MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION OR CERTIFICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW
On July 11, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s April 28, 2006 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See PI. Mot. for Recons. In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek an order certifying their preliminary injunction motion for interlocutory review. Id. at 4. For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is denied. In addition, the court also has determined that interlocutory appeal is not appropriate in this case.
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 27, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a pro se Complaint, seeking injunctive and monetary relief, stemming from of the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Treasury (collectively “the Government”)’s tax collection activities. See Compl. at 1-7. On February 27, 2006, Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, pursuant to RCFC 65(a), asserting that the Government engaged in collection activities, including federal tax hen(s) and levy of wages, salary and other income, that: deprived Plaintiffs of “property, rights to property, and rights to opportunities to acquire property!!;]” made Plaintiffs “the victim of publication of irreparable derogatory (slanderous & defamatory) reports in public records by Defendants!!;]” and adversely affected Plaintiffs’ credit and financial reputations. See PI. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 3-4; see also PI. Proposed Prelim. Inj. at 3. Plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin the Government from:
1) Conducting any tax collection activity against Plaintiffs) during the pendens of this action;
2) Issuing, maintaining, publishing, or continuing the publication of any derogatory notices or claims (inclusive of “NOTICE OF LIEN” and “NOTICE OF LEVY ... ”) relating to Plaintiffs; [and]
3) This injunction shall have the effect, when recorded, of voiding any and all evidences and/or notices of claims, liens and/or levies relating to Plaintiffs[.]
See PL Proposed Prelim. Inj. at 4 (alteration and underlining in original).
On April 5, 2005, the Government filed an Opposition, by leave of the court. See Gov’t Resp. to Pl. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. On April 28, 2006, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction was denied, because the court does not have jurisdiction to issue the injunction that Plaintiffs seek. See Ct. Order, Thorndike v. United States, No. 06-149T (Fed.Cl. April 28, 2006). On May 16, 2006,
On July 11, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration. See PI. Mot. for Recons. In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek an order certifying for interlocutory review Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Id. at 4. On July 28, 2006, the Government filed an Opposition. See Gov’t Resp. to PL Mot. for Recons.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Reconsideration Of The Court’s April 28, 2006 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion For A Preliminary Injunction.
Plaintiffs assert that reconsideration is required for two reasons.
INLAW
1. Declaratory Judgment that Defendants have not established an administrative record upon which any tax obligation could lie.
2. Declaratory Judgment that there is no signed 23C Assessment form in the Defendants’ records upon which any tax is assessed upon which collection activity could lawfully occur.
3. Declaratory Judgment that Plaintiff is not a “taxpayer” as Congress uses that term in publishing the Internal Revenue Code.
4. Declaratory [J]udgment that Plaintiff has no outstanding tax obligation.
AND UPON DECLARATION OF THE LAW, IN EQUITY:
5. Enjoin the Defendants from any further tax collection and/or enforcement activities as it relates to Plaintiff for any tax year ending before the entry of judgment in this action.
*583 6. Enjoin the Defendants from any tax collection and/or enforcement action relating to the Plaintiff without first complying with constitutional due process requirements of a) serving upon the Plaintiff evidence of Plaintiffs involvement in a privileged activity within a geographical venue for which Congress has express legislative jurisdiction; b) execution of a 23C Assessment against Plaintiff based upon evidence of income from a source identified in section “a”; and c) a determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and upon due process, that Plaintiff is a “taxpayer” as that term is used by Congress’ publication of the Internal Revenue Code.
7. Restitution in an amount to be determined by the court of not less than $5000.00 plus the costs and legal expenses of prosecuting this action.
Compl. at 11-12 (bold omitted).
The court, however, does not have jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgment, where such relief is the primary focus of the suit. See Rice v. United States,
Plaintiffs also argue that “[t]he cases cited by the court as the precedent basis for its [April 28, 2006] decision are inapplicable based upon the facts appearing as a matter of the reeord[.]” PI. Mot. for Recons, at 2-3 (citing Rice; Brown; and Betz v. United States,
Plaintiffs also argue that Rice is inapplicable, because “Plaintiffs’ [Cjomplaint seeks substantial money damages for tort injuries resulting from the unlawful (collection) activities of persons acting under color of federal jurisdiction, a factual scenario that does not invoke RICE.” PI. Mot. for Recons, at 3 (emphasis in original).
B. Certification For Interlocutory Appeal.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs request that the court enter an order certifying their preliminary injunction for interlocutory review. See Pl. Mot. for Recons. at 4 (“Provide Plaintiff [sic] a final appealable interlocutory order upon which Plaintiff [sic] may appeal the denial of protection for [sic] the United States Treasury.”).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over “final decisions] of the United States Court of Federal Claims.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims.”). A decision is final when it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States,
Congress established a three-part test to determine whether a question may be certified for interlocutory appeal. First, it must concern “a controlling question of law.” Id. Second, the question must be one “with respect to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Id. Finally, the question must be such that “an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Id. Based on this multi-part test, the United States Supreme Court has instructed trial judges that interlocutory appeals are reserved only for “exceptional cases.” See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,
1. The Court’s Jurisdiction To Award The Equitable Relief That Plaintiffs’ Request Is Not A Controlling Question Of Law.
A controlling question of law is one that “materially affect[s] issues remaining to be decided in the trial court.” Jaynes v. United States,
2. There Is No Substantial Ground For Disagreement As To The Statutory Interpretation.
In order to certify a question for interlocutory appeal, there also must be a “substantial ground for difference of opinion.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2); see also Caterpillar,
The Federal Circuit has held that one basis for this ‘substantial ground’ may be two different, but plausible, interpretations of a line of cases. More often, however, this criterion manifests itself as splits among the circuit courts, an intraeircuit conflict, or a conflict between an earlier circuit precedent and a later Supreme Court case, or, at very least, a substantial difference of opinion among judges of this court.
In this case, Plaintiffs have proposed one interpretation of the court’s authority to issue injunctive relief and the Government has proposed another. The court has not identified any precedent to support Plaintiffs’ interpretation. Therefore, this case does not present any of the bases that have been recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as a “substantial ground” for disagreement. Accordingly, the court has determined that the second requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2) has not been met.
3. An Interlocutory Appeal Will Not Materially Advance the Ultimate Termination of this Litigation.
Finally, to be certified for interlocutory appeal, the resolution of the question must “materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2). If every case was considered to meet the standard of “materially advancing] the ultimate determination of this litigation,” the policy limiting interlocutory appeal to “exceptional cases” would be severely eroded. See Caterpillar,
For example, certification is appropriate when the court determines that the resolution of the issue certified for interlocutory appeal could result in the “entire lawsuit ... be[ing] dismissed[.]” Vereda, Ltda. v. United States,
In this case, the court is not persuaded that this case warrants certification for interlocutory appeal. Neither of the situations presented above is relevant here. Plaintiffs have made no arguments regarding this issue for the court to consider. See PI. Mot. for Recons, at 4. Regardless of the Federal Circuit’s decision on this particular question, the court will still be required to rule on the Government’s Motion to Dismiss, as well as, potentially, a determination of the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claims. If the court were to certify this question, the policies behind interlocutory appeal, judicial efficiency and avoiding piecemeal litigation, would be severely eroded. See Pause Tech.,
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiffs’ July 11, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration hereby is DENIED. The court also declines to certify the question raised by Plaintiffs for interlocutory appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. On May 17, 2006, the Government filed a Motion to Dismiss. See Gov’t Mot. Dis. On June 8, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition. See PI. Resp. to Gov’t Mot. Dis. On June 22, 2006, the Government filed a Reply. See Gov’t Reply. The court will issue a separate order regarding the Government's Motion to Dismiss in September 2006.
. Rule 59 of the United States Court of Federal Claims affords the court discretion to grant reconsideration "to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the reasons established by the rules of common law or equity applicable as between private parties in the courts of the United States.” RCFC 59(a)(1); see also Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States,
. PI. Reply to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 3-4 (capitalization omitted).
. Assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief was not the primary focus of Plaintiffs' suit, nevertheless, the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 prevents the court from granting equitable relief. Subject to several enumerated exceptions that are not applicable in this case, the Anti-Injunction Act provides:
[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).
. To the extent the Complaint in this case could be construed to plead a tort claim, such a claim also would be beyond the jurisdiction granted to this court by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."); see also Brown,