123 Iowa 313 | Iowa | 1903
Lead Opinion
This case was decided in the lower court prior to any of the decisions under the provisions of the Code of 1897 and amendments thereto, relating to the enforcement of taxes on property concealed or omitted from assessment. The decisions of this court rendered since that time have disposed of all the fundamental questions involved in this appeal. See Galusha v. Wendt, 114 Iowa, 597; Lambe v. McCormick, 116 Iowa, 169; Bell v. Stevens, 116 Iowa, 457; Beresheim v. Arnd, 117 Iowa, 83; Mead’s Estate v. Story County, 119 Iowa, 69; Siberling v. Croper, 119 Iowa, 420.
A brief statement of the application of these decisions to the present case, so far as any questions of doubt are involved, is all that is necessary. The points to be considered are: First. From what time should the five-year limitation provided for in Code, section 1374, oh the right of the treasurer to collect taxes on concealed or omitted property, be computed? Second. Can the auditor, under Code, section 1385, and chapter 47, page 31, Acts 28th General Assembly assess concealed or omitted property, without limitation of time ?'
Rehearing
Opinion on Rehearing, Wednesday, Maroii 9, 1904.
After the original opinion was filed in this case, counsel for appellee presented a petition for a rehearing, in which they called our attention to one point which was overlooked on the original submission. That had reference to the failure of the plaintiff Thornburg, as treasurer of Dallas county, to list or assess defendant Cardell’s property before bringing suit. Plaintiff Thornburg alleged in his original petition that he had made demand of said defendant Cardell for the payment of the taxes sought to be recovered with interest, and that defendant failed and refused to pay the same. One of the grounds of defendant’s demurrer to this petition was that “no assessment of said property had been made, and that no tax could legally be levied or collected without an assessment.” This point was overlooked when writing the former opinion, and a rehearing was granted as to appellant Thornburg on the proposition as to whether or not an assessment was necessary under Code, section 1374, as amended by chapter 50, page 33, Acts 28th General Assembly, before an action could be brought to recover taxes on property omitted from taxation. During the trial in the
But it is argued that notice and an opportunity to be heard were not essential to the validity of the assessment, and that in no event has the defendant suffered any injury or prejudice by reason of plaintiff’s failure to give the same. This view overlooks the fundamental proposition that it is not a question of injury or prejudice to the defendant, but of right in the plaintiff to maintain the action. Unless there was a valid assessment under the law, there was no right of action in the plaintiff, and he cannot recover. At the time this action was brought, notice and opportunity to be heard were essential to the validity of the assessment, and these absent there was no assessment.
The cases cited by appellant Thornburg on these propositions are not in point. In none of them was there any such statutory requirement as to notice as appears in chapter 50, page 33, Acts 28th General Assembly. Our Legislature has seen fit to require notice, and the requisite steps must be followed, to make a valid assessment.
This disposes of the appeal as to the appellant Thorn-burg, and it follows that as to him the judgment must be affirmed. t
The result of the whole matter is that the demurrer to the plaintiff Thornburg’s petition was properly sustained, and that the demurrers to the cross-petitions of Webster and Kossuth counties should have been overruled. The case, as to these two last mentioned counties, will he reversed, and the cause remanded to the district court for such further proceedings as may he necessary with reference to taxes'for the years 1896 and 1897. The defendant Car dell will pay two thirds of the costs of this appeal, and the plaintiff Thornburg one third.
Aeeiemed in part, and reversed in part.