27 Vt. 140 | Vt. | 1854
The opinion of the court was delivered, at the circuit session, in September, 1855, by
I. The present case involves the question of the right of the legislature to require existing railways to respond in damages for all cattle killed or injured by their trains until they erect suitable cattle-guards at farm-crossings. No question could be made where such a requisition was contained in the charter of the corporation, or in the general laws of the state at the date of the charter. But where neither is the case, it is claimed that it is incompetent for the legislature to impose such an obligation by statute, subsequent to the date of the charter.
It has never been questioned, so far as I know, that the American legislatures have the same unlimited power in regard to logislation which resides in the British parliament, except where they are restrained by written constitutions. That must be conceded, I think, to be a fundamental principle in the political organizations of the American states. "We cannot well comprehend how, upon principle, it should be otherwise. The people must of course, possess
It is a conceded point, upon all hands, that the parliament of Great Britain is competent to make any law binding upon corporations, however much it may increase their burdens or restrict their powers, whether general or organic, even to the repeal of their charters.
This extent of power is recognized in the case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518, and the leading authorities are there referred to. Any requisite amount of authority, giving this unlimited power over corporations to the British parliament, may readily be found. And if, as we have shown, the several state legislatures have the same extent of legislative power, with the limitations named, the inviolability of these artificial bodies rests upon the same basis in the American states with that of natural persons, and there are, no doubt, many of the rights, powers, and functions of natural persons which do not come within legislative control. Such, for instance, as are purely and exclusively of private concern, and in which the body politic, as such, have no special interest.
IT. It being assumed then, that the legislature may control the action, prescribe the functions and duties of corporations, and impose restraints upon them to the same extent as upon natural persons, that is, in all matters coming within the general range of legislative authority, subject to the limitation of not impairing the obligation of contracts, provided the essential franchise is not taken without compensation, it becomes of primary importance to determine the extent to which the charter of a corporation may fairly be regarded as a contract within the meaning of the United States constitution.
Upon this subject, the decisions of the United States supreme
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall there says, “ a corporation is an atificial being — the mere creature of the law — it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence.” The decision throughout treats this as the fundamental idea, the pivot upon which the case turns. The charter of a corporation is thus regarded as a contract, inasmuch as it is an implied undertaking on the part of the state, that the corporation, as such, and for the purposes therein named or implied, shall enjoy the powers and franchises by it charter conferred. And any statute essentially modifying these corporate franchises is there regarded as a violation of the charter. But when we come to inquire what is meant hy the franchises of a corporation, the principal difficulty arises. Certain things, it is agreed are essential to the beneficial existence and successful operation of a corporation, such as individuality and perpetuity, when the grant is unlimited; the power to sue and to be sued, to have a common seal and to contract; and in the case of a railroad, to hare a common stock to construct and maintain its road, and to operate the same for the common benefit of the corporators. Certain other things, as incident to the beneficial use of these franchises, are necessarily implied. But there is a wide field of debateable ground outside of all these. It is conceded that the powers expressly, or by necessary implication, conferred by the charter, and which are essential to the successful operation of the coi*porations are inviolable.
But is has sometimes been supposed that corporations possess a kind of immunity and exemption from legislative control, extend
This is sufficiently explicit, and upon examination will be found, I think, to have placed the matter upon its true basis. In reason, it would seem that no fault could be found with the rule here laid down by the great expounder of American constitutional law. As to the general liability to legislative control, it places natural persons and corporations precisely upon the same ground. And it is the true ground, and tho only one ujjon which equal rights and just liabilities and duties can be fairly based.
To apply this rule to the present case, it must be conceded that all which goes to the constitution of the corporation and its beneficial operation is granted by tho legislature, and can not be revoked, either directly or indirectly, without a violation of the grant, which is regarded as impairing the contract, and so prohibited by the United States constitution. And if we suppose the legislature to have made the same grant to a natural person which they did to defendants, which they may undoubtedly do, Moor v. Veasie, 32 Maine 343; S. C. in error in the Sup. Ct. U. S., 4 Peters 568, it would scarcely be supposed that they thereby parted with any general legislative control over such person, or the business secured to him. Such a supposition, when applied to a single natural person, sounds almost absurd. But it must, in fact, be the same thing when
But in the pxresent case the question arises upon the statute of 1850, requiring all railways in the state to make and maintain cattle-guards at farm crossings, and until they do so, making them liable for damage done to cattle by their engines, by reason of defect of
But upon the principle contended for in Providence Bank v. Billings (supra), and sometimes attempted to be maintained in favor of other corporations, most of the railways in this state would be quite beyond the control of the legislature, as well as to their own police, as that of the state generally. For in very few of their charters are these matters defined, or the control of them reserved to the legislature. Many of the charters do not require the roads
But the present case resolves itself into the narrow question of the right of the legislature, by general statute to require all railways, whether now in operation, or hereafter to be chartered, or built, to fence their roads upon both sides, and provide
We think the power of the legislature to control existing rail-1 ways in this respect, may be found in the general control over the police of the country, which resides in the law-making power in all free states, and which is, by the fifth article of the bill of rights of this state, expressly declared to reside perpetually and inalienably in the legislature, which is, perhaps, no more than the enunciation of a general jorinciple applicable to all free states, and which cannot, therefore be violated so as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by express grant to any mere public or private corporation. And when the regulation of the police of a city or town, by general ordinances, is given to such towns and cities,' and the regulation of their own internal police is given to railroads to be carried into effect by their by-laws and other regulations, it is, j of course always, in all such cases, subject to the superior control; of the legislature. That is a responsibility which legislatures can-i not divest themselves of, if they would.
This police power of the state extends to the prqtectiop of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the state. According to the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut cdienum non laedas, which being of universal application, it must of course, be within the range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure others. So far as railroads are concerned, this police power which resides primarily and ultimately in the legislature, is two-fold 1. The police of the roads, which, in the absence of legislative control, the corporations themselves exercise over their operatives, and to some extent over all who do business
There would be no end of illustrations upon this subject, which, in the detail are more familiar to others than to us. It may be extended to the supervision of the track, tending switches, running upon the time of other trains, running a road with a single track, using improper rails, not using proper precaution by way of safety beams in case of the breaking of axlertrees, the number of brakemen upon a train with reference to diet number of cars, employing intemperate or incompetent engineers and servants, running beyond a given rate of speed, and a thousand similar things, most of which have been made the subject of legislation or judicial determination, and all of which may be. Hegeman v. Western R. Co., 16 Barbour, 353.
2, There is also the general police power of the state, by which persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state, of the perfect right, in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned. And it is certainly calculated to excite surprise and alarm, that the right
The first point has already been somewhat labored. It is admitted that the essential franchise of a private corporation is recognized by the best authority as private property, and cannot be taken without compensation, even for public use. Armington v. Barnet 15 Vt. 745 ; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446 ; S. C. in error hi the United States Sup. Ct.; 6 Howard, 507 ; 1 Shelford (Bennett’s ed.) 441, and cases cited.
All the cases agree that the indispensable franchises of a corporation cannoj be destroyed or essentially modified. This is the very point upon which the leading case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward was decided, and which every well considered case in this country maintains. But when it is attempted upon this basis to deny the power of regulating the internal police of the railroads, and their mode of transacting tlieir general business, so far as it tends unreasonably to infringe the rights or interests of others, it is putting the whole subject of railway control quite above the legislation of the country. Many analagous subjects may be adduced to show the right of legislative control over matters chiefly of private concern. It was held, that a statute making the stockholders of existing banks liable for the debts of the bank was a valid law as to debts thereafter contracted, and binding to that extent, upon all stockholders, subsequent to the passage of the law. Stanley v. Stanley, 26 Maine, 191. But where a bank was chartered with power to receive money on deposit, and pay away the same, and to discount bills of exchange, and make loans, and a statute of the state subsequently made it unlawful for any bank in the state to transfer by endorsement or otherwise, any bill or note, etc., it was held that the act was void, as a violation of the contract of the state with the bank in granting its charter. Planters’ Bank v. Sharp, and Baldwins. Payne, C Howard, 301, 326, 327, 332; Jameson s. Planters’ and Merchants’ Bank, 23 Alabama, 168. Is is true that any stat- “ ute destroying the business or profits of a iank, and equally of a railroad, is void. Hence a statute prohibiting banks from taking
The’legislature, may no doubt, prohibit railroads from carrying freight which is regarded as detrimental to the public health or morals, or the public safety generally, or they might probably be made liable as insurers of the lives and limbs of passengers as they virtually are of freight. The late statute, giving relatives the right to recover damages where a person is killed, has wrought a very important change in the liability of railways, ten times as much, probably, as the one now under consideration ever could do. And I never knew the right of the legislature to impose the liability to be brought in question.
But the argument that these cattle-guards at farm-crossings are of so private a character as not to come within the general range of legislative cognizance, seems to me to rest altogether upon a misapprehension. It makes no difference how few or how many persons a statute will be likely to affect. If it professes to regulate a matter of public concern, and is in its terms general, applying
So, too, a statute requiring division fences between adjoining land proprietors, to be built of a given height or quality, although differing from the former law, would bind natural persons and equally corporations. But a statute requiring land owners to build all their fences of a given quality or height, would no doubt be invalid, as an unwarrantable interference with matters of exclusively private concern. But the farm-crossings upon a railway are by no means of this character. They are division fences between adjoining occupants, to all intents. In addition to this, they are the safeguards which one person, in the exercise of a dangerous business, is required to maintain in order to prevent the liability to injure his neighbor. This is a control by legislative action coming within the obligation of the maxim, Sic viere tuo, and which has always been exercised in this manner in all free states, in regard to those whose business is dangerous and destructive to other persons, property or business. Slaughter-houses, powder-mills, or houses for keeping powder, unhealthy manufactories, the keeping
I do not now perceive any just ground to question the right of the legislature to make railways liable for all cattle killed by their trains. It might be unjust or unreasonable, but none the less competent. Girtman v. Central Railroad, 1 Kelly, (Georgia) 173, is sometimes quoted as having held a different doctrine, but no such point is to be found in the case. The British parliament for centuries, and most of the American legislatures, have made the protection of the lives of domestic animals, the subject of penal enactment. It would be wonderful if they could not do the same as to railways or if they could not punish the killing, by requiring them to compensate the owner, or, as in the present case, to do it until they used certain precautions in running their trains, to wit, maintained cattle-guards at roads and farm-crossings.
There are some few cases in the American courts bearing more directly upon the very point before us. In Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barbour, 358, the very same point is decided against the railway; Willard, J., compares the requirement to the law of the road, the passing of canal boats, and keeping lights at a given elevation in steamboats, and says it comes clearly within the maxim Sic utere tuo ; and in Waldron v. The Renssalaer & Saratoga R. Co., Ibid. 390, the same point is decided, and the same judge says the requirements of the new act, which is identical with our statute of 1850, as applied to existing railways, “are not inconsistent with their charter, and are, in our judgment, such as the legislature had the right to make.” They were designed for the public safety, as well as the protection of property. In Milliman v. The Oswego & Syracuse R., 10 Barbour, 87, the ground is assumed that the new law wá's not intended to apply to existing roads. And no doubt is here
The supreme court of Ohio, in Mechanics’ and Traders’ Bank v. Debolt, 1 Ohio, 591, have even denied tills, and in argument assume the right of the legislature to repeal the charter of banking corporations. So, also, in Toledo Bank v. Bond, Ibid., 622. But these cases involve only the right of the legislature to grant away, permanently, for a consideration, the right of taxation, which seems to me not to involve the general question.
There arc some analogous subjects where legislative control has been sustained by the courts which may properly be here alluded to. The expense of sidewalks and curbstones in cicies and towns has been imposed upon adjacent lots, chiefly for general comfort and convenieuce. Paxson v. Swett, 1 Greenleaf 196; City of Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Metcalf, 180. Unlicensed persons not allowed to remove house-dirt and offal from the streets. Vandine’s Case, 6 Pick. 187. Prohibiting persons selling produce not raised upon their own farms, from occupying certain stands in the market. Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick. 168. See also Buffaloe v. Webster, 10 Wendell, 99; Bush v. Seabury, 8 Johns, 327. Prohibiting the driving or riding horses faster than a walk in certain streets. Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462. Prohibiting bowling alleys. Tanner v. The Trustees of the City of Albion, 5 Hill, 121, or the exhibition of stud horses or scallions in public places. Nolin v. Mayor of Franklin. 4 Yerger, 163. The same may be said of all statutes regulating the mode of driving upon the highway or upon bridges, the validity of which have long been acquiesced in.
The destruction of private property in cities and towns, to prevent the spread of conflagrations, is an extreme application of the rule, compelling the subserviency of private rights to public security, in cases of imperious necessity. Put even this has been fully sustained after the severest scrutiny. Jtttfy. v. Lawrence, and other eases upon the same subject; 1 Zabriskic, 714; 3Zabriskie, 590, andcases there referred tofroin theNew York deports. There is, in short, no end to these illustrations, when we look critically into the police of the large cities. _ One in any degree familiar with this subject would never question the right depending upon invincible necessity, in order to the maintenance of any show of administrative authority among the class of p arsons with which the city police have to do. To such men any doubt of the right to subject persons and property to such regulations as the public security and health may require, regardless of merely private convenience, looks like mere badinage. They can scarcely regard the objector as altogether serious. And generally, these doubts in regard to the extent of governmental authority come from those who have had smaUjoxperieiice,