KATHY LYNNE THURSTON, Individually and as Personal Representative of the estate of her husband CURTIS LEO THURSTON, Deceased, and as parent and natural guardian of their minor children, Jedediah, Jessica Lynne and Cody v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
No. 95-4111 (D.C. No. 94-CV-34)
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Filed 10/9/96
888 F. Supp. 1100
Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
(D. Utah)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Plaintiff sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
Mr. Thurston was killed when the small aircraft he was piloting crashed into the mountainside near Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 16, 1993. He was authorized to pilot an airplane under visual flight rules (VFR). See generally
On appeal, plaintiff claims (1) the air traffic controllers breached their duty to advise Mr. Thurston of the current weather in Ogden, Utah, and in failing to pass information from the first controller to the second; and (2) the air traffic controllers should have treated Mr. Thurston‘s situation as an emergency because he was a VFR pilot who stated twice that he could not see something on the ground.
The parties do not dispute that Utah negligence law applies, see Tinkler v. United States ex rel. FAA, 982 F.2d 1456, 1466 (10th Cir. 1992), that Mr. Thurston and the air traffic controllers were presumed to know the applicable laws and regulations governing air travel, see Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 63 (1984), or that the duty owed by the air traffic controllers to Mr. Thurston was one of “reasonable care,” see Yates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878, 883 (10th Cir. 1974).
“Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required standard of care is a question of fact . . . .” White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994)(quoting Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982)). Accordingly,
Plaintiff argues that the air traffic controllers were negligent in failing to inform Mr. Thurston of the weather conditions at the Ogden airport. When he first contacted air traffic control at the Salt Lake City International Airport, Mr. Thurston requested a vector to land at Salt Lake City. Air traffic controller Wolverton informed him of a thirty minute delay to land at Salt Lake City. Mr. Thurston then asked for a vector to Bountiful, Utah. Mr. Wolverton asked if he could see Bountiful, to which Mr. Thurston replied, “negative, if possible ah can you vector me to Ogden. Ogden is reporting three miles.” Aplt. app. vol. I at 57; R. suppl. vol. II at 180. Mr. Thurston‘s statement meant that he understood that Ogden weather was VFR, providing three miles’ visibility. Mr. Wolverton then instructed him to stay east of the freeway, and advised him to transfer to another radio frequency for assistance from another air traffic controller, Mr. Miller. In fact, Ogden weather was much worse than Mr. Thurston believed, and the air
Mr. Thurston did not ask for a weather report. Evidence was adduced at trial that if Mr. Thurston had called for a weather briefing before he took off, he would have learned that the weather in Ogden was not VFR. R. suppl. vol. IV at 467-69. Mr. Thurston also had available over his airplane radio a weather service from which he could have obtained the current Ogden weather. Air traffic coordinator Jefferson testified that he assumed that Mr. Thurston had current weather information. R. suppl. vol. V at 678. Furthermore, nothing in Mr. Thurston‘s transmissions indicated that he could not see the landmarks due to bad weather, or that he was otherwise in danger. Authorities stating an air traffic controller‘s duty to provide weather information where the pilot is under the controller‘s direction, e.g., DeWeese v. United States, 576 F.2d 802, 803, 805 (10th Cir. 1978), or where the pilot has requested weather information, see, e.g., Webb v. United States, 840 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (D. Utah 1994), are inapposite. In the absence of a request for weather information or a pilot‘s statement that he is hindered by weather conditions, we cannot say that the district court‘s view of the evidence is clearly erroneous.
Next we address plaintiff‘s claim that the air traffic controllers should have treated Mr. Thurston‘s situation as an emergency when he stated twice that he could not see landmarks on the ground. They assert that the controllers should have understood from those statements that he was not in VFR conditions. Plaintiff‘s argument is premised on the deposition testimony of Ms. Hinz, the air traffic supervisor on duty at the time of the accident. She stated in her deposition that if a VFR pilot said twice that he could not see something on the ground, that indicates that the aircraft is not necessarily in an emergency, but has a problem to be dealt with by the controller. R. suppl. vol. I at 71. At trial, however, Ms. Hinz clarified that the treatment of such a situation should be based on the controller‘s judgment. Id.
The pilot has the ultimate responsibility for the safety of his airplane. Cappello v. Duncan Aircraft Sales, 79 F.3d 1465, 1469 (6th Cir. 1996); see also
We have reviewed the trial transcripts, the appendices, and the briefs submitted by the parties. We conclude that the district court‘s findings of fact, based on the record considered as a whole, are not clearly erroneous.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
