,
pass
legislation
it must
testing. Like
statutory
change. Tibbetts I
court's
norm
muster.42 Walls and
the fundamental law's
only effective law for
remains
judi
legitimate
are both acts of
Patterson43
because it stands undis-
case. This is so
lawmaking that fall under the constitu
cial
by
as final
certiorari's
deni-
turbed as well
on the effect of after-enacted
tional restraints
al.
pronouncements
amend
legislation. These
manner,
Every retrospective change in the law
case,
T 24
in a
for this
substantive
of,
meaning
produces "injustice"-losers
become winners
and conse
earlier-declared
versa;
statutory
from,
They
nay, after-crafted
flowing
Act.
and vice
quences
applied,
finally
jurisprudence,
retrospectively
statutory law
when
contrary
the extant
Although
perceived by
some as
instrument
I.
do not
be
proclaimed
process
injustice.44 -It violates the
that is
commit
the court's current
recede from
Patterson,
join the court's
everyone's due.
I cannot
I cannot
ment
Walls
legisla-
with the
recognizes
lawmaker when contrasted
some fac
as a
U.S.
41. The
lawmaking.
consequential
law which has
because he cannot unmake
ets of
ture
fudicature
623-24,
statute,
or,
Walker,
effectively
85
381 U.S.
declared
Linkletter
been
1731, 1734,
(1965),
statute,
pre
spheres
14 L.Ed.2d
decisions
S.Ct.
in which there is no
exclusionary
question
subject
binding upon
whether
sented
He is
which are
him.
Ohio,
Mapp v.
367 U.S.
S.Ci.
only
rule of
greater
that he can
restriction
the even
(1961),
be held to
L.Ed.2d 1081
should
specific
happen to
issues as
make law on such
by including
operate retrospectively
Cross,
within its
Rupert
note
litigated before him."
sweep
Mapp deci
final convictions before the
necessary
only
to observe that
"[IJt
27 at 34.
Mapp retroactively,
declining
apply
sion.
judges can and do make law is
that our
the fact
ap
explicitly repudiated
universal
the Court
recognized by
universally
writers on the Brit-
now
that courts
plicability of the Blackstonian view
Id.,
(emphasis supplied).
at 30
ish Constitution."
and,
instead,
only preexisting
declare
adopted
positivist approach counseled
against retro-
restraints
42. For the constitutional
something
judges
in fact do
John Austin "that
do
VII,
through
lawmaking
IV
active
see Parts
infra.
law; they make it interstifial
more than discover
interpretation
ly by filling
in with
Supra notes 4 and 5.
generic
vague,
or com
indefinite,
empty
are but
terms that alone
mon-law
According
legal philosophy
of Professor
623-24,
Id.,
U.S. at
of the law."
crevices
catalogue
added).
recognize
to isolate
(emphasis
"I
Fuller, who strove
Lon
S.Ct. at 1734
qua
universally accepted sine
non val-
hesitation,"
the law's
Justice Holmes in
without
wrote
ues,
provide a mecha-
of law is to
the function
legislate,
judges
but
"that
do and must
"
eliminating
play
blind
of chance'
'the
nism
interstitially."
only
S. Pac. Co. v.
can do so
previously de-
rules
clear and understandable
524, 531,
37 S.Ct.
Jensen,
U.S.
Fuller,
consistently applied."
L.
J.,
Lon
(1917)(Holmes,
dissenting)(em
clared and
L.Ed.
Morarity
ed.1969).
(2d
He main-
added).
Or Law 9
THs
phasis
Rupert
observes that
Sir
Cross
truly
law is
a monstrosi-
disadvantage
that "a retroactive
English judge
tains
is at a
[tlhe modern
*21
y
plaintiffs
protections
to afford the
refusal
by
upon
conferred
them
the Oklahoma Constitution
THE COURT
AND
IGNORES
VIOLATES
against
application of
45
retroactive
THE
OF OKLA-
PROVISIONS
after-promulgated changes
statutory juris
HOMAS CONSTITUTION WHICH
prudence.
retrospective
Inasmuch as the
ef-
REQUIRE THAT THE SUBSTAN-
given today's pronouncement destroys
feet
TIVE LAW TO BE APPLIED IN LIT-
54,
rights
by
§§
protected
Art. 5
52 and
Ok
Const.,46
BE
I
IGATION PROCESS MUST
after-promul
would hold that the
THAT
IN
WHICH WAS
FORCE
gated jurisprudential
change in
substantive
THE
WHEN
PROCEEDINGS WERE
statutory
applied
norms cannot
this
claim
"pro
which had "accrued" and which
BEGUN
ceedings
begun" before
the rule
[stood]
Retrospective overruling
1 25
of the settled
fundamentally
change. It is
unfair
to de
by
legislative
law of the case
after-enacted
prive
constitutionally
of their
(or
through
changes
pro
those effected
protected
rights,48
by
accrued
declared
judicature)
explicit
cess of
offends
con
I and
COCA
Tibbetts
left undisturbed to
changing
applicable
stitutional
barrier
by
become final
this court's election not to
proceeding
norms of substantive law for a
disturb them on certiorari review.49 In
begun
change.
earlier than the effected
Art.
short,
application
I
make
would
§5
Okl. Const.50
today's
statutory
change
meaning
deny
text conform to the
application
constitution's mandate
26 One cannot
that for
against
lawmaking.
statutory
retroactive
claim
law to
ty.
governance
period
unconstitutionally
infringe upon
Law has to do with the
of haman
can
Id.,
speak
governing
right.'"
citing
conduct
rules. To
Corp.
or
'vested
Chase Securities
directing
conduct
rules that
be enacted
will
v. Donaldson,
325 U.S.
n.
and 315-
prose."
(1945).
tomorrow is to talk in blank
Id. at 53.
65 S.Ct.
VI today's private claim is pronouncement. gone the winds is now abolished and AND THE IGNORES VIOLATES COURT entitiement to an also the declared THE OF OKLA- THE PROVISIONS RE- WHICH attorney's Responsible CONSTITUTION HOMA fee.
QUIRE RIGHTS" THAT "ACCRUED this surprising and sudden demise is claim's BY AFTER- BE NOT DISTURBED after-promulgated pronouncement court's ENACTED LAW Act in unrelated law- that construes the two phase I this the Tibbetts 128 When court's came to an end litigation Inc., 135, 16, ¶ (or Supply, through 1971 OK 490 changes Co. v. P & H those effected islative 1361; 1358, County Barry Com v. Board judicature). P.2d process In First Nat. Bank 132, Valley Crudup, 1982 OK P.2d 173 Pauls missioners, 701, OK Dictionary (7th 914, Law oper- 645. Bmack's Okl. the court dealt with an enactment ed.1999) right" a "ma governing an "accrued as abridge period defines a limitation ated to right right; ripe for enforcement." tured or material- of certain mechanic's foreclosure right power do certain ac timely (pursu- "A is the filed 'vested A lien statement men's liens. things lawfully, statute) and is possess certain then-existing tions or was held to consti- ant to a right. may substantially property It be created begun" "proceeding whose limitation tute law, or contract. Once either common statute an after-enacted stat- not be shortened could absolute, created, protected and is it becomes offending provisions of Art. 5 ute without § Ok. Const. legislative Secs. 52 and invasion Art. from Water Re Oklahoma our Constitution." Con Oklahoma Master as sources Board v. Central to a counsel-fee award
51. One's entitlement
litigant
party brings
an added
prevailing
to a
123, 464 P.2d
District,
1968 OK
servancy
added).
which,
recovery,
(emphasis
postjudgment
on its
element of
attachment,
right" that
becomes
"an accrued
protected by
§
OK1.Const.
Art. 5
Inc.,
stands
America,
Volkswagen
Lee
80, ¶ 3,
(one's
to an
entitlement
to an
of that
con-
16, ¶ 24,
438,
Corp.,
troleum
1986 OK
732 P.2d
Patterson,
54. See Walls and
notes 4 and 5.
supra
449; Timmons v.
Globe Ins.
Co., 1985
Royal
Qualls
55. The court's
v. Farm-
pronouncement
¶ 13 n.
713
76,
18,
589,
18;
594 n.
Mayhue
Co., Inc.,
61,
ers Ins.
1981 OK
ing
application
than
rather
for its reasoned
quest.
upon timely-brought
certiorari
the law.
gives
today
second bite it
the loser
lies clear-
support
For
of its reliance on the
ly on a collision course with constitutional
open-ended escape hatch from settled law the
lawmaking
restraints on retroactive
either
longevity
authority
court invokes the
legislation
adjudication.
brazenly
It
con-
today's
say
departure.
it to
Suffice
preclusion
travenes
standards of issue
"
revolting
to have no better reason
'it
incorporated
body
which stand
into the
a rule of law than that so it was laid down in Oklahoma law from the norms of Restate-
Henry
It
the time of
IV.
is still more revolt
(Second) §
Judgments
ment of
27 and from
grounds upon
ing if the
which it was laid
exposition in
the Restatement's
recent
since,
long
down have vanished
rule
jurisprudence.
U.S.
simply persists
from blind imitation of the
past.""
legal reasoning
not sus
Sound
will
IX
tain a rule
time of usefulness has
whose
passed.
SUMMARY
justify
attempts
The court
its
{42 Any departure from settled law or
by invoking
abandonment of settled law
from
preclusion
the doctrine of issue
*25
"palpably erroneous" test. The latter is as
solely upon
authorized
a court's determina-
injustice."
vacuous and standardless as "manifest
that,
settlement,
tion
before its
the issue was
says nothing
degree
67
It
about the
of
fully
fairly litigated.
not
and
one
When
error that must be exceeded before it can be
empty
shapeless yardstick
invokes the
and
of
applying
invoked.
this test
the court is
"justice,"
legal rights by per-
one measures
utterly
palpably
free to find
error
erro
predilection
sonal
rather
than
a fixed
neous. The test-a mere verbal camou
gauge of the law.
flage-serves
as a carte blanche for total
judicial
prece
freedom from
norms of
{43
"injustice"
The
from which the court
dent.
saves
defendant was occasioned
(a)
provide
palpably
If a
court's
to the
decision is indeed
erro
failure
relief
in
sought
defendant when certiorari was
T4ib-
neous,
the time to correct
is not after
(b)
relitigation
is barred
the command of
betts
retroactive destruction
of
through
applying
settled law the case
preclusion,
petition
rather
issue
but
when a
of
general
upon
general
(1971)
rule that a decision
de-
(Burger,
1999, 2016,
S.Ct.
I cannot be Party Dallas, Real Scott jurisprudence infuses promulgated Respondent. Interest meaning. contrary or different 98,881. No. jurispruden- Today's rejection of a T45 meaning the statute's norm declared for tial of Oklahoma. and the retro- the claim accrued at the time Sept. changed application norm spective by Art. destroy rights protected case to this 18, 2008. As Corrected Oct. I would §§ Ok. Const. changed
apply the court's to this claim
meaning Act.
] go pronouncement I would today's 46 In does, reiterate, as the court
no further than to the reconere- commitment
our continued meaning Act's norm of the
tized *26 Patterson, but, contrary
crafted Walls I leave undis- holding, would
to the court's finally case settled for this
turbed the law shielded from and now
COCA's legislative change rule both
retroactive tinkering. The de- judicial after-the-fact justice-invoking res- proposal for a
fendant's so proceeding, which of this certiorari
olution pro-
plainly violates the state constitution's applying sub- against after-crafted
tection escape changes, cannot
stantive-law positively destructive It
condemnation. part illegal. from that I hence recede retroactively thrusts today's opinionwhich re-engineered after norms
into this case the law that I settlement of
COCA's remand. govern
