RODGER THORNTON, Plаintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD N. SNYDER, JR., Director, JAMES M. SCHOMIG, Warden, and CAPTAIN JOSH J. SHETTLEWORTH, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 04-1500
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
ARGUED JUNE 3, 2005—DECIDED NOVEMBER 3, 2005
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 01 C 1347—Harold A. Baker, Judge.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Rodger Thornton, an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed a civil rights action alleging that prison officials violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on his cell conditions claims but allowed a claim concerning yard exercise privileges to continue. Thornton raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that summary judgment on his cell conditions claims was inappropriate, as he contends that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Because Thornton filed grievances concerning his cell conditions that
I. BACKGROUND
Rodger Thornton is an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections serving a life sentence. On January 13, 2000, after a disciplinary charge, corrections officials placed Thornton in Cell 106 of the Pontiac Correctional Center, a segregation cell. Several days later, he wrote letters to defendants Donald Snyder, Jr., Director of the Pontiac Correctional Center, Warden James Schomig, and Captain Josh Shettleworth expressing displeasure about the conditions of his cell. He received no response. On January 28, Thornton submitted an emergency grievance tо Warden Schomig complaining about the conditions in his cell. In this grievance, he asked to be moved from his cell.1 Thorn-
By February 22, officials had transferred Thornton from Cell 106 to Cell 752. On that day, Thornton filed a grievance concerning the poor condition of the mattress in Cell 752. He requested a clean mattress. After receiving another unsatisfactory mattress, Thornton was furnished with a satisfactory mattress on May 11. On May 12, prison officials dismissed the February 22 grievance as moot because Thornton had received an acceptable mattress. The record contains no indication that Thornton appealed either grievance to Director Snyder.
Thornton later filed a lawsuit pursuant to
In contrast, the district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Thornton‘s deprivation of yard exercise claim. Before trial, the district court received evidence concerning Thornton‘s security risk at an ex parte hearing. A casework supervisor at the Stateville
In light of the high security and escape risk Thornton posed, in addition to the fact that approximately twenty persons from the Department of Corrections (both inmates and employees) were listed as potential witnesses, the district court decided to conduct the trial by videoconference. At trial, Thornton and the prosecutors appeared via videoconference and were not physically present in the courtroom with the jury. In addition, all the witnesses testified by videoconference, save one that testified by telephone. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and Thornton appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
We review the district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. McCoy v. Gilbert, 270 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 2001). “Ordinarily, plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under
“[T]he PLRA‘s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,” Porter, 534 U.S. at 532, and “an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). An inmate‘s perception thаt exhaustion would be futile does not excuse him from the exhaustion requirement. Id.; Perez v. Wisc. Dep‘t of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 1999). “Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 741); see also Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 2004).
The Illinois Department of Corrections has an established grievance process. See
We begin with the defendants’ argument that Thornton did not even begin the grievance process for his claim concerning the conditions in Cell 106. The defendants contend that after corrections officials deemed the grievance not an emergency, the grievanсe ceased to exist. We disagree. Thornton followed the proper procedure for filing a grievance that he considered an emergency by submitting his grievance directly to the warden. See
We turn now to the heart of the case. Thornton contends that he exhausted all the remedies that were available to him with respect to his cell condition complaints, as he filed grievances and then received exactly what he had requested in these grievances. Thornton‘s first grievancе, filed January 28, 2000, complained about the conditions in Cell 106. In the “Relief Requested” section of his grievance, Thornton wrote, “To be moved from this dangerous cell
Thornton also receivеd the result he sought with respect to his Cell 752 mattress grievance. On February 22, 2000, Thornton filed a grievance that complained about the poor condition of his mattress in Cell 752. In his grievance, he requested a clean mattress, and he subsequently received an adequate mattress. The grievance officer then recommended that “[Thornton‘s] grievance be found moot as he has been issued a replacement mattress.” The next day, the warden concurred, and the grievance was dismissed as moot.
In support of their argument that Thornton did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the defendants point to the provision in the grievance process for appeals to the Director of the Department of Corrections from warden determinations that do not resolve the grievance to an inmate‘s satisfaction. See
As the defendants emphasize, the PLRA requires exhaustion of “all available” remedies, and this requirement applies to “all” suits about inmate life. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 524, 532. Unlike the defendants, however, we do not take the requirement to exhaust “аll available” remedies to mean Thornton must appeal grievances that were resolved as he requested and where money damages were not available.
Perez, 182 F.3d at 538. The Tenth Circuit‘s decision in Ross v. County of Bernadillo, 365 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2004), decided after Booth, is similarly instructive. There, an inmate filed a grievance requesting that shower mats be placed on his shower floor. Shortly thereafter, prison officials furnished the shower with a mat, thus alleviating the problem the inmatе had raised in his grievance. The court found that the inmate had exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the shower mat grievance, stating, “Once a prisoner has won all the relief that is available under the institution‘s administrative procedures, his administrative remedies are exhausted. Prisoners are not required to file additional complaints or appeal favorable decisions in such cases. When there is no possibility of any further relief, the prisoner‘s duty to exhaust available remedies is complete.” Id. at 1187. See also Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 653 (2d Cir. 2004) (“All parties agree, as do we, that Ortiz has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his due process claim. He appealed the Tier III hearing and obtained a reversal. He did not appeal to the highest level of DOCS,It is possible to imagine cases in which the harm is done and no further administrative action could supply any “remedy.” . . . Suppose the prisoner breaks his leg and claims delay in setting the bone is cruel and unusual punishment. If the injury has healed by the time suit begins, nothing other than damages could be a “remedy,” and if the administrative process cannot provide compensation then there is no administrative remedy to exhaust.
Nonetheless, the defendants persist in arguing that Thornton‘s situation is no different from that in cases such as Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), which hold that futility is not an excuse for the failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Booth, however, does not help the defendants. In Booth, the Supreme Court considered whether the requirement to exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” required an inmate seeking only money damages to “complete а prison administrative process that could provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated, but no money.” 532 U.S. at 734 (emphasis added). Before filing suit in federal court, the inmate had filed an administrative grievance. In it, he sought several forms of injunctive relief and money damages, but as in Illinois, the state grievance process did not provide for money damages. The prison authority denied his request for relief, and the inmate did not seek further review even though the state provided for such process. The Supreme Court held that although the prison administrаtive process could not provide monetary compensation as relief, the inmate was still required to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Booth‘s holding does not speak to Thornton‘s circumstances. Unlike here, there was in Booth still the possibility of some relief that prison officials could have offered that might have satisfied the inmate. As we have said, here, though, the inmate already received what he requested in his grievances. If anything, Booth supports Thornton‘s position. The Court made it a point to stаte that in the case
The defendants also point to policy considerations behind the PLRA‘s exhaustion requirement and contend that these policies can only be served by requiring an inmate like Thornton to continue to seek higher review in the administrative chain. In particular, the defendants stress that a grievance can put prison officials on notice of a systemic problem that, once remedied, will allow them to avoid similar complaints in the future. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 524. Therefore, the defendants argue, an inmate in Thornton‘s situation should be required to pursue further administrative review. We do not agree with the defendants’ logic. Thornton submitted grievances, so prison officials were on notice of his complaints, and we do not think it Thornton‘s responsibility to notify persons higher in the chain when this notification would be solely for the benefit of the prison administration. Moreover, appealing a favorable result risks reversal. And reversals of once favorable results would tend to increase, not decrease, the number of inmate suits, running counter to another recognized policy behind the PLRA‘s exhaustion requirement, “to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” See Porter, 534 U.S. at 524.
In short, the defendants’ notion that Thornton should have appealed to higher channels after receiving the relief he requested in his grievances is not only counterintuitive, but it is not required by the PLRA. Accordingly, we find that Thornton exhausted his administrative remedies, and we reverse the district court‘s entry of
B. Trial by Videoconference
Thornton also contends that the district court abused its discretion when it conducted the jury trial of his remaining civil rights claim by videoconference and did not аllow Thornton to be physically present in the courtroom. The civil, not criminal, nature of Thornton‘s trial is important. Although due process prohibits the denial of access to the courts, a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to attend the jury trial of his civil rights claim involving the conditions of his confinement. Jones v. Hamelman, 869 F.2d 1023, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1989); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). Rather, the district court has discretion to determine whether a prison inmate can attend court proceedings in connection with an action initiated by the inmate, and we rеview the district court‘s decision to conduct the trial by videoconference for an abuse of discretion. See Stone, 546 F.2d at 735.
In Stone, we counseled that the lack of a constitutional right to attend a civil action did not warrant summary exclusion of an inmate plaintiff from his trial. Id. at 730. “Rather the trial court must weigh the interest of the plaintiff in presenting his testimony in person against the interest of the state in maintaining the confinement of the plaintiff-prisoner.” Id.
Clearly, a jury trial conducted by videoconference is not the same as a trial where the witnesses testify in the same room as the jury. Videoconference proceedings have their shortcomings. “[V]irtual reality is rarely a substitute for actual presence and . . . even in an age of advancing technology, watching an event on the screen remains less
Despite the limitations videoconferencing provides, challenges to videoconference proceedings have been rejected in other civil contexts. See Rusu v. U.S. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting challenge to asylum proceeding conducted by videoconference); United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837 (4th Cir. 1995) (same in civil commitment proceeding); cf. Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 301 (finding sentencing by videoconference violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43‘s requirement that criminal defendant be present at sentencing). No circuit court has yet published an opinion addressing the decision to conduct an inmate‘s civil rights trial by videoconference. Cf. Edwards, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (grant by district court of state‘s request to conduct inmate‘s § 1983 claim by videоconference despite videoconferencing‘s shortcomings).
The PLRA does not prohibit the use of videoconferencing at trial. Nor does
The Advisory Committee Notes to this rule recognize the shortcomings of contemporaneous transmission and emphasize the importance of presenting live testimony in court.2In every trial, the testimony of witnesses shall betaken in open court, unless a federal law, these
rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Cоurt provide otherwise. The court may, for good cause shown in compelling circumstances and upon appropriate safeguards, permit presentation of testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.
The limitations videoconferencing presents demonstrate that the decision to deny a prisoner the opportunity to be physically present at a civil rights trial he initiates is not one that should be taken lightly. Nonetheless, this decision remains within the district court‘s discretion, and our recognition of videoconferencing‘s limitations does not mean that Thornton was denied due process. In this case, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in conducting the trial by videoconference.
First, we cannot say the district court abused its disсretion in finding good cause to conduct the trial by
Appropriate safeguards were also in place during the trial. The jury, seated in the courtroom, viewed a four-way screen that showed the judge, Thornton, the witness,3 and the defendants’ counsel. Thornton and the jury were also able to see and hear everyone at the same time. Each witness testified under oath and was subject to cross-examination.
In addition, because Thornton was acting pro se, he did not have counsel forced to choose between being in the same room as his cliеnt and thus not in the same room as the judge and jury, or remaining in the courtroom with the judge and jury and thus unable to confer in person with his client. Cf. Rusu, 296 F.3d at 323. We also note the relatively straightforward nature of his claim that he had been denied
Finally, Thornton has not identified anything he was unable to do via videoconference that he could have done had he been physically present in the courtroom. He presented twelve witnesses, including himself. In addition, he delivered an opening and closing statement, offered other evidence, and cross-examined witnesses. Moreover, although he points to minor technical issues, the record reflects that they were small in number and quickly resolved. In this case, then, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in conducting the trial by videoconference.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court‘s grant of summary judgment on Thornton‘s cell conditiоns claims. We AFFIRM the judgment in favor of the defendants on his denial of yard exercise claim.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
USCA-02-C-0072—11-3-05
Notes
This seg cell north 106 is in very poor shape. There appears to be human feces smeared on the walls covering most of the inside of the cell. It has a foul smell to it. The toliet leaks. There is 2 to 3 inches of water on the floor, it clearly has a sewer aroma to it. The water that comes from the sink is discolored it looks like rust water. The conditions of this mattress sir is so bad that there is no way that I can or will sleep on it. Its stained and its got a piss smell to it . . . . I can‘t even eat cuz of the smell in this cell. I‘ve already had several asthma attacks since I‘ve been back here. Sir please help this is just not right at all. . . . Please I beg of you before I contract some major health problems get me out of here.
Contemporaneous transmission of testimony from a different location is permitted only on showing good causе in compelling circumstances. The importance of presenting live testimony in court cannot be forgotten. The very ceremony of trial and the presence of the factfinder may exert a powerful force for truthtelling. The opportunity to judge the demeanor of a witness face-to-face is accorded great value in our tradition. Transmission cannot be justified merely by showing that it is inconvenient for the witness to attend the trial.