179 N.Y. 206 | NY | 1904
This action was brought to obtain a decree, which should enjoin the defendants from using certain wharves, or docks, at points upon the St. Lawrence river, for their business purposes. The plaintiff, a steamboat company, had been, for some years, engaged in the business of carrying passengers and freight upon the river and the defendants had been engaged in a like business with steamboats of their own. The plaintiff claims that it had acquired, through leases from the owners, an exclusive right to make use of the "Fine View," "Cornwall," and "Crossmon" wharves, in, or near, Alexandria Bay. This claim has been sustained in the courts below as to the first of these wharf properties; but as to the others, the judgment recovered by the plaintiff, at Special *209 Term, was reversed by the Appellate Division and it was there decided that the conditions contained in grants heretofore made by the state to the owners of the properties subjected their ownership to the rights of the public, to the extent necessary for the purposes of commerce. So far as the Fine View wharf is concerned, the disposition made below is acquiesced in by both parties. The plaintiff appeals from the determination of the Appellate Division in relation to the other two wharves; but I think in that there was no error. The possession of the plaintiff's lessors did not permit them to limit the use of the wharves by leases, or otherwise, in favor of any particular person, or business.
These wharves had been built out into the St. Lawrence, some fifty years ago, by the owners of the shore, or uplands, and they had been, down to the time of commencing this action, practically, open to general use by all of the steamers and boats engaged in navigating the river, for a compensation charged by the wharf owners. Cornwall and Crossmon, in 1883, applied to the commissioners of the land office for a grant of the lands under water, on which their docks stood; which application the commissioners granted, by virtue of the power conferred upon them by the legislature of the state to make grants of lands under the waters of navigable rivers, or lakes, to the proprietors of the adjacent lands, "as they shall deem necessary to protect the commerce of this state, or proper for the beneficial enjoyment of the same by the adjacent owner." (Chap. 283, Laws of 1850.) Accordingly, letters patent were caused to be issued, which, in each case, recited that the grant by the People of the state was made "for the purpose of promoting the commerce of our said State and for no other object, or purpose, whatsoever and with the reservations and upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned." One of such conditions was that if the grantee should not, "within five years from the date hereof, actually appropriate and apply the described premises to the purposes of commerce by erecting a dock, or docks, thereon and filling in the same," then the grant should become void. Holding under this title *210
from the state, the grantees made the leases to the plaintiff, under which it claims an exclusive right to use the docks leased. The plaintiff's rights are to be measured by such rights as the People of the state had granted to its lessors. If their ownership was subject to public rights of user, as the necessities of commercial traffic might require, then the plaintiff gained no exclusive possession by its leases. As riparian owners, Cornwall and Crossmon, originally, in building a dock out into the river, but exercised the right, at all times, conceded to such ownership. The proprietors of lands upon navigable waters are entitled to the right of access to the navigable part of the river and to the right to make a landing, wharf, or pier for their own use, or for the use of the public, subject to such general rules and regulations as the legislature may see proper to impose for the protection of the rights of the public, whatever these may be. (3 Kent's Com. 431; Yates v.Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; Rumsey v. N.Y. N.E.R.R. Co.,
I think that the case falls within the authority of Harper v.Williams, (
The case of Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gas Light Co., (
Nor does the fact that there was a subsequent grant by the state to Crossmon, in 1897, which was without conditions, or reservations, affect the situation. Crossmon appears not to have made improvements, within the time specified in the grant of 1883, and, therefore, applied for the subsequent grant; but as the state authorities had not taken action to vacate the prior grant, it was binding upon the grantee. If the state had not resumed its title by annulment of its grant, the title remained in Crossmon, subject to the terms imposed. (Archibald v.N.Y.C. H.R.R.R. Co.,
For these reasons, which are in harmony with the views expressed below, I advise the affirmance of the order appealed from and that judgment absolute be rendered upon the appellant's stipulation; with costs to the respondents in this court.
PARKER, Ch. J., BARTLETT, MARTIN, VANN, CULLEN and WERNER, JJ., concur.
Order affirmed, etc.