57 Wash. 441 | Wash. | 1910
Tins is a suit in equity brought for the purpose of annulling a marriage on the alleged ground of duress. At
The duress alleged in the complaint is that an attorney and a police officer, at the instance of the respondent, for the purpose of coercing and intimidating the appellant to enter into a marriage contract with the respondent, made threats to the appellant, “that they would continue and complete a certain criminal action then pending, wherein the plaintiff was charged with criminal seduction of a female under the age of eighteen years, and that said defendant was the female referred to; that the respondent wrongfully charged that the appellant was the father of an unborn child of which she was soon to be delivered; that a warrant had been issued and was in the hands of the officer; that she placed the appellant under arrest in virtue of the warrant-, and compelled him by fear of a criminal prosecution to enter into the marriage relation; that she represented to the appellant that she was under the age of eighteen years, when in fact she was of the age of nineteen years.” The respondent joined issue on the allegations of duress and misrepresentation.
Our statute, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 7162, provides that a marriage is voidable at the suit of the injured party “when the consent of either party shall be obtained by force or fraud.” The statute does not define the kind or degree of force or fraud required to annul a marriage. Similar statutes, however, have been construed as being merely jurisdictional, and to mean that kind of force and fraud defined by the unwritten law applicable to marriage contracts. Franke v. Franke (Cal.), 31 Pac. 571, 18 L. R. A. 375; Bishop, Marriage & Divorce, §§ 475, 478; Foss w. Foss, 12 Allen 26.
The record discloses, that the appellant was twenty-six years of age at the time of the marriage; that the day preceding the marriage an attorney and a police officer, or one believed by the appellant to be such, called upon the appellant at the place where he was working; that the attorney
“Threats and acts of intimidation do not necessarily prove duress, and where the party was under a moral obligation to enter into or discharge a contract, the presumption is that he acted from a sense of moral duty, and this presumption should be weighed in the scale against the evidence of duress, . . . ”
Assuming that there was a constructive arrest, there is another ground upon which a court of equity will decline to annul the marriage. If a man lawfully arrested on process for seduction, the prosecution being based upon probable cause, marries the woman to procure his discharge, he cannot annul the marriage upon the ground of duress. Marvin v. Marvin, 52 Ark. 425, 12 S. W. 875, 20 Am. St. 191; Jackson v. Winne, 7 Wend. 47, 22 Am. Dec. 563; Sickles v. Carson, 26 N. J. Eq. 440.
“A marriage brought about by force, duress, abduction, or terror under threats may be annulled. But these influences must have been brought to bear by the other contracting party or with his procurement or connivance. And threats of any legal or penal measures authorized by law and the circumstances of the case will not invalidate the contract. Thus, in particular, if a man under lawful arrest for seduction or bastardy, the complaint being based on probable cause, chooses to marry the woman as a means of obtaining his release and terminating the proceedings against him, he cannot allege duress as a ground for annulling the marriage. But it is otherwise if the prosecution was maliciously instituted and without probable cause, or if the accused, being pliant and inexperienced, is bullied by the magistrate and yields under threats of more severe penalties than the law allows.” 26 Cyc. 906, 907.
Not only does the moral obligation of the appellant appear from the complaint by clear implication, as we have seen, but the respondent in her answer admits that she represented to the appellant that she was with child by him, and
The decree is affirmed.
Rudkin, C. J., Fullerton, Chadwick, and Morris, JJ., concur.