76 So. 732 | Miss. | 1917
delivered the opinion of the court.
J. M. O’Quin & Sons, appellees, were lumber manufacturers and dealers, and the Thornton-Claney Lumber Company was a corporation doing business at Chicago, 111., and engaged in the buying and selling of lumber. The agent of the Thornton-Claney Company went to the appellees to buy about two hundred fifty, thousand feet of lumber then on the yard of appellees. An order was written out and signed by the agent of appellant and the appellees, but the order was signed immediately before the arrival of a train, and the appellees claimed not to have read the order, but signed it hastily so the agent of appellant could catch the train. They claim that when the copy of the order was returned to them, about a week after the signing, that it did not contain the agreement as actually agreed upon, and they refused to ship - the lumber. The appellant claims to have bought the lumber at nine dollars per thousand, and testified that the order was written as agreed, and was returned the following day. The appellees refusing to deliver the lumber, appellant filed a bill in the chancery court alleging the contract, and making the order signed by O ’Quin & Sons an exhibit thereto, alleged the buying of the lumber, and that because of the peculiar facts, and of the various grades of lumber included in the order, there should be an accounting, and prayed for an injunction against the sale of the lumber by appellee, and an injunction writ was issued. A demurrer was filed to the bill and sustained by the court, from which an appeal was taken to this court, and the decree affirmed here. There was no motion to dissolve the injunction.
After the decree was affirmed here, appellees, 0 ’Quin ;& Sons, filed a suggestion of damages in the chancery court, but the appellant refused to appear for some
On the trial the evidence as to attorney’s fees showed that one hundre’d dollars was a reasonable fee for the original hearing on the demurrer in the court below; and that seventy-five, dollars was a reasonable fee for prosecuting the appeal here. The court also allowed one hundred dollars for feeding oxen for a reasonable time after suing out the injunction, and also allowed one hundred and twenty-five dollars attorney’s fee in the.present.suit.
It seems there were approximately two hundred and fifty thousand feet of lumber on hand at the time the injunction was sued out, and that two hundred and twenty-five thousand feet of this lumber was contracted to be sold to another party by appellee, at ten dollars and fifty cents per thou
We think the measure of damages in this case would be the amount of attorney’s fees expended in' the first suit, the amount appearing to be one hundred and seventy-five dollars, but no allowance should be made for services in the present suit, as it has
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.