Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY OWENSBORO DIVISION
DAMARTEZ DAQUAN THRUSTON PLAINTIFF v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-93-JHM ART MAGLINGER et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil-rights action. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint.
I. Plaintiff Damartez DaQuan Thruston is incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at Daviess County Detention Center (DCDC). He sues DCDC and DCDC Jailer Art Maglinger in his individual capacity only.
Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at DCDC on February 27, 2020, he “nearly died from eating something off of the lunch tray that contained peanut butter.” He implies that since that time it has been on record at DCDC that he has “nut allergies” and that, on four occasions in 2025, he received a food tray with nuts on it, including two occasions when he received a macadamia nut cookie. As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief including release from incarceration and the restoration of good-time credits.
II. Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the *2 complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); and McGore v. Wrigglesworth , 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 199 (2007). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin , 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, while liberal, this standard of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Columbia Natural Res., Inc . v. Tatum , 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The Court’s duty “does not require [it] to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall , 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v . Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co. , 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton , 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. “Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. , 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo , 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett , 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
A. DCDC
As a jail, DCDC is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983. See Marbry v. Corr. Med. Servs. , No. 99-6706, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 28072, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that a jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983). In this situation, Daviess County is the proper Defendant. See Smallwood v. Jefferson Cnty. Gov’t , 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990). Neither a municipality nor a county can be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal or county policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio , 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton , 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that he suffered any constitutional injury due to a policy or custom of Daviess County. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations pertain only to himself and *4 four specific occasions. Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against DCDC/Daviess County for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Jailer Maglinger
The complaint contains no allegations against Jailer Maglinger. The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson , 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psych. Hosp. , 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the claim against the defendant is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan , 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery No. 00-3402, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30782, at *7 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant).
To the extent Plaintiff is suing Jailer Maglinger based on his supervisory role at DCDC, the doctrine of respondeat superior , or the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr. , 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley , 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). “Because § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior, proof of personal involvement is required for a supervisor to incur personal liability.” Miller v. Calhoun Cnty. , 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005). There is no respondeat superior liability where the *5 plaintiff alleges only that the defendant merely failed to act or control employees. Shorts v. Bartholomew , 255 F. App’x 46, 53 (6th Cir. 2007); Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn. , 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998).
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claim against Jailer Maglinger must also be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
C. Injunctive Relief
As to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff release from incarceration or restoration of his good-time credits in this § 1983 action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”); Sango v. Johnson , No. 14-2294, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 23046, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2015) (“[A] claim seeking the restoration of good-time credits affects the fact or duration of confinement, and must be brought in a habeas action.”) (citing Preiser , 411 U.S. at 487).
D. Amended Complaint
Although the Court is dismissing this action for the above-stated reasons, the dismissal will be without prejudice and with leave to Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, he should identify the individual DCDC officers and/or food service workers who he alleges gave him the food trays with nuts on them, name those individuals as Defendants, and sue those Defendants in their individual capacities. See Rashada v. Fiegel , No. 23-1674, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7883, at *12 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024) (approving dismissal of pro se complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend).
IV. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will enter a separate Order dismissing this action without prejudice and with leave to file a second amended complaint.
IT IS ORDERED that any amended complaint must be filed no later than December 15, 2025 .
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place this case number and the word “Amended” on a § 1983 complaint form and send it to Plaintiff, along with three summons forms, should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint.
Date: November 17, 2025 cc: Plaintiff, pro se
4414.011
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