194 Iowa 565 | Iowa | 1921
Much of appellant’s abstract is denied by ap-pellee’s additional abstract. There has been no certification. We take the additional abstract as true. It - is therein stated, and not denied, that said amendment contains the entire record of the lower court, up to and including the time of the entry of the judgment or order of dismissal. On July 29, 1919, there was filed in the office of the clerk of the distrust court of Polk County, Iowa, the following notice of appeal (-omitting caption) :
“To Oscar Thorson: You are hereby notified that the city of Des Moines appeals from the action of the sheriff’s jury in awarding you the sum of twelve hundred dollars ($1,200) for a strip of ground in Lot 2, Union Place, to be used as an easement for the construction of a storm sewer, and that this appeal will be heard at the September term of the Polk County district court, which convenes on Tuesday, September 2, 1919.
“ [Signed by attorneys for city.]
“Service accepted this 22d day of July, 1919.
“0. Thorson.”
The notice is entitled, ‘ ‘ Oscar Thorson, plaintiff, v. City of Des Moines, defendant. — Notice of Appeal.”
Another notice was given in the Eeimer case, and filed July 29, 1919, in the clerk’s office, except that the caption names Jesse Eeimer as plaintiff, and the city of Des Moines and John F. Griffin, sheriff of Polk County, Iowa, as defendants, and the notice is addressed to Jesse Eeimer and John F. Griffin, sheriff, etc., and the return of service thereon is as follows:
“State of Iowa, Polk County, ss. I hereby certify that this notice came into my hands this-24th day of July, 1919, and that I personally served the same on plaintiff by reading to him the said notice and by delivering a copy thereof.
“[Signed] Wm. Kern.”
It does not appear that Kern was an officer, and the return is not sworn to. That, however, is not the main point relied
“Either party may appeal from such assessment to the dis
The statute seems to be plain, and we-think appellee’s point was well taken, and the appeals properly dismissed. Where the statute provides the mode of procedure, the provisions must be pursued, and the parties cannot substitute a different mode. 20 Corpus Juris 1103. Buckmiller v. Creston, W. & D. M. R. Co., 164 Iowa 502, holds that the service must be made upon the sheriff. In Simons v. Mason City & F. D. R. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 146, it was said that:
‘ ‘ The appeal is taken and perfected by the service of notice on the adverse party and the sheriff. From that time down until the final disposition of the case, it is in the court to which the appeal is taken.”
Other cases cited by appellee on this point are Phillips v. Follet, 69 Iowa 39; McClellan v. McClellan, 2 Iowa 312; In re Estate of Anderson, 125 Iowa 670; German Am. Sav. Bank v. Council of City of Burlington, 118 Iowa 84; City Council of Marion v. National Loan & Inv. Co., 122 Iowa 629. We shall not take the time to review the cases.
Appellee cites Spurrier v. Wirtner, 48 Iowa 486, to the proposition that an appearance to move to dismiss an appeal does not waive notice or confer jurisdiction. See, also, Bedford v. Board of Supervisors, 162 Iowa 588, 592. Appellant appears to concede the rule to be as appellee claims, so far as the service on the sheriff is concerned, for they say in argument:
“An appeal in actions of this nature is perfected by filing with and serving upon both the sheriff and the plaintiff-appellee the notice prescribed by law.”
Appellant’s argument proceeds, for the most part, upon the assumption that notice was served upon the sheriff, as recited in appellant’s abstract. However, they cite Hahn v. Chicago, O. & St. J. R. Co., 43 Iowa 333, as holding that it is not essential that service be made upon the sheriff. But in that case, other questions were relied upon more than that. In that case, the appeal was by the landowner, and the defendant railway was seeking to dismiss. Appellant also cites Buckmiller v. Creston, W. & D. M. R. Co., supra, and a statement therein that the
As said, we think that, under the statute, it was necessary to serve the sheriff. The statute was not complied with. The appeal was properly dismissed, and the order and judgment of the district court is — Affirmed.