(After stating the foregoing facts.) The action is for a breach of covenant of warranty. The warranty was general, which includes a covenant of freedom from encumbrances, whether known or unknown to the purchaser at the time of taking the deed. Civil Code (1910), §§ 4194, 4195; Miller v. Desverges, 75 Ga. 407. There was an encumbrance on the property of $3,500, which has been discharged by the purchaser’s grantee, and the suit is for reimbursement on account of an alleged breach of the warranty.
The parol-evidence rule excludes any variation or contradiction of the terms of a valid written instrument. There is, however another rule of statutory sanction, that the consideration of a deed may always be inquired into when the principles of justice require it. Civil Code (1910), § 4179. It is upon the application of these two rules of evidence to the case at bar that the contending parties differ. Recitals in deeds, except payment of purchase-money as against the grantor and his privies, generally work an estoppel. Civil Code (1910), § 5736. In the'inquiry into the real consideration of a deed, the parties will not be allowed to add a new covenant (L. & N. R. Co. v. Willbanks, 133 Ga. 15, 65 S. E. 86, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 374, 17 Ann. Cas. 860), or to change an express covenant as to the quantity of the land conveyed, by parol proof of an agreed exception of a part of the premises (Miller v. Desverges, supra), or to destroy a mutual covenant (Wellmaker v. Wheatley, 123 Ga. 201, 51 S. E. 436). On the other hand, the parties will not be cut off from showing the real consideration by parol evidence, although it may reduce or enlarge the amount which may be recoverable for a breach of warranty. Stone v. Minter, 111 Ga. 45 (36 S. E. 321, 50 L. R. A. 356). The recital of the consideration is open to explanation, if the consideration is not referred to in the deed in such a way as to make it one of the terms or conditions of the contract.
Judgment reversed.