Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a judgment of no cause of action in favor of defendants following a jury trial and from the trial court’s denial of their motion for a new trial.
Plaintiff Howard Thon was employed by Faulkner Construction Company in latе 1973, during which time Faulkner was engaged in a renovation project for defendant Dow Corning Corporation. Plaintiffs alleged that while Mr. Thon was performing work at the Dow plant, he was injured when he inhaled fumes while mixing paint which was used in the project. The paint was manufactured by defendant Saginaw Paint Manufacturing Company. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged negligencе against Dow and negligence and breach of warranty against Saginaw.
Plaintiffs first complain that the trial court reversibly еrred by instructing the jury that it could consider Mr. Thon’s comparative negligence in determining liability. In support of that position, рlaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Funk v General Motors Corp,
Plaintiffs next complain that the instructions on comparative negligence wеre unduly repetitive. We find this claim to be without merit. Although we agree that error may result where the instructions to the jury are unnеcessarily repetitive and argumentative,
Mack v Precast Industries, Inc,
Plaintiffs also complain that the comparative negligence instructions were not modeled after the style of the Standard Jury Instructions as required by GCR 1963, 516.6(4). This claim is also meritless. At the time the trial took place in this matter, no Standard Jury Instruction had been adopted con *749 cerning comparative negligence. The instruction given by the trial court informed the jury that it was their duty to determine whether Mr. Thon failed to exercise the care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the circumstances and, if so, whether his acts or omissiоns were a proximate cause of his injuries. The court also stated that a finding of negligence on the part of Mr. Thоn did not bar plaintiffs’ recovery. Finally, the court instructed the jury that, if they found that Mr. Thon was negligent, they were to determine the рercentage of negligence attributable to Mr. Thon and to reduce recovery by that percentage. In оur opinion, these instructions were in the style of the Standard Jury Instructions and were not argumentative. See SJI 10.02, 11.01.
Plaintiffs next complain that the trial court erred by refusing to rule, as a matter of law, that Dow exercised a sufficient degree of control over Faulkner so that liability could be imposed. We disagree. It is well established that an owner of land cannot bе held liable for injuries to employees of a contractor to whom he has delegated the task of perfоrming work on the property unless the owner retains control of the manner in which the work is performed, or unless the aсtivity constitutes a nondelegable duty.
Funk v General Motors Corp, supra,
p 101;
Warren v McLouth Steel Corp,
In the present case, the agreement entered into between the рarties placed a sufficient degree of control on Dow so that a prima facie case of negligence on the part of Dow was established. However, since the agreement did not place responsibility on Dоw to control the day-to-day operations of Faulkner, and since other evidence was presented on this issuе which raised a question of fact concerning the degree of control which Dow exercised, the trial court was correct in submitting this issue to the jury.
Plaintiffs finally contend that the activity in which Mr. Thon was engaged was inherently dangerous and that, therefore, it constituted a nondelegable duty. They contend that because their expert testified that the work was inherently dangerous, and because that testimony was uncontroverted, the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on that issue.
In
Brown v Unit Products Corp,
" 'According to 65 CJS, Negligence, § 66, p 944, fn 35.25: "The term 'inherently dangerous’ means that type of danger which inhеres in the instrumentality or condition itself at all times, thereby requiring special precautions to be taken with respeсt to it to prevent injury”.
" 'Where the activity being analyzed is "inherently dangerous” is thus a question of fact to be determined by the jury.’ ”
In the present case, Dr. Floyd Van Atta, plain
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tiffs’ expert, testified that it was his opinion that the activity in which Mr. Thon was engaged "could be” classified as an inherently dangerous activity. Plaintiffs correctly point out that defendants’ expert did not testify that the activity was not inherently dangerous. Howеver, Dr. Van At-ta’s testimony was based upon a hypothetical set of circumstances posed by plaintiffs’ attorney. Although the facts which served as the basis for the hypothetical question did have factual support in the form of testimony оf other witnesses, that testimony was disputed. Furthermore, the testimony of Dr. Van Atta embraced the ultimate issue which was to be dеcided. Although the testimony of an expert is not objectionable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue, MRE 704, the jury is not bound by that testimony. See,
e.g., Ruddock v Lodise,
Therefore, it was for the jury to resolve the underlying factual dispute, and the trial court was correct in refusing plaintiffs’ request.
Affirmed. Costs to defendants.