The Director of Revenue (Director) appeals the judgment of the trial court reinstating David Thurman’s (Driver’s) driving privileges after they had been suspended pursuant to § 302.505, RSMo 1986. The trial court did not issue findings of fact and did not give the basis of its decision. We reverse and remand.
After his driving privileges were revoked, Driver requested and was grаnted a trial de novo. At that trial the only witness was the arresting officer. The officer testified he observed a vehicle weaving on the road and pulled it over. As he approached the vehicle Drivеr got out and staggered towards the officer. The officer noticed Driver’s eyes were bloodshot аnd watery, his pupils were dilated, his speech was slurred and he seemed a little confused. The officеr then administered several field sobriety tests. Driver was unable to successfully complete his alphabet, count backwards from 100 to 78, walk heel to toe, find his nose with either hand, or walk a straight line. The officer arrested Driver and administered a breath analysis test which indicated Driver’s blood alcohol to be .133 percent by weight. The officer also testified at the trial de novo that he held a Type III permit to oрerate the breath analysis machine, that he was the primary operator of that machine, and that he had last calibrated it about three weeks before Driver was arrested. Admitted into evidencе at the trial de novo were the officer’s public safety certificate, his Type III permit, the checklist used in administering Driver’s breath test, the chromatogram from Driver’s breath test indicating .133 percent blood alcohol by weight, and a certified copy of the ordinance under which Driver was arrested. After hearing this testimony the trial court, without making any findings, sustained Driver’s petition and reinstated his driving privileges.
The judgment of the trial сourt will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law. In determining if there is substantial evidence, we dеfer to the ability of the trial court to ascertain the facts and judge witness credibility. We view the evidenсe in the light most favorable to the judgment. And, where there are no findings of fact we assume the trial court’s judgment was based on proper grounds.
See Cissell v. Director of Revenue,
At the trial de novo the Director bears the burden of proving there was probable cause to make the arrest and that Driver had a blоod alcohol content of .13 percent or more.
Stewart v. Director of Revenue,
*262
Probable cause to make an arrest for driving while intoxicаted exists if an officer observes a vehicle being driven erratically and after stopping the car the driver exhibits the indicia of intoxication.
See Cissell,
The Director bears the burden of proving Driver had a blood alcohol content of .13 percent or greater, but once Director presents evidence to show the officеr administering the test was certified and that the test was administered in accordance with established procedures, a claim that the test results are invalid can only succeed if there is some evidencе to suggest a malfunction of the machine.
Bradford v. Director of Revenue,
The Director met his burden at trial. The transcriрt reveals no inconsistencies in the officer’s testimony, and there is no indication he hesitated or еquivocated in his answers on ¿ither direct or cross-examination. Without findings of fact we cannot determine on the record before us whether the trial court’s action was supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, we note the judgment and the Notice of Appeal give Driver’s name as Thurman, while his driver’s licensе and the briefs give his name as Thurmond.
Judgment reversed and remanded for findings of fact on the issues, which if believed by the finder of fact, entitle Director to a judgment in its favor, at which time the trial judge will consider if defendant’s name is Thurman or Thurmond.