In re DENNIS M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. WARREN E. THORNTON, as Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DENNIS M., Defendant and Appellant.
Sac. No. 7819
Supreme Court of California
Feb. 20, 1969
70 Cal. 2d 444 | 450 P.2d 296 | 75 Cal. Rptr. 1
Traynor, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
[Sac. No. 7819. In Bank. Feb. 20, 1969.]
In re DENNIS M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
WARREN E. THORNTON, as Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DENNIS M., Defendant and Appellant.
made an issue until the matter was appealed, is not borne out by the record. Instead, plaintiff urged her right to prejudgment interest in proposed findings and conclusions of law, to which defendant filed objections and counterproposals, and again in amended findings and conclusions and in the form of judgment prepared and submitted to the court by her counsel.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, Edsel W. Haws and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MOSK, J.-Dennis M., a juvenile, appeals from a judgment declaring him to be a ward of the court and committing him to the Youth Authority. (
At the time the events in issue took place, appellant was 15 1/2 years old. On August 18, 1966, appellant and his friend Gilbert took an automobile without the owner‘s consent. Before abandoning it, appellant stole a .22-caliber revolver from the glove compartment, and Gilbert stole a shotgun from the trunk. About 8:30 p.m. on August 28 appellant called on his 15-year-old girl friend Yolanda. After the two had stood outside her house talking for some 15 minutes, a shot was heard. Yolanda‘s father rushed out and found his daughter shot in the head, the bullet having entered under her chin. No gun was visible, and no other persons were present. Appellant immediately claimed that the shot had been fired by a passerby; asking, “You want me to go after him?” appellant mounted his bicycle and appeared to give chase. He returned empty-handed, and when Deputy Sheriff Piper arrived a few minutes later appellant volunteered a detailed description of the incident and the alleged assailant.1
At 10:15 p.m. Sheriff‘s Officers Stamm and Tobler went to Yolanda‘s house to talk with appellant about the shooting. They had discussed the event with Officer Piper, and believed that appellant had given him a false story. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Tobler found a .22-caliber revolver in a flower bed of the house next door. The chamber of the weapon contained an empty cartridge.2 The officers then asked appellant to step outside, showed him the revolver, and advised him of his constitutional rights under the decision of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) supra, 384 U.S. 436. When asked if he wanted to talk about it, appellant acknowledged that he had shot Yolanda. At this point he was arrested and placed in the
An hour and a half later appellant was questioned in the sheriff‘s office by a deputy district attorney, who began by readvising appellant of his Miranda rights. Appellant stated he understood, and proceeded to elaborate on his story of an accidental shooting. In substance, he related that after stealing the gun he had loaded it and practiced firing it; that on the evening he visited Yolanda he pulled it out to show her; that he thought he had removed all the bullets while talking with her, but “I didn‘t know if it was loaded or not“; that he pointed the gun upwards and pulled the trigger twice while hugging Yolanda, and it fired the second time; and that he immediately threw the gun over the fence and told Yolanda‘s father and Officer Piper the tale of the phantom assailant.
On August 30 a petition was filed in the juvenile court, praying that appellant be adjudged a ward of that court on the ground that he was a “person under the age of twenty-one years who violate[d] any law of this State” (
At the outset of the hearing, appellant, represented by counsel, admitted the theft of the gun. The above-related evidence was then introduced, and the court found that appellant had committed the three charged violations of law and hence was within the jurisdiction defined by section 602. Judgment was thereafter rendered declaring appellant to be a ward of the court4 and committing him to the care and custody of the Youth Authority.
The appeal is devoid of merit insofar as it attacks the “jurisdictional” finding. Appellant, represented by counsel, judicially admitted the charge of stealing the .22-caliber revolver. Such a violation of law, standing alone, is sufficient to bring a juvenile within the purview of section 602, and the record discloses that the court so found: in the course of the hearing the court ruled, “Without making any disposition at this time, I‘ll sustain the petition ... as to the violation of [Penal Code] Section 484 [i.e., theft of the gun].” Appellant has not challenged the propriety of that ruling; nor, indeed, has he questioned on appeal the finding that he was also guilty of the theft of the car. The juvenile court‘s finding of jurisdiction over appellant is thus more than adequately supported.
Nevertheless, we recognize that the third stated jurisdictional ground, i.e., that appellant was guilty of manslaughter in the shooting of Yolanda, may have had significant weight in the court‘s subsequent ruling on disposition. (
We meet at the outset a contention advanced by appellant at oral argument: i.e., that the United States Supreme Court decision in In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 87 S.Ct. 1428], compels the state to establish the facts supporting a charge of juvenile delinquency by the criminal standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” We do not so read Gault. It is true, of course, that the decision inaugurated a sweeping constitutional reform of the rights of juveniles in this country. It drew from the teaching of earlier cases the fundamental proposition that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone” (387 U.S. at p. 13 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538]), and laid down specific guidelines for implementing those guarantees in juvenile proceedings. Yet in so doing the court took repeated pains to limit its holding by warning that “We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile ‘delinquents.‘” (Ibid.) First, the decision was intended to affect only the adjudicatory stage of juvenile proceedings, and then only when the outcome may be commitment to a state institution. (Ibid.) Secondly, the court made it clear that even if the foregoing conditions are met, the Constitution does not require that the full panoply of rights
Rather, the opinion (at pp. 30-31 [18 L.Ed.2d at pp. 547-548]) adopts for juvenile court adjudications of delinquency the holding of Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 562 [16 L.Ed.2d 84, 98, 86 S.Ct. 1045], that “the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Those essentials, as the remainder of the opinion spells out, are (1) adequate notice of the charges, (2) assistance of counsel, (3) opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and (4) the privilege against self-incrimination. (387 U.S. at pp. 31-57 [18 L.Ed.2d at pp. 548-563].)
Not only is standard or quantum of proof missing from the foregoing itemized list, but the court expressly declined to reach this very issue. In the course of its opinion below, the Arizona court had ruled on the question of the appropriate standard of proof in juvenile cases; referring inter alia to that ruling, the United States Supreme Court stated (387 U.S. at pp. 10-11 [18 L.Ed.2d at pp. 536-537]) that “We emphasize that we indicate no opinion as to whether the decision of that court with respect to such other issues does or does not conflict with requirements of the Federal Constitution.” And one year later the court again refrained from deciding the issue.5
We infer that at least for the present the Supreme Court has left this matter to the states and the lower federal courts. The results, however, are still highly inconclusive. At least three different formulae have been sanctioned. The great weight of authority holds that in juvenile proceedings the general civil standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence governs. (See cases collected in Note, 43 A.L.R.2d 1128, 1138-1141.) Some courts, including the Arizona Supreme Court in Gault itself, have adopted the special civil standard of proof by “clear and convincing evidence.” (See, e.g., Application of Gault (1965) 99 Ariz. 181 [407 P.2d 760, 768].) And the few jurisdictions to consider the issue since Gault are divided: in Illinois and Texas it has been held that
In California we do not write upon a clean slate. For the first half-century of their existence our juvenile court statutes contained no provision on this topic, and a wide variety of standards of proof was in actual use.6 In 1957, however, a special commission was created to survey and evaluate the administration of juvenile justice in this state and submit recommendations for legislative action. After three years of field studies, hearings, drafts, and conferences with experts and practitioners alike, the commission filed its report. On the important issue of procedural rules, the commission posited that “The problem in attempting to establish acceptable juvenile court procedures is to attain a working balance between two essential objectives-first, preserving the guarantee of due process to the minor; and second, establishing an informal court atmosphere so that potentially harmful effects of the proceedings are minimized and the minor‘s receptivity to treatment is encouraged.” (Rep. of Governor‘s Special Study Com. on Juvenile Justice (1960), pt. I, p. 29.) Mindful of both these goals, the commission concluded (at p. 30) that “All of the reasons for employing rules of evidence in other judicial proceedings, e.g., to insure truthful, reliable, and fair testimony, apply with equal force to a hearing on a minor‘s delinquency or a hearing in which a child may be removed from his family because of parental neglect. ... On the other hand, the Commission sees no valid reason for requiring the degree of proof customary in criminal cases. It is our opinion that requiring proof of the jurisdictional facts by a
The Legislature, moreover, has been fully responsive to Gault. Many of the safeguards required by Gault had already been incorporated into our law six years before that decision, as the opinion itself recognizes. (387 U.S. at p. 37 fn. 63 [18 L.Ed.2d at pp. 551-552].) Nevertheless, in its 1967 session the Legislature adopted numerous amendments designed to comply with the entire mandate of Gault, by implementing in considerable detail the juvenile‘s right to notice, to counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination, and his privilege against self-incrimination. (Stats. 1967, chs. 507, 1355, 1356; see generally Gardner, Gault and California (1968) 19 Hast.L.J. 527, 532-539.)
Such deliberate acts of the Legislature come before us clothed with a presumption of constitutionality. “All presumptions and intendments favor the validity of a statute and mere doubt does not afford sufficient reason for a judicial declaration of invalidity. Statutes must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively and unmistakably appears. [Citations.]” (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 481, 484 [171 P.2d 21, 166 A.L.R. 701]; accord, State of California v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 365, 371 [310 P.2d 7]; In re Davis (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 645, 651 [51 Cal.Rptr. 702].) No such showing is here made with regard to the statutory standard of proof in juvenile matters.
In contrast to a number of the fundamental guarantees of Anglo-American criminal law which can trace their sources back to the Magna Carta or even earlier (e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145 [20 L.Ed.2d 491, 88 S.Ct. 1444] [right to trial by jury]; Klopfer v. North Carolina
Prior to Gault it was squarely held that by reason of the fundamental differences in nature and purpose between a criminal prosecution and a juvenile proceeding, the use in the latter of the preponderance of the evidence standard prescribed by
We do not deny that Gault casts doubt on the traditional parens patriae theory, and exposes many defects in its practice; but we also take the high court at its word when it reiterates that under the Constitution the juvenile court hearing need not “conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing” (387 U.S. at p. 30 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 548], quoting from Kent v. United States (1966) supra, 383 U.S. 541, 562). Indeed, the opinion is replete with language admonishing that the new rules there laid down should not be taken to spell the end of the juvenile court process per se, and that many of its unique attributes can and should be preserved.8
In a thoughtful decision reviewing the just quoted language of Gault, a Pennsylvania appellate court has concluded that “those who find in Gault the obliteration of any distinctions between the treatment accorded juveniles and adults are reaching a conclusion that is unwarranted. It is clear to us that the Supreme Court has properly attempted to strike a judicious balance by injecting procedural orderliness into the juvenile court system. ... It has not suggested that we discard the flexibility which has long been the hallmark of juvenile courts, but that we temper it with certain procedural safeguards. ... [W]e are in full agreement with the holding of the Supreme Court that the constitutional safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed to adults must similarly be accorded juveniles. It is inconceivable to us, however, that our highest Court attempted, through Gault, to undermine the basic philosophy, idealism and purposes of the juvenile court. We believe that the Supreme Court did not lose sight of the humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system; it did not ignore the need for each judge to determine the action appropriate in each individual case; it did not intend to convert the juvenile court into a criminal court for young people. Rather, we find that the Supreme Court recognized that juvenile courts, while acting within the constitutional guarantees of due process, must, nonetheless, retain their flexible procedures and techniques.” (
The issue before the Pennsylvania court was whether Gault required, by implication, that the right to a jury in adult criminal trials be incorporated into juvenile court law. The court held that it did not, reasoning that “the institution of jury trial in juvenile court, while not materially contributing to the fact-finding function of the court, would seriously limit the court‘s ability to function in this unique manner, and would result in a sterile procedure which could not vary to meet the needs of delinquent children.” (Id. at p. 17; accord, Dryden v. Commonwealth (Ky.App. 1968) 435 S.W.2d 457; In re Fletcher (1968) 251 Md. 520 [248 A.2d 364]; People v. 3656, 3658, Y.O. (Sup.Ct. 1968) 289 N.Y.S.2d 782.)
Although the consequences of adopting the reasonable doubt standard in juvenile court would perhaps be less drastic than adopting a jury system, to do so would nevertheless introduce a strong tone of criminality into the proceedings. The high degree of certainty required by the reasonable doubt standard is appropriate in adult criminal prosecutions, where a major goal is corrective confinement of the defendant for the protection of society. But even after Gault, as we have seen, juvenile proceedings retain a sui generis character: although certain basic rules of due process must be observed, the proceedings are nevertheless conducted for the protection and benefit of the youth in question. In such circumstances, factors other than “moral certainty of guilt” come into play: e.g., the advantages of maintaining a noncriminal atmosphere throughout the hearing, and the need for speedy and individualized rehabilitative services. Indeed, the youth‘s alleged crime may often be only the latest or most overt symptom of an underlying behavioral or personality disorder which could equally well warrant a declaration of wardship pursuant to other provisions of the code.9
Thus a determination whether or not the person committed the particular misdeed charged-although the very heart of an adult criminal prosecution-may not in fact be critical to the proper disposition of many juvenile cases. On the contrary, in the latter the best interests of the youth may well be served by a prompt factual decision at a level short of “moral certainty.”10
In any event, we cannot say that the Legislature plainly exceeded constitutional limits in finding that the benefits of the reasonable doubt standard would be outweighed by the adverse effects of imposing that doctrine of adult criminal law on the essentially remedial proceedings of the juvenile court.11
The draftsmen of model acts have proposed the adoption, at various times, of each of the three standards of proof mentioned herein. In 1959 the United States Children‘s Bureau took the view that the standard should be preponderance of the evidence. (Comment to § 19 of the Standard Juvenile Court Act (1959) 5 Nat. Prob. & Parole Assn. J. 370.) In 1966, however, in a publication quoted and relied on by the Supreme Court throughout its Gault opinion (see, e.g., 387 U.S. at p. 38 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 552], characterizing the work as “authoritative“), the Children‘s Bureau recommended the special civil standard of clear and convincing evidence as
Similar disarray reigns in the recommendations of the law review writers. Even prior to Gault, contrary positions had been taken (compare Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender (1957) 41 Minn.L.Rev. 547, 562-563 (disapproving reasonable doubt standard), with Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts (1961) 46 Cornell L.Q. 387, 412 (approving reasonable doubt standard)); since Gault, the views have proliferated. Some authors call for extension of the reasonable doubt standard to juvenile proceedings (Dorsen and Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law (1967) 1 Fam.L.Q. 1, 26-27; Comment, In re Gault and the Persisting Questions of Procedural Due Process and Legal Ethics in Juvenile Courts (1968) 47 Neb.L.Rev. 558, 579-580), while others resist such a step (Welch, Kent v. United States and In re Gault: Two Decisions in Search of a Theory (1967) 19 Hast.L.J. 29, 36-38, 40-45) and criticize the courts that have taken it (Note (1968) 19 Syracuse L.Rev. 1041, 1046). The majority, however, propose compromise solutions of varying content. (See, e.g., Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal (1967) 53 Va.L.Rev. 1700, 1713 (a higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence, but not reasonable doubt unless right to jury trial is also granted); Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, in Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (1967), p. 103 (favoring clear and convincing evidence standard, with reasonable doubt standard reserved for “the
In the light of the foregoing analysis, we cannot conclude that the standard of proof provision of
On appeal, of course, the issue is of narrower scope. We “cannot examine evidence to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. [Citations.] Our function is to determine whether the record contains any substantial evidence tending to support the finding of the trial court.” (In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 823-824 [41 Cal.Rptr. 379].) Such evidence is present in the case at bar.
The relevant statutory language defines manslaughter as a killing without malice “in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death ... without due caution and circumspection” (
And it is no defense that no harm was intended, for a homicide which “results from playing or skylarking with or the reckless handling of firearms” may properly be found to be manslaughter. (People v. Sica (1926) 76 Cal.App. 648, 651 [245 P. 461].)
Here it appears that appellant “thought” he had removed all the bullets from the gun while talking to Yolanda. He now argues that a 15-year-old youth‘s inadvertent failure to “complete” such an unloading process can amount, as a matter of law, to no more than simple negligence. The argument misses the mark: appellant‘s culpability derives not from his inept unloading but from the fact that, although not certain he had removed all the bullets, he proceeded deliberately to pull the trigger, not once but twice, while hugging Yolanda and pointing the gun at her head. As the trial court emphasized, “holding the gun in that obvious close proximity, knowing a few minutes before he just apparently checked to see if the gun was unloaded and knowing full well that that gun had been loaded just prior to that, having previously fired this weapon, to me the act was obviously culpable.” Such conduct displays a reckless disregard of human life, and amply supports the challenged finding of involuntary manslaughter. (Cf. In re Hartman (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 801, 807 [210 P.2d 53].)
II
Appellant next contends that his statements to the police were admitted into evidence in violation of the rules laid down in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) supra, 384 U.S. 436.
It cannot now be urged that appellant was not fully advised of his rights under Miranda. The transcript of the questioning of appellant in the sheriff‘s office on the night of the shooting reveals on its face that such advice was given. As to the earlier questioning at the scene itself, Officer Stamm testified that he used a slip or card “per accordance with the Miranda Decision and it was read to [appellant] and ex-
Appellant contends, rather, that because he was a minor at the time of the questioning he should be held incompetent as a matter of law to waive his rights without the advice of a parent or an attorney. In fairness to appellant‘s counsel, we note that the proceedings in this case took place a year before our decision in People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365 [62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202]. We there held that the issue of a minor‘s capacity to waive these rights must be resolved on the “totality of circumstances” shown by the record. We recognized that the advice and consent of an adult in this
Applying these rules to the facts in Lara, we found such a capacity to waive in the following circumstances; “Here the officers specifically asked each defendant if he understood the statement of rights just given to him, and each replied that he did. There was testimony that at the time of the questioning Lara was ‘very calm’ and gave no indication of having consumed alcoholic beverages, and Alvarez appeared ‘cognizant and aware.’ Each defendant, moreover, concluded his handwritten confession with a full statement of his Dorado rights. Also relevant is the fact that each defendant, though young, had had considerable experience with the police and the courts. (People v. Reeves (1966) 64 Cal.2d 766, 775 [51 Cal.Rptr. 691, 415 P.2d 35].) Thus Alvarez admitted to the defense psychologist that ‘he had had more arrests and convictions than he could remember since the age of 11 or 12. He had been used to this type of environment [i.e., incarceration]‘; and Lara testified that only four months before his arrest in the present case he had been arrested on a narcotics charge and had been informed he had a right to counsel and to remain silent and that anything he said could be used against him, and court-appointed counsel had in fact been furnished to him.” (Fn. omitted; pp. 376-377 of 67 Cal.2d.) The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. (392 U.S. 945 [20 L.Ed.2d 1407, 88 S.Ct. 2303].)
Appellant attempts to distinguish Lara on factual grounds, but none is persuasive. He points out that during the two or three days between the crime and the arrests in Lara, the defendants “had the opportunity” to consult with adults; but there was no showing, of course, that they did so in fact. Appellant stresses that at the time of the interrogations he was 15 years old, whereas Alvarez, the younger codefendant in Lara, was 17; yet our opinion recited expert testimony (67 Cal.2d at p. 377) to the effect that Alvarez had a considerably lower “mental age” and an I.Q. of 65 to 71. As Lara makes clear, chronological age alone is not determinative of the question of capacity: “The issue, as with all matters of waiver, is to be resolved upon the whole record.” (Id. at p. 376.)
Appellant next turns to alleged procedural distinctions. He complains that he was not given, as were the defendants in
Finally, appellant charges that the explicit finding of waiver made in Lara was not made here; but “Although it is good practice for the trial court to make an explicit finding that a defendant waived his constitutional rights, no such finding is required; a finding of waiver may be implied from the fact that the trial court received a defendant‘s extrajudicial statement in evidence after receiving proof that the defendant had been advised of his rights as required by Dorado [or, here, Miranda] before the statement was made.” (People v. Rodriguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 663, 668 [64 Cal.Rptr. 253] [17-year-old youth charged with murder]; cf. People v. Thomas (1967) 65 Cal.2d 698, 704-705 [56 Cal.Rptr. 305, 423 P.2d 233], and cases cited.)
The record thus bears out the juvenile judge‘s personal appraisal of appellant‘s maturity: in ruling on the culpability of his conduct, the judge observed, “I don‘t think we have a naive fifteen-year-old. I think he fully understood what was going on. He knew the gun was loaded when he went over there and he gave it a cursory examination and, obviously, he didn‘t pick up one of the shells. That naive little young man had a-within seconds after an act, a terrible act causing the death of a young fifteen-year-old girl, had the unmitigated gall to make up a story and identify some person-his outward appearance was that of calmness, not of excitement. It doesn‘t strike me as the naive little fifteen-year-old. Instead of being shocked, complete hysteria, sick at heart at this moment, what does he do? He makes up a story and goes chasing off [after] an alleged person that shot the girl, and then throws the bullet and the gun into a vacant lot.”
From the totality of the circumstances in this case we conclude there is substantial evidence that appellant had the capacity to understand the meaning of the warnings given him, and that he knowingly and intelligently waived the rights here in issue. Accordingly, there was no error in admitting the challenged statements into evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
Traynor, C. J., McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
There is also involved a highly debatable Miranda issue. In People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365 [62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202], the majority of this court held that a waiver of a minor‘s constitutional rights should not be measured by the same rule applicable to adults but must be measured by the “totality of circumstances.” Here the record shows the police read to the minor the Miranda warnings from a card. To hold that after the mere reading and parroting of the Miranda rights a confession constitutes a knowing waiver of constitutional rights without the advice of a parent, adult or lawyer is to simply disregard the limitations on the waiver rule announced in Lara so far as minors are concerned.
I would reverse the judgment.