84 F. 63 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern California | 1897
This is a suit to quiet title to lots B and C, in block 196, of the town of Santa Monica, Cal. The material facts of the case, as stipulated and shown in evidence, are as follows: On the 1st of May, 1864, one Andrew Chism and one Mary Bankhead were married at the county of San Bernardino, in the state of California,, and continued to be husband and wife up to the time of the death of the said wife, on the 1st day of October, 1884. On the 24th day of March, 1884, W. D. Vawter and 12. J. Vawter, then the owners of the said property, made, executed, and delivered to Mary Chism a deed, conveying to her all of said property; said deed being for a consideration of §900, and without any recitals showing that said land was conveyed to the said Mary Chism as her separate estate. Mary Chism died at the county of Los Angeles, in the state of California, on the 1st day of October, 1884, and had theretofore made no transfer or conveyance of said property to any person whomsoever, and was in possession thereof at the time of her death. Andrew Chism survived his wife, Mary Chism, and on the 2:>d dav of March, 1885, by a deed in the form of a quitclaim, and for the expressed consideration of $100, conveyed all his right, title, and interest in said property to complainant. On tne 10th day of March, 1885, upon proceedings for that purpose duly and regularly had in the superior court of the county of Los Angeles,
I am clearly of the opinion that said property was the separate property of Mary Chism. Indeed, I can see but little, if any, room for controversy on this point. It is true, as claimed by defendant, that, where land is conveyed to either husband or wife during the mar
On the other issue in the case, the contention of the defendant is also well taken. In California, the property of an infosfate passes to his or her heirs, subject to the control of the probate court, and to the possession of any administrator appointed by the court for the purposes of administration. Civ. Code Cal. 1384. Section 1452 of the Code of Civil Procedure of said state further provides that:
“The executor or administrator is entitled to the possession of all the real and personal estate of the decedent, and to receive the rents and profits of the real estate until the estate is settled, or until delivered over hy order of the court to the heirs or devisees; and must keep in good tenantable repair all houses, buildings, and fixtures thereon which are under his control. The heirs or dev-isees may themselves, or jointly with the executor or administrator, maintain an action for the possession of the real estate, or for the purpose of quieting title to the same, against any one except the executor or administrator; hut this section shall not be so construed as requiring them so to do.”
The last sentence of this section 1452 clearly implies that an heir or devisee shall not maintain an action for the possession of the real estate of the decedent, or to quiet title to the same1, against the executor or administrator. Construing these and similar statutory provisions, the supreme court of said state have held, in a multitude of cases, that an action for the possession of such property cannot be
Without reference, however, to the statutes of California, or decisions based thereon, except so far as they establish the competency of the probate court to determine questions of heirship, the present suit, it seems to me, is a flt one for the application of the rule of law, recognized and applied universally in this country, that, where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject-matter, the one before whom proceedings are first commenced, and whose jurisdiction first attaches, will be left to determine the controversy, without interference from the other. Sharon v. Terry, 36 Fed. 337; Gamble v. City of San Diego, 79 Fed. 487, and cases there cited; Brooks v. Delaplaine, 1 Md. Ch. 354. In the last-cited case the chancellor says:
“When two courts hare concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject-matter, the court in which the suit is first commenced is entitled to retain it. This rule would seem to he vital to the harmonious movement of courts whose powers may be exerted within the same spheres, and over the same subjects and persons. * * * Any other rule will unavoidably lead to perpetual collision, and be productive of the most calamitous results.”
For the reasons above indicated, this bill will be dismissed. In order, however, that the decree herein may not affect any rights or interests which the complainant may have acquired through Andrew Chism, as one of the heirs at law of Marv Chism, deceased, the dismissal will be without prejudice to any other proceeding or suit now pending, or that may be hereafter brought, for the determination of such rights or interests.