112 A. 209 | R.I. | 1921
This is a suit in equity by the trustees under the will of Lydia L. Thurber praying for a construction of certain provisions of said will and for instructions relative to the same. In the Superior Court the cause, being ready for hearing for final decree, was certified to this court for determination.
The following facts appear in proof. The testatrix, Lydia L. Thurber, died in 1905. Her will, dated May 7, 1897, together with a codicil dated July 20, 1901, was probated before the Municipal Court of Providence. One of her sons, Edmund G. Thurber, in 1892, was adjudged insane by a justice of the Supreme Court and committed to the Butler Hospital for the Insane from which hospital he has never been discharged as restored to soundness of mind. He was, however, permitted upon the orders of a justice of this court from time to time to go at large. Later he departed from the State and remained away for a long period contrary to the terms of his parole; and at the request of said Butler Hospital he was discharged from commitment at said hospital by the order of a justice of this court. He is now at large. Prior to his commitment to the Butler Hospital Edmund inherited certain property from his father upon the death of the latter. Such of his independent estate as has not been expended is now under the control of the Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company as guardian of his estate. After Edmund was adjudged insane and before the execution of his mother's will he married and had one son as the issue of said marriage. His wife and son, the son being now of full age, are both alive. Said testatrix by her will and codicil gave, devised and bequeathed to each of her two daughters and to each of her sons William H. Thurber and Dexter Thurber, respectively, one-fifth part of her residuary estate, the remaining one-fifth part she gave, devised and bequeathed to said William H. and Dexter Thurber in trust. It is in regard to the clause *506 of her will creating said trust that the trustees ask instruction and direction. The provisions of the will with reference to the trust so far as they are material to the questions before us, are as follows: "That said trustees shall hold, stand seized and possessed of said trust estate and property and shall collect and receive the rents, dividends, income and profits thereof as they shall accrue and after the payment therefrom of the expenses of administering said trust shall use and appropriate the same or so much thereof as may be necessary to the care, maintenance and support of my son Edmund G. Thurber for and during his natural life, it being my will and intention that the income of said trust estate shall be used and appropriated solely for the benefit of my said son Edmund personally so long as he shall live, and in no case for the support or benefit of any wife or child of my said son, and upon the further trust upon the death of my said son Edmund to convey, transfer and pay over all said trust estate then in their hands and possession in equal shares to my said daughters, Nettie Thurber Sprague and Alice Thurber, and my said sons William H. Thurber and Dexter Thurber, or to the children of any of my said sons or daughters who may have deceased, in equal shares, discharged of said trust."
In the execution of said trust the said trustees have appropriated some but not all of the net income of said trust estate as it accrued for the care, maintenance and support of said Edmund. The Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, guardian as aforesaid, now claims that under said trust Edmund G. Thurber is given a vested equitable life estate in the income of thecorpus of the trust and said trust company has demanded of said trustees that they pay to it as guardian of the beneficiary all of the net income of said trust estate and any accumulations of income now in their hands. Because of this claim of the trust company the trustees have filed this bill asking for instructions as to their duty under said clause of the will. *507
The claim of the guardian is apparently based upon what it urges was the intention of the testatrix expressed in the language, "it being my will and intention that the income of said trust estate shall be used and appropriated solely for the benefit of my said son Edmund personally so long as he shall live." If that was the only expression of the testatrix's intent the claim of the guardian would be entitled to much weight. The clause however must be construed not from an examination of a single expression apart from the context. The object of the testatrix should be sought from the language of the clause as a whole. The expression upon which the guardian relies is immediately preceded by the direction that the trustees shall use and appropriate the income "or so much thereof as may be necessary to the care, maintenance and support" of the beneficiary; and said expression is immediately followed by the provision "and in no case for the support or benefit of any wife or child of my said son." As to the phrase "or so much thereof as may be necessary" the argument of the guardian is that as this language does not give to the trustees absolute and uncontrolled discretion in using the income for the benefit of Edmund and as there is no express gift over of accumulation of unused income the phrase should be disregarded and held to have no effect in limiting the provision for the benefit of Edmund. As to the provision precluding the use of any portion of said income for the support of Edmund's wife and son the guardian urges that such provision is against public policy and is invalid. The cardinal rule to be applied in the construction of wills is that the purpose of the testator should be found if possible and that purpose should be given effect if compatible with established rules of law. The guardian would have us find a vested equitable life estate by disregarding provisions in the will which might aid us in determining the extent of the interest which the testatrix intended to give; and having thus established the gift of a vested estate the guardian would then have us declare invalid such provisions, as appear to limit the gift, on the *508
ground that they are inconsistent with an equitable life estate. We cannot accept the conclusion of the guardian reached in this manner. The testatrix plainly intended that the measure of her bounty in favor of Edmund should be his necessities and not the amount of the income of the trust fund. She contemplated that all the income might not be appropriated for his use and provided that less than the whole should be used for his benefit, unless his necessary care, maintenance and support should require all. Such portion as is not needed for that purpose she clearly withholds from his use. This purpose is inconsistent with an intent to give to the cestui que trust a vested estate for life in the entire income. The purpose of the testatrix expressed in this clause of the will is that the trustees shall use only so much of the income of the trust fund as shall be required for the care, maintenance and support of Edmund during his life. That her meaning may be plain that none of said income shall be appropriated beyond the amount necessary for that purpose she adds that it is her intention that the income, which in accordance with the provision immediately preceding must be limited in amount to that portion which is necessary for the purpose, shall be appropriated solely for the personal benefit of Edmund; and to further emphasize her intention that none of said income shall be used save for Edmund's personal maintenance she adds "and in no case for the support or benefit of any wife or child of my said son." There is the suggestion that the testatrix was unfriendly to the wife of Edmund, but the animus of the testatrix will not affect the validity of the restriction and whatever may have induced the intention the purpose is plain, to restrict the appropriation of income within the amount necessary for the support of her son. With such purpose strongly in her mind she may well have desired to prevent the possibility that the phrase "care, maintenance and support of my son" should receive a construction broad enough to include the support of his wife and child. This construction has at times been given to somewhat similar *509
provisions. Gardner v. O'Loughlin,
In each of the foregoing cases, relied upon by the guardian, the court found an intention of the testator to give an absolute interest in the whole of a trust fund or the whole of the income of such fund, and held that the character of the beneficiary's interest, as a vested estate, was not affected by other provisions in which the testator successfully or otherwise sought to regulate or postpone the full enjoyment of such vested interest.
The guardian places great reliance upon Rhode IslandHospital Trust Co. v. Noyes,
In support of its contention that the restriction providing that none of the income of the trust estate shall be appropriated for the support of the wife and child of the cestui was void and that the cestui received a vested estate in the whole income the guardian has cited Tillinghast v. Bradford,
The trustees in their execution of the trust have appropriated only a portion of the net income for the benefit of Edmund. Believing that his mental derangement is incurable, that it will be necessary at some later time to again place him under restraint for his protection and the safety of others, whereby his personal expenses will be greatly increased, the trustees have accumulated the unexpended income of the trust fund and have invested the same in order to later apply the accumulations if necessary to any larger requirements of Edmund for care, maintenance and support. The trustees would not be justified in restricting their present appropriation of income for the benefit of Edmund to a sum less than his necessities for the purpose of accumulating a fund to meet some possible future requirement, which, in the nature of the case may never arise. After using such of the income as is reasonably required at present for the maintenance of the beneficiary the trustees very properly do not add the amount unexpended to the principal, but *516
invest it separately to answer possible future demands for the benefit of Edmund in accordance with the provisions of the trust.In re Bavier,
The trustees claim that they have absolute discretion in the use of the income for the care, maintenance and support of Edmund; that they may pay or withhold its appropriation entirely in accordance with their own judgment. At times in his argument and briefs their solicitor appears to *517
take the position that the court cannot properly interfere with or review the trustees' appropriation of income for the benefit of Edmund unless it is made to appear that they have acted dishonestly and have been guilty of fraud or bad faith. The trustees have not such absolute and uncontrollable discretion. The testatrix has not in terms conferred any discretion upon the trustees as to the amount of income which they shall appropriate for the benefit of Edmund, but has directed that they shall use so much as shall be necessary for the care, maintenance and support of the beneficiary. In their execution of the trust they must necessarily in the first instance exercise their judgment as to the needs of Edmund and appropriate what they consider necessary; but this is by no means conclusive. The amount necessary for his maintenance is a question of fact, and the judgment of the trustees upon that fact is subject to review. If question is raised as to the sufficiency of the appropriation a court of equity having jurisdiction over the trustees will direct an inquiry. Woodward v. Dain,
We are of the opinion that Edmund G. Thurber did not take a vested estate in the whole income of the trust; that the accumulations of unexpended income remaining at the death of Edmund then becomes a part of the trust fund to be distributed with the principal; and that the trustees do not have an absolute and uncontrolled discretion in the use of said income for the benefit of Edmund, but that the reasonableness of their conduct in that regard is subject to review and revision.
The parties may present a form of decree in accordance with this opinion.